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Using the Italian asylum system as a case study, this article lays bare the current
impasse in European asylum policy and underscores the injustice and inefficiencies
caused by the European Union (EU) Dublin Regulation. Deficiencies in the asylum
systems in EU states on the southern and eastern borders encourage asylum seekers to
flee from the EU states they enter first. In recognition of the dire conditions in some
asylum systems, the European Court of Human Rights has forbidden states to rely on
the Dublin Regulation to send asylum seekers back to the first state for a decision on
the asylum application. Instead, states that apprehend asylum seekers must provide
the applicants an opportunity to contest their return by presenting evidence that the
first EU state they entered has a deficient asylum system. This creates opportunities
for satellite litigation. It also creates perverse incentives for member states to respond
to the Dublin Regulation proceedings by offering individualized relief to the liti-
gants rather than remedying system-wide deficits. This cumbersome procedure is inef-
ficient and imposes great human costs on individual asylum seekers ensnared in the
European system.
A bolder and simpler approach is necessary. In light of the massive refugee crisis
in the Mediterranean, the vastly uneven situations of asylum seekers in different EU
states, and the evolving European human rights norms, the current Dublin Regula-
tion should be suspended. More precisely, EU member states should examine asylum
applications with a presumption that the state with custody of the asylum seekers
will decide the asylum claim. Transfers pursuant to the Dublin Regulation should be
limited to exceptional cases involving family unity or other compelling humanitarian
reasons.
This reworking of the Dublin Regulation would instantly diminish the workload
on the EU asylum system. In recent years, close to twenty percent of asylum applica-
tions filed in Europe have led to transfer requests under the Dublin Regulation, but
very few actual transfers take place. Thus, most of the Dublin process is wasted
effort. Of the Dublin transfers that occur, many take place between states that send
and receive asylum seekers from one another. These states should decide the substance
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Law, University of
Trento (2013).
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of the applications rather than engage in an elaborate process of swapping asylum
seekers.
Suspending most Dublin transfers would allow asylum officials to redeploy their
resources to focus on the merits of the claims. It would benefit individual asylum
seekers who would experience shorter periods of uncertainty about their status. Moreo-
ver, suspending the Dublin Regulation could lead to the increased sharing of respon-
sibility among EU states for receiving asylum seekers.
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INTRODUCTION
Within sight of the island of Lampedusa,' fire destroyed an overloaded
fishing boat. As people rushed to escape the flames, the boat full of Eritrean
refugees capsized. All of those sleeping below deck were killed. Some of
those on deck, though they could not swim, landed in the water and man-
aged to stay afloat for several hours. At daylight, fishing boats and the
1. See Irene Tischenko, Lampedusa, LIFE IN ITALY (July 29, 2015), htup://www.lifeinitaly.com/tour
ism/sicily/lampedusa [https://perma.cc/X3DG-D8W9).
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Italian Coast Guard arrived at the scene. More than 350 people died in the
accident in October 2013, but 155 survived to claim asylum in Italy. 2 As
gruesome images flashed around the world, headlines told the story of the
migrants' deaths at Europe's door. Matteo Renzi, the Prime Minister of
Italy, called for a European summit,' and EU diplomats proposed military
operations to destroy ships used by migrant smuggling rings.4 This trag-
edy-and the lack of a coordinated European response to it-was an omen
of the humanitarian crisis that has unfolded in Europe in recent years.
Lampedusa, a small Italian island seventy miles off the Tunisian coast, is
a vacation destination. An isolated speck of natural beauty, where imposing
headlands meet the Mediterranean Sea, it features fresh seafood and sand
beaches. Lampedusa is also the nearest Italian landfall to North Africa and
is the entry point to Europe each year for thousands of asylum seekers
packed on rickety boats. Fifteen thousand landed on Lampedusa in 2013,
ten thousand from Eritrea alone,' a country infamous for its political pris-
oners and its years-long military conscription.6 In 2014, the numbers
skyrocketed: 170,000 asylum seekers crossed the Mediterranean to Italy.7
More than one million Syrians, Eritreans, and others fleeing repressive re-
gimes made the perilous crossing in 2015, and 153,000 of them landed in
Italy. 8
As more asylum seekers made their way across the Mediterranean, more
tragedies occurred. A ship overcrowded with migrants and asylum seekers
sank off the coast of Libya in April 2015, with 900 people locked in the
2. See Zed Nelson, Lampedusa Boat Tragedy: A Survivor's Story, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/22/lampedusa-boat-tragedy-migrants-africa [https://per
ma.cc/VHL2-JZBM}.
3. Italian Prime Minister Requests European Summit on Migrant Crisis, RTE NEWS (Apr. 20, 2015),
http://www.rte.ie/news/2015/0419/695113-malta-migrant-boat/ [https://perma.cc/RA8X-649J].
4. EU officials also promised that no refugees intercepted at sea would be sent back against their
will. See Somini Sengupta, E.U. Is Prepared to Combat Migrant Smugglers, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (May
11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/world/europe/eu-prepared-to-combat-migrant-smug
glers-diplomat-says.html [https://perma.cc/4AWH-7FGJ}.
5. Of the 14,753 boat people who landed on Lampedusa in 2013, 9,834 were from Eritrea. Id.
More than 170,000 arrived in Italy by sea in 2014; the largest contingents were Eritreans and Syrians.
U.N. High Comm'r of Refugees, So Close Yet So Far From Safety (Oct. 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocPDFViewer.html?docid= 54ad5 3b69&query= italy%20syria% 20eritrea
(https://perma.cc/88X6-GJNAJ.
6. See Nelson, supra note 2; U.S. DEPT OF STATE, ERITREA 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT (2013),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220321.pdf {https://perma.cc/3E4D-VVT9}; see also An-
nual Report: Eritrea 2013, AMNESTY INT L (May 23, 2013), http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/
annual-report-eritrea-2013 ?page=show [https://perma.cc/8LP8-8BDW}.
7. Elisabetta Povoledo, Migrants in Rome Try to Recover After Ponte Mammolo Camp is Destroyed, N.Y.
TIMES (May 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/16/world/europe/migrants-in-rome-try-to-re
cover-after-ponte-mammolo-camp-is-destroyed.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/E8DW-75FF].
8. The UN High Commissioner of Refugees reported that 1,015,078 migrants crossed the Medi-
terranean to Europe by boat in 2015, with 153,000 reaching Italy. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees,
Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response - Mediterranean (Mar. 1, 2016), http://data.unhcr.org/medirerranean/
country.php?id = 105 [https://perma.cc/ZRF7-EFGJ] [hereinafter UNHCR, Mediterranean Emergency
Response].
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hold and feared dead.9 That same week, a boat carrying 200 migrants
crashed into the rocks off the Greek island of Rhodes, while authorities in
Italy received distress calls that another ship with over 300 migrants was
sinking in the Mediterranean.' 0 In all, more than 3,700 people lost their
lives in the Mediterranean Sea in 2015 as they tried to reach safety in Eu-
rope." Finally, in September 2015, the EU responded to the mass arrivals
of desperate individuals. The EU Council agreed to redistribute 120,000
asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other member states, an agreement
opposed by four of the twenty-eight EU states.'" Notwithstanding the for-
mal agreement to assist asylum seekers in overwhelmed member states, the
lack of a sense of collective responsibility was evident. By the end of 2015,
only 144 asylum seekers had been officially relocated from Italy.' 3 The fate
of hundreds of thousands of other asylum seekers who have recently made
their way to Europe remains unresolved.
The large-scale humanitarian crisis has shone a spotlight on the increas-
ingly dysfunctional institution of asylum in Europe. Ten years after the
launch of the much-heralded Common European Asylum System (CEAS),' 4
the lack of common standards has seriously undermined the EU-wide ap-
proach. Glaring differences between the asylum systems in EU states on the
southern and eastern borders and those in the west encourage asylum seek-
ers to flee the EU states they enter first. In recognition of the inhuman and
degrading conditions in some asylum facilities, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) has forbidden European states from automatically
relying on the Dublin Regulation," which is the EU mechanism for trans-
ferring asylum seekers between member states. The ECtHR requires na-
tional tribunals to afford asylum seekers an opportunity to present evidence
of deficient asylum systems in the EU states into which they entered. Re-
9. Jim Yardley, Rising Toll on Migrants Leaves Europe in Crisis; 900 May Be Dead at Sea, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/world/europe/european-union-immigration-mi
grant-ship-capsizes.html [https://perma.cc/H38L-E6J5].
10. AFP, Migrant Boat Disaster: EU Proposes a 10 Point Crisis Plan Following Hundreds of Deaths in the
Mediterranean, NEWS.COM.AU (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.news.com.au/world/europe/migrant-boat-
disaster-eu-proposes-10-point-crisis-plan-following-hundreds-of-deaths-in-the-mediterranean/story-
fnh8lp7g-1227312713630 (htrps://perma.cc/N6AD-6WNP).
11. U.N. High Comm'r of Refugees, Italy Sea Arrivals, UNHCR Update #4 (Dec. 2015), https://
data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/download.php?id= 528 (https://perma.cc/S6H9-M5ZG}.
12. Council Decision 1523/2015, 2015 O.J. (L 239) 146 (relocating 24,000 asylum seekers from
Italy); Council Decision 1601/2015, 2015 O.J. (L 248) 80 (relocating 15,500 asylum seekers from
Italy); see James Kanter, The Migrant Crisis in Europe: Readers' Questions Answered Crisis, N.Y. TIMEs (Sept.
27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/28/world/europe/refugee-crisis-europe-syria.html [https://
perma.cc/E9GF-ZSYW1.
13. MARIA DE DONATO, ASYLUM INFO. DATABASE, COUNTRY REPORT: ITALY (2015), htrp://www
.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/italy [https://perma.cc/M63P-LT22) [hereinafter COUNTRY
REPORT).
14. Common European Asylum System, EUR. COMM'N (June 23, 2015), http://ec.europa.euidgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/indexen.htm [https://perma.cc/S63K-5F5T].
15. Council Regulation 343/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1 (EC) (establishing the criteria and mecha-
nisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one
of the member states by a third-country national) [hereinafter Dublin II}.
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cent EU legislation has acknowledged the need to improve the Dublin Reg-
ulation and has added greater procedural safeguards to it. 1 6 Unfortunately,
the amended Dublin Regulation, together with the evolving European
human rights jurisprudence, has created a more cumbersome approach
likely to impose greater costs on the individual asylum seekers ensnared in
the European system. Rather than focusing on a thorough and efficient ex-
amination of the merits of the asylum claims, these new developments en-
courage EU states to devote more attention and effort to ancillary issues.' 7
Furthermore, a recent ECtHR judgment has created perverse incentives for
member states to provide individualized relief to litigants whose cases reach
the ECtHR rather than focusing on improving system-wide deficiencies in
their asylum systems.'
A bolder and simpler approach is warranted. At this juncture, in light of
the massive refugee crisis in the Mediterranean, the vastly uneven situations
of asylum seekers in different EU states, and the evolving European human
rights norms, the current Dublin Regulation should be suspended. More
precisely, EU member states should examine asylum applications with a
presumption that the state with custody of the asylum seekers will decide
the asylum claim. Transfers pursuant to the Dublin Regulation should be
limited to exceptional cases involving family unity or other compelling hu-
manitarian reasons.
This reworking of the Dublin Regulation would diminish the workload
of the EU asylum system. In recent years, close to twenty percent of asylum
applications filed in Europe have led to transfer requests under the Dublin
Regulation." However, very few actual transfers take place: only one-fifth
of the requests result in transfers.2 0 Eighty percent of the Dublin process
fails to address the underlying issue. Furthermore, many of the Dublin
transfers that take place are between states that send and receive asylum
seekers to and from one another. 2 1 It would be more efficient for the states
16. Council Regulation 604/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31 (EU) [hereinafter Dublin III (establishing
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for examining an application
for international protection lodged in one of the member states by a third-country national or a stateless
person).
17. For example, pursuant to M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, 2011-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 255, EU states must
thoroughly evaluate the system-wide inadequacies in asylum procedures and conditions before transfer-
ring asylum seekers to another country that may be responsible for evaluating the substance of the
asylum claims. See infra text accompanying notes 274-299.
18. See Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, Eur. Cc. H.R. (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.in/eng?i=001-148070#{"itemid":("001-148070"I} (https://perma.cc/76ZV-FUBK) (prohibiting trans-
fer pursuant to the Dublin Regulation without assurance of reception conditions in receiving country
suitable for family with minor children).
19. SUSAN FRATZKE, MIGRATION POLICY INST. EUR., NOT ADDING UP: THE FADING PROMISE OF
EUROPE'S DUBLIN SYSTEM 6 (2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/defaule/files/publications/
MPle-Asylum-DublinReg.pdf Lhttps://perma.cc/2KDC-NUKQ}.
20. Id. at 11.
21. Id. at 13.
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to decide the substance of the applications submitted to them, rather than
engaging in an elaborate process to swap asylum seekers.
In addition to eliminating the wasted effort, suspending most Dublin
transfers would allow asylum officials to redeploy their resources to focus on
the substance of the asylum claims. This would permit them to decide more
quickly which applicants qualify for asylum or other forms of protection
and which do not. Curtailing satellite transfer litigation-along with the
attendant individualized hearings and appellate review-would save states
time and money. It would also benefit individual asylum seekers by expe-
diting the decisions on their requests for protection and thus more quickly
eliminate uncertainty about their status.
Furthermore, resources redeployed from Dublin hearings, receiving
transferees, and reintegrating them into the receiving states' asylum sys-
tems could be used more productively. They could be invested in improv-
ing systemic weaknesses in a state's asylum process, thus assuring better
treatment to current and future arrivals. Sustained efforts to shore up and
recalibrate the weaker asylum systems in the states along the EU periphery
is one way to create a more equal and more just EU asylum system.
Suspending the Dublin Regulation could also have a profound impact on
EU member states' commitment to sharing responsibility for the reception
of asylum seekers in the EU. Most asylum seekers subject to Dublin trans-
fers have traveled from the coastal and frontier states of the EU into the
interior. 22 Requiring EU states to decide the asylum applications submitted
by asylum seekers physically present in their national territory would result
in a larger number of asylum claims being determined by EU states that are
distant from the periphery. This would, in effect, spread responsibility more
broadly within the EU. Indeed, this scenario is exactly what occurred when
hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers sought refuge in Europe in the
summer of 2015. Germany temporarily suspended the Dublin Regulation,
chose not to spend time and resources requesting states on the EU periph-
ery to assume responsibility, and evaluated the asylum claims for the appli-
cants who had arrived in Germany. As will be explained in the following
pages, European human rights law required this result. Germany's suspen-
sion of the Dublin Regulation was a harbinger of the future.
This Article lays bare the current impasse in the CEAS. Focusing on
Italy-an EU member state on the southern frontier of immigration-as a
case study, this Article illuminates the injustice and inefficiencies caused by
the Dublin Regulation. Part I begins with an overview of the CEAS. It
discusses, in particular, the Dublin Regulation and the Reception Condi-
tions Directive, the two components most directly implicated by the flight
of the Lampedusa survivors and other asylum seekers from Italy northward
into the heart of Europe. Part II examines the Italian asylum system and the
22. See, e.g., id. at 9-10 (explaining that many asylum seekers arrive in Germany and Sweden from
the border states of Greece and Italy).
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impact of EU asylum law on Italy. Here, the Article pays special attention
to transfers requested pursuant to the Dublin Regulation and to the accom-
modations provided to applicants for protection.
Part III turns to the limits that European human rights law places on
transfers of asylum seekers to different EU member states. These limits
include the non-refoulement prohibition and its application by the ECtHR to
curtail transfers of asylum seekers to European states where the individuals
would face a serious risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. The Article
argues that the judgment of the ECtHR in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece23
fractured the CEAS by ruling that EU member states cannot rely on the
Dublin Regulation to return asylum seekers to sister EU states with seri-
ously flawed asylum systems.
Part IV shows that the M.S.S. decision not only effectively halted public
transfers of asylum seekers to Greece, but also had far wider consequences.
It mandated a fact-intensive examination into each individual case of an
asylum seeker ordered to depart from one EU member state to another. In
light of M.S.S., a growing number of national courts have concluded that
European human rights law prevents the return of asylum seekers to Italy,
the major Mediterranean gateway into the EU. 24 Challenges to the Dublin
Regulation again reached the ECtHR. In late 2014 in Tarakhel v. Switzer-
land,23 the ECtHR concluded that unsatisfactory Italian reception condi-
tions precluded Switzerland from relying on the Dublin Regulation to
return asylum seekers to Italy. 2 6
Part V examines the recent legislative amendments to the Dublin Regu-
lation and the Reception Conditions Directive. It notes that new procedural
safeguards will likely increase delays in the process, complicating and exac-
erbating the problems involved in transferring asylum seekers between
countries. It also analyzes the statistical information and reveals that the
Dublin system has required an inordinate amount of effort for a paltry
result.
The Article concludes that the common European asylum system is an
illusion. Worse, the current CEAS framework guarantees a proliferation of
23. M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255.
24. E.g., Verwaltungsgeright [VG] [Administrative Trial Court} Jan. 24 2013, 2013 OPENJUR
5398 (Get.), https://openjur.de/u/601080.html [https://perma.cc/9UUE-RMET] (refusing to return Er-
itrean asylum seekers with small children to Italy where they had been homeless after applying for
asylum); Verwaltungsgeright [VGJ [Administrative Trial Court) Feb. 21 2013, 2A 126/11 (Get.),
http://www.rechtsprechung.niedersachsen.de/jportal/portal/page/bsndprod.psml?doc.id=MWRE14000
0906&st=null&showdoccase=1 [https://perma.cc/9VG9-3PMM} (refusing to return Iranian asylum
seekers to Italy where they had been housed on shipping containers with poor sanitary conditions and
limited rations of food and water).
25. Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-148070#{"itemid":1"001-148070"I} {htps://perma.cc/76ZV-FUBK).
26. In Tarakhel, the court ruled that Swiss authorities must obtain from Italian asylum officials
"detailed and reliable information concerning the specific facility, the physical reception conditions and
the preservation of the family unit" in order to assess whether the returning the asylum seekers would
subject them to a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment. Id. $ 121.
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legal proceedings, increasing both the human suffering of asylum seekers
and the burdens on asylum systems throughout the EU. It is time to replace
the duplicative individualized hearings required by the current legal regime
with a more rational scheme. In the end, it is crucial to the institution of
asylum in Europe that national systems provide substantially equivalent
reception conditions and yield substantially similar results on asylum appli-
cations. Until then, there should be a presumption that the EU member
states decide the asylum claims of asylum seekers in their custody.
1. COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM
When the EU was created, immigration and asylum were matters left to
the competence of the member states. 2 7 Accordingly, the national govern-
ment of each of the six original member states defined the terms under
which non-EU citizens could enter and depart from that state. 2 8 In contrast,
the movement of EU citizens between member states was within the com-
petence of the supranational organization, originally known as the European
Economic Community. 29
By 1999, the EU had more than doubled in size and encompassed fifteen
member states. In the post-Cold War era, the EU anticipated adding ten
formerly communist states in the near future. The addition of these states
would, again, more than double the size and population of the EU.3 0 Refu-
27. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome founded the European Economic Community, also known as the
"Common Market," comprised of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3
(hereinafter Treaty of Rome). Over the next five decades, the original six members grew to twenty-
eight, the number of member states today. In 1993, after many amending treaties in the interim, the
Maastricht Treaty on European Union changed the name and other important aspects of governance.
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1 (hereinafter Treaty of Maastricht]. The
Treaty of Lisbon renamed the Treaty of Rome as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. Prior to the European Economic Community, the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had been founded in 1951. Treaty of Paris Establishing
the Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (hereinafter Treaty of Paris).
28. The Court of Justice of the European Union emphasized the immigration competence of mem-
ber states, as opposed to the supranational European Economic Community. See Case 281/85, Fed.
Republic of Ger. & Others v. Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys., 1987 E.C.R. 3203.
29. The European Economic Community was premised on four fundamental rights that citizens of
member states had with regard to other member states: the freedom of movement of goods, services,
capital, and people. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 45, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J.
(C 115) 47. Originally, free movement of people referred to workers, but the concept expanded to
include non-working individuals, such as retirees, and ultimately all citizens of other EU member
states. See Directive 2004/38/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
the Right of Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the
Territory of the Member States, 2004 O.J. (L 229) 35.
30. The original six countries, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands,
had been joined in the intervening years by Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal,
Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Ten additional countries joined in 2004: Cyprus and Malta, plus
the former Warsaw Pact nations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Slovenia. Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007. Croatia joined in 2013. See EU Member Coun-
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gee status and asylum had been major issues in the previous decade, with
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the wars in former Yugoslavia send-
ing many individuals to seek safety in various EU member states."1 The
inconsistent responses of member states to those refugee emergencies were
fresh memories, and it was easy to foresee the inefficiencies, duplications,
and complexities of having twenty-five different asylum laws in contiguous
territory under harmonized visa policies. At this juncture, the EU issued
the Tampere Declaration, committing itself to developing a common Euro-
pean asylum system throughout all member states.3 2 The fifteen years since
Tampere have featured complex political negotiations to construct an asy-
lum regime applicable throughout the EU.
In the first phase, between 2000 and 2005, EU member states enacted a
set of laws that imposed more detailed and explicit requirements on the
asylum process. These included rules regarding: which member state should
decide particular claims,33 care of asylum seekers during the process,34 crite-
ria for who is entitled to legal protection,3 5 and procedural rules for asylum
decisions.36 These key elements of the CEAS became law via the
EURODAC Regulation,3 7 the Temporary Protection Directive, 8 the Dub-
lin Regulation,39 the Reception Conditions Directive,40 the Qualification
tries, EUR. UNION (Nov. 4, 2015), http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/ [https://per
ma.cclWS4L-X53U}.
31. The war in former Yugoslavia displaced more than 500,000 Bosnians into other European
countries. U.N. High Comm'r of Refugees, Asylum in Europe: Summer ofSadness, Refugee Magazine, Issue
101 (Sept. 1, 1995), http://www.unhcr.org/3b543ddd4.html [https://perma.cc/X2X3-E5VQ}.
32. Presidency Conclusions, The Tampere European Council, ¶ 13 (Oct. 15-16, 1999), http://www
.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm [https://perma.cc/358G-D6UH] (hereinafter Tampere
Declaration].
33. Dublin II, supra note 15.
34. Council Directive 2003/9, 2003 O.J. (L 31) 18 (EC) (hereinafter Reception Conditions Direc-
tive] (laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers in the member states).
35. Council Directive 2004/83, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC) [hereinafter Qualification Directive)
(addressing minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country national or stateless
persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the
protection granted).
36. Council Directive 2005/85, 2005 O.J. (L 326) 13 (EC) [hereinafter Procedures Directive] (ad-
dressing minimum standards on procedures in member states for granting and withdrawing refugee
status in the member states).
37. Council Regulation 2725/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 316) 1 [hereinafter Eurodac Regulation] (con-
cerning the establishment of "Eurodac," European Dactyloscopy, for the comparison of fingerprints for the
effective application of the Dublin Convention).
38. Council Directive 2001/55, 2001 O.J. (L 212) 12 (EC) [hereinafter Temporary Protection Di-
rective] (regarding minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of
displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between member states in receiving
such persons and bearing the consequences thereof). The Temporary Protection Directive, which has
thus far never been employed, was a response to the mass movement of Bosnian refugees throughout the
EU in the 1990s. Temporary Protection, EUR. COMM'N (June 23, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/temporary-protection/indexen.htm {https://perma.cc/QW7U-
ZNQA).
39. Dublin II, supra note 15.
40. Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 34.
Harvard Human Rights journal / Vol. 29
Directive, 4 and the Asylum Procedures Directive. 42 Most pertinent to this
Article's discussion are the two 2003 laws, the Dublin Regulation and the
Reception Conditions Directive. Each was amended in 2013 and is worthy
of a treatise to itself; they are discussed briefly below in their original ver-
sions to provide background for the asylum crisis in Italy. In a later section,
some of the important 2013 modifications are highlighted.
All of the CEAS laws adopt a minimum standards approach. Member
states must provide at least the guarantees set forth in EU legislation but
are free to be more generous.43 Today, there are twenty-eight different asy-
lum systems in the EU.4 4 Each member state dutifully transposes the EU
legislation into its national law, but local structures and historical contexts
mold the actual asylum processes in each individual EU state. Moreover,
member states do not always enforce the laws they have passed. Asylum
seekers' experiences vary so much significantly from state to state that it
strains credulity to say that the twenty-eight member states have one com-
mon system.
A. Dublin Regulation
The Dublin Regulation has its origins in a separate non-EU treaty, the
Dublin Convention, signed in 1990 by twelve states.45 All twelve were
members of the EU, but they entered into the treaty separate from and
parallel to their EU legal obligations. Several non-EU states, such as Nor-
way, Iceland, and Switzerland, ratified the treaty.4 6 The Dublin Convention
had multiple goals. It aimed to prevent individuals from seeking asylum in
more than one EU state. It intended to reduce the number of asylum seek-
ers shuttled between member states when the states debated which one was
responsible for determining the asylum claim. It attempted to articulate
41. Qualification Directive, supra note 35, at 12.
42. Procedures Directive, supra note 36, at 13.
43. Even with this variable solution, there were wrenching political compromises as to the floor
below which member states could not go. For a window into debates and compromises in the drafting
of the asylum legislation, see generally Jane McAdam, The European Union Qualification Directive: The
Creation of a Subsidiary Protection Regime, 17 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 461 (2005).
44. See Tampere Declaration, supra note 32, for a list of the EU member states.
45. Signed in 1990 by Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark,
Greece, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Portugal, and Spain, the Dublin Convention went into force in
September 1997 for the original twelve states, in 2008 for Switzerland, the most recent ratifying state,
and at dates in between for the other states. See generally Convention Determining the State Responsible
for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Commu-
nities, Aug. 19, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 254) 1 [hereinafter Dublin I.
46. See generally Agreement Between the European Community and the Republic of Iceland and the
Kingdom of Norway Concerning the Criteria and Mechanisms for Establishing the State Responsible
for Examining a Request for Asylum Lodged in a Member State or Iceland or Norway, 2001 O.J. (L 93)
40. See also Agreement Between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation Concerning the
Criteria and Mechanisms for Establishing the State Responsible for Examining a Request for Asylum
Lodged in a Member State or in Switzerland, 2008 O.J. (L 53) 5, ¶ 4.
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criteria that enabled EU states to determine quickly which state was the
most appropriate to render an asylum decision on the merits.
In 2003, the EU incorporated the Dublin system as a core element of the
CEAS.4 7 The EU legislation, called the Dublin II Regulation in recognition
of its origins, 4 8 set forth its goals:
A common policy on asylum, including a Common European
Asylum System, is a constituent part of the European Union's
objective of progressively establishing an area of freedom, secur-
ity and justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legiti-
mately seek protection in the [European Union}.
The European Council, at its special meeting in Tampere . . .
[agreed to ensure) that nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. [to
maintain] the principle of non-refoulement. In this respect, and
without affecting the responsibility criteria laid down in this
Regulation, Member States, all respecting the principle of non-
refoulement, are considered as safe countries for third-country
nationals.
[T~his system should include . . . a clear and workable method
for determining the Member States responsible for the examina-
tion of an asylum application.
Such a method should be based on objective, fair criteria both for
the Member States and for the persons concerned. It should, in
particular, make it possible to determine rapidly the Member
State responsible, so as to guarantee effective access to the proce-
dures for determining refugee status and not to compromise the
objective of the rapid processing of asylum applications.4 9
The heart of the Dublin II Regulation describes criteria for determining
which state is responsible for deciding the claim. 5 0 For example, if the asy-
lum seeker has a valid visa, the issuing member state is responsible for
determining the asylum claim." If the asylum seeker has a family member
who has received a residence permit based on refugee status, the issuing
member state is responsible for deciding the asylum application.5 2 If the
47. Dublin III, supra note 16; see Dublin II, supra note 15; Council Regulation 604/2013, 2013
O.J. (L 180) 31 (amending Dublin II, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the
member state responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the
member states by a third-country national or a stateless person).
48. See Dublin 1, supra note 45 (indicating that Dublin I was the Dublin Convention); suopra note 15
and accompanying text (Dublin II); supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing Dublin 11 as the
second iteration, this time as part of EU law); supra note 16 and accompanying text (Dublin III refers to
the 2013 revisions).
49. Id. pmbl., cls. 1-4.
50. Id. arts. 5-14; Dublin III, supra note 16, arts. 7-15.
51. Dublin II, supra note 15, art. 9(2); Dublin III, supra note 16, art. 12(2).
52. Dublin II, supra note 15, art. 7; Dublin III, supra note 16, art. 9.
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asylum seeker is an unaccompanied minor, special rules apply. 3 In the ab-
sence of any of the listed criteria, the default provision is that the first EU
state the asylum seeker entered is responsible for examining the asylum
claim. 4 The Dublin Regulation contains several escape hatches. Member
states can opt not to transfer asylum seekers if there are humanitarian rea-
sons to proceed with the claim.55 They can also choose, under what is
known as the sovereignty clause, to exercise responsibility for the asylum
claim even if the state is not responsible under the Dublin criteria. 6
Few member states rely on either the humanitarian or the sovereignty
clauses; most rely on the default provision. For example, in 2013, fewer
than three percent of German requests that other member states take charge
of asylum seekers pursuant to the Dublin Regulation were predicated on
family grounds, and less than one percent involved humanitarian grounds;
roughly ninety-seven percent concerned asylum seekers who had entered
without documents.5 7 Similar statistics characterize other states that file
many Dublin transfer requests. 8 This places substantial burdens on the
member states that form the external border of the EU, and, in particular,
on Italy and Greece. 9 Their asylum systems are foundering under their
economic crises, inadequate asylum infrastructure, and the surging number
of claimants.60 Many asylum seekers prefer to seek asylum elsewhere in the
53. Dublin II, supra note 15, art. 6; Dublin III, supra note 16, art. 8.
54. Dublin II, supra note 15, art. 13; Dublin III, supra note 16, art. 13(1). There must be evidence
or proof, as detailed in the Directive, that the asylum seeker entered that portion of the EU first. Dublin
IlI, supra note 16, art. 22(3). The responsibility of the first country entered ceases after twelve months.
Id. art. 13(1). At that time, the country where the asylum seeker has been most recently living for five
or more months becomes responsible. Id. art. 13(2).
55. Dublin II, supra note 15, art. 15 (containing a humanitarian clause referring to family reasons
or cultural considerations, and the asylum seeker must consent); Dublin III, supra note 16, art. 17(1)
(allowing member states to decide asylum claim even if not responsible under Dublin III).
56. Dublin II, supra note 15, art. 3(2); Dublin III, supra note 16, art. 17(1).
57. See FRATZKE, supra note 19, at 8.
58. Id.
59. Of the 8,149 requests Italy received in 2013 to take charge of asylum seekers located in other
states, seventy-one were based on family reasons, eight on humanitarian grounds, and 8,070 on first
entry into the EU. The statistics were similar in Poland (48, 5, and 543, respectively) and in Hungary
(46, 2, and 350, respectively). See id. at 9, tbl.2.
60. For a sample of reports concerning the abysmal conditions asylum seekers faced in Greece, see
generally Moises Saman, Greece: Unsafe and Unwelcoming Shores, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 2009),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/12/greece-unsafe-and-unwelcoming-shores [https://perma.cc/L2JH-
FZJS}; U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Observations on Greece as a Country of Asylum (Dec. 2014), http:/
/www.refworld.org/docid/54cb3af34.html (https://perma.cc/M8D2-89CV]; AMNESTY INT'L, THE Due.
LIN 11 TRAP: TRANSFERS OF DUBLIN ASYLUM SEEKERS To GREECE (2010), http://www.amnesty.eu/en/
news/statements-reports/eu/asylum-and-migration/the-dublin-ii-trap-transfers-of-asylum-seekers-to-
greece-0446/#.VtuJu5MrIdU [https://perma.cc/2PM7-Q4ST}; NAT'L COMM'N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
DETENTION CONDITIONS IN POuCE STATIONS AND DETENTION AREAS OF AuENS (2010), http://www
.nchr.gr/images/EnglishSite/SINTIKESKRATISIS/Police detention_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BED6-246F}; AMNESTY INT'L, IRREGULAR MIGRANTS AND AsYLUM-SEEKERs ROUTINELY DETAINED IN
SUBSTANDARD CONDITIONS (2010), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR25/002/2010/en/
{https://perma.cc/7SZ4-K3CS]; see also Comm'r for Human Rights, Report by Nils Muiznieks, Following
his Visit to Italy from 3 to 6 July 2012, CommDH (2012) 26 (Sept. 18, 2012), https://w-ww.ecoi.net/
file upload/1226_1348554916_com-instranetdh.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ53-P6A6); U.N. High
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EU, and, consequently, many try to evade the Dublin system. They may
move surreptitiously in order to avoid contact with authorities and authori-
ties' efforts to take the asylum seekers' fingerprints.6 1
The Dublin II Regulation depends on EURODAC, the EU-wide finger-
print database of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. 62 This system,
launched in 2000, records the fingerprints, country of origin, and other
personal data of asylum seekers.6 3 By the end of 2012, EURODAC con-
tained the fingerprints of more than 2.3 million individuals. 64 Officials who
receive an asylum application immediately take the applicant's fingerprints
and enter them into the EURODAC database to see whether the applicant
had previously been in another EU state.6 5 If so, the Dublin Regulation
may indicate that the other EU state is responsible for deciding the asylum
claim, and the asylum seeker may be sent back to the other EU state.6 6
Many asylum seekers are aware of the Dublin scheme and want to avoid
being sent to states with substandard asylum systems. 6 7 Accordingly, if
they enter the EU through one of the poorer border states, they avoid the
authorities and try to travel elsewhere before they present their asylum
claim. If they encounter the police in the first EU state they enter, asylum
seekers may refuse to have their fingerprints taken. They may attempt to
mutilate the tips of their fingers,'6 for example, or protest through hunger
strikes. If their strategies are not successful and they are fingerprinted, they
may nonetheless leave the state where they initially entered the EU. They
travel onward, hoping they can either live clandestinely in another member
state or persuade another member state to process their asylum application
on the merits.
As mentioned earlier, the EURODAC and Dublin II Regulations com-
prise two of the six pillars of the CEAS that were enacted between 2000 and
2005. Shortly after 2005, refugee advocates and government officials began
discussing legislative improvements to the asylum laws, thus launching the
second phase of the CEAS. The European Commission circulated a proposed
Comm'r for Refugees, Recommendations on Important Aspects of Refugee Protection in Italy (July 2012), htp://
www.unhcr.org/500950b29.pdf (https://perma.ccl3HFF-3AF7); Swiss REFUGEE COUNCIL, RECEPTION
CONDITIONS IN ITALY: REPORT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND BENEFICIARIES
OF PROTECTION, IN PARTICULAR DUBLIN RETURNEES (2013), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
5315872c4.html [https://perma.cc/FRL4-ZPRY] [hereinafter Swiss REFUGEE COUNCIL].
61. See FRATZKE, supra note 19, at 15.
62. Eurodac Regulation, supra note 37 (referring to European Dactyloscopy).
63. The original Eurodac Regulation of 2000 became effective in January 2003. Supra note 37; see
also Council Regulation 603/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 1, ¶ 4 (EU) (recasting the Regulation enacted in
2013, with an effective date in July 2015).
64. Chris Jones, Eleven Years of Eurodac, STATEWATCH (Jan. 2014), http://www.statewatch.org/anal-
yses/no-235-eurodac.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MNE-UVTF}.
65. Eurodac Regulation, supra note 37, art. 4.
66. Id. arts. 1, 11.
67. See, e.g., FRATZKE, supra note 19, at 15.
68. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 2; see also Author's Interviews with Asylum Seekers, Initial Recep-
tion and First Aid Center (CPSA) in Lampedusa, Italy (Feb. 2013).
69
70 Harvard Human Rights journal / Vol. 29
amendment to the Dublin II Regulation that included greater procedural
protections for asylum seekers,6 9 including the right to a personal inter-
view,7 0 to receive information about the Dublin process,7 I and to a pre-
transfer challenge to a transfer decision.72 This 2008 Proposed Recast Dub-
lin Regulation (proposed Dublin III Regulation) also included a mechanism
that could trigger temporary suspension of transfers to member states
whose asylum systems were under great pressure.73 The temporary suspen-
sion mechanism, strongly opposed by some member states, was a major
sticking point.74 The European Parliament reviewed the Commission's pro-
posal and adopted an alternative text in 2009.71 Despite robust discussion
and commentary among member states, the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), international nongovernmental organizations, aca-
demics, and others,'7 6 neither the 2008 nor the 2009 text was adopted.
In the meantime, challenges to applications of the 2003 Dublin II Regu-
lation mounted. Asylum seekers threatened with transfer pursuant to the
Dublin II Regulation pursued appeals in national and supranational courts.
As discussed below, both the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (CJEU) ruled in favor of asylum applicants' challenges to the
Dublin Regulation in 201 1.7 This brought renewed urgency to the 2012
negotiations of the Recast Dublin Regulation (Dublin III). The European
69. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Criteria and
Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protec-
tion Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person, at 8, COM (2008)
820 final (Mar. 12, 2008) {hereinafter COM, Int'l Protection].
70. Id. art. 5(1).
71. Id. art. 4(1).
72. Id. art. 26(1).
73. Id. art. 31(1) ("When a Member State is faced with a particularly urgent situation which places
an exceptionally heavy burden on its reception capacities, asylum system or infrastructure, and when the
transfer of applicants for international protection in accordance with this Regulation to that Member
State could add to that burden, that Member State may request that such transfers be suspended.").
74. See, e.g., Council of the European Union Note 15561/10 from Presidency on Common European Asylum
System - State of Play, at 3 (Oct. 29, 2010) (ministers expressed serious concerns regarding proposed
suspension mechanisms for Dublin transfers).
75. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Criteria and
Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protec-
tion Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast), COM
(2008) 0820 (Apr. 29, 2009).
76. See, e.g., Eur. Council on Refugees and Exiles, Comments on the European Commission Proposal to
Recast the Dublin Regulation (Apr. 2009), http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/
133.htmi [https://perma.cclYX3D-Z27C]; U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, UNHCR Comments on
the European Commission's Proposal for a Recast of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible
for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a
Third Country National or a Stateless Person ("Dublin II") (COM(2008) 820, 3 December 2008) and
the European Commission's Proposal for a Recast of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council Concerning the Establishment of 'Eurodac' for the Comparison of Fingerprints for the
Effective Application of [the Dublin II Regulation] (COM(2008) 825, December 2008) (Mar. 18,
2009), http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/49cOca922.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G7G-9Q62}.
77. See M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, 2011-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 255; Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/
10, N.S. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2011 E.C.R. 1-13905.
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Parliament and the European Council agreed on a new text and enacted the
Dublin III Regulation in June 2013,78 with implementation to take place
in 2014.79 Because Dublin III includes provisions that attempted to cure
deficiencies highlighted by the ECtHR and the CJEU, its modifications
will be addressed after discussing the pertinent judicial rulings.
B. Reception Conditions Directive
The Reception Conditions Directive, first enacted in 2003 and revised in
2013,s0 requires all EU member states to provide asylum seekers with "ma-
terial reception conditions [that] provide an adequate standard of living for
applicants, which guarantees their subsistence and protects their physical
and mental health."81 The Directive defines material reception conditions
to include housing, food, clothing, and a daily expenses allowance. 8 2 States
may provide housing, food, and clothing directly by delivering these goods
to asylum seekers who live in state-supported centers, or states may give
asylum seekers financial allowances or vouchers to acquire food and shelter
themselves.83 The Directive requires states, in furnishing housing and other
services, to take into account special treatment needed by
vulnerable persons such as minors, unaccompanied minors, dis-
abled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents
with minor children, victims of human trafficking, persons with
serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders and persons who
have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psy-
chological, physical or sexual violence, such as victims of female
genital mutilation. 4
The Directive also requires member states to promptly inform asylum
seekers about benefits they are entitled to, obligations with which they
must comply, and organizations or individuals who might provide them
assistance and information about health care.8 5 The applicants must receive
emergency care and treatment for illnesses.8 6 Minor children must receive
78. The European Parliament adopted the Council text on June 12, 2013, the final act was signed
on June 26, 2013, published in the official journal on June 29, 2013, and entered into force on Jan. 1,
2014. The 2003 Dublin II Regulation was repealed when the Dublin III Regulation went into effect in
2013.
79. Dublin III, supra note 16, art. 49.
80. Directive 2013/33 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Laying
Down Standards for the Reception of Applicants for International Protection, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 96
(EU), http://www.refworld.org/docid/51d29db54.html Chttps://perma.cc/DZ6W-SZYD} (hereinafter
Recast Reception Conditions Directive).
81. Id. art. 17(2).
82. Id art. 2(g).
83. Id. art. 17(5).
84. Id. art. 21.
85. Id. art. 5(1).
86. Id. art. 19(1).
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education under the same conditions as children of citizens of the member
state.8 7 Vocational training may be provided, and employment authoriza-
tion must be granted if more than one year has passed since the filing of the
asylum application.8 When the EU Reception Conditions Directive en-
tered into force in February 2003, it allowed member states two years to
incorporate the EU standards into their national laws. Some states did not
meet the legislative deadline. 9 A similar two-year transition period is al-
lowed for the 2013 revision.90 As discussed below,9' even when national
legislation has been amended in a timely fashion to include the EU norms,
not all of EU member states have translated the new measures into an ade-
quate reception system for asylum seekers.
Compared to the United States, where asylum seekers receive no govern-
ment support during the pendency of their claims, 9 2 EU law mandating
government-supplied accommodations for all asylum seekers while they
wait for their asylum hearing appears strikingly charitable. In fact, the EU
approach is both generous and utilitarian. The generosity of guaranteeing a
"dignified standard of living"91 to asylum applicants is part of the effort to
assure that asylum seekers receive "comparable living conditions"94 in all
EU member states, in order to "limit the secondary movements of appli-
cants influenced by the variety of conditions for their reception."91
The realities on the ground, however, belie the aspirations codified in the
Reception Conditions Directive. Some states have been neither generous in
providing shelter to asylum seekers nor effective in forestalling secondary
movements of asylum seekers and other applicants for protection.9 6 Further-
more, the dismal reception conditions in some EU states-and the utter
87. Id. art. 14.
88. Id. art. 16 (discussing vocational training); id. art. 15 (discussing employment). The delay in
deciding the application must not be due to the applicant, and member states can decide the conditions
for granting access to the labor market, with priority permissible for EU citizens and third-country
nationals who are lawfully present. Id. art. 15(2). Once granted, employment permission cannot be
withdrawn during the appeals process until the applicant receives notice of the negative appellate deci-
sion. Id. art. 15(3).
89. Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 34, art. 26 (stating that member states must bring
national laws into compliance with this Directive by February 6, 2005). Italian implementing legisla-
tion was not enacted until May 30, 2005. Decreto Legislativo 30 maggio 2005, n.140, G.U. July 21,
2005, n.168 (It.) (enacting minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers).
90. Recast Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 80, art. 31.
91. See discussion infra Section II.B.2.
92. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & SETON HALL Lw, "AT LEAST LET THEM WORK": THE DENIAL OF
WORK AUTHORIZATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (Nov. 12,
2013), https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/11/12/least-let-them-work/denial-work-authorization-and-as-
sistance-asylum-seekers-united [https://perma.cc/UB9K-UGQ7}.
93. Recast Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 80, pmbl., cl. 11.
94. Id.
95. Id. pmbl., cl. 12.
96. FRATZKE, supra note 19, at 9-10, 13-14 (describing, for example, secondary movement from
Greece and Italy to Germany and Sweden as common).
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absence of accommodations in other EU states-have played a key role in
the collision of European human rights law with European asylum law.9 7
II. THE ITALIAN AsYLum SYSTEM
The 155 refugees who survived the capsized and burning boat on the
coast of Lampedusa in October 2013 were brought ashore.98 Their encoun-
ter with the CEAS began in Italy, where they were fingerprinted and taken
to reception centers for processing.99 Within six months, however, 153 of
the 155 survivors had left Italy to try to start new lives in other European
countries. 00 They did not wait for their asylum decisions in Italy, and they
do not want to return there.10 ' Their departures illuminate the crisis in the
Italian asylum structures and the dysfunction in the CEAS.
A. Historical Context
Historical context is crucial to assessing the contemporary asylum policy
in Italy because it helps explain Italy's parallel frameworks for asylum.
Mussolini's use of exile to punish opponents and persecution of political
dissidents was recent history for those drafting Italy's Constitution in 1947.
Mindful of the vulnerability of individuals who challenge state authority,
they were determined that post-Fascist Italy would provide refuge to those
oppressed by autocratic forces in other lands. Article 10 declares, "A for-
eigner who, in his home country, is denied the actual exercise of the demo-
cratic freedoms guaranteed by the Italian Constitution shall be entitled to
the right of asylum under the conditions established by law."02
97. M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255, It 169-72 (stating that asylum
seekers in Greece were homeless, with fewer than 1,000 beds for tens of thousands asylum seekers, and
because asylum seekers slept outside in parks, they were subject to the weather and predators); see
discussion infra Section II.B.2.b (describing the situation in Greece and Italy, where many asylum
seekers were housed in large facilities containing several thousand individuals, with three toilets for one
hundred individuals, no heat, in atmospheres of violence and crime).
98. Nelson, supra note 2.
99. Id.
100. Juliane von Mittelstaedt & Maximilian Popp, 'Aren't We Human Beings?': One Year After the
Lampedusa Refugee Tragedy, DER SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
europe/lampedusa-survivors-one-year-after-the-refugee-tragedy-a-994887.html {https://perma.cc/
DRP2-BSW2] (describing how, on the one-year anniversary of the Lampedusa tragedy, only one of its
former passengers was still in Italy, living in an abandoned building in Rome after being returned to
Italy by Swedish asylum authorities); see also Nelson, supra note 2.
101. This flight from Italy occurred in 2013, when Italy received 15,000 asylum seekers on Lampe-
dusa. The situation has been exacerbated by the large numbers of asylum seekers who arrived in Italy in
2014 (170,000) and 2015 (150,000). Migrant Arrivals by Sea Top 170,000 in Italy in 2014 Top 170,000
in 2014, INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.iom.int/news/migrant-arrivals-sea-
italy-top-170000-2014 {https://perma.cc/SHM6-SA43); UNHCR, Mediterranean Emergency Response,
supra note 8 (reporting that 1,015,078 migrants crossed the Mediterranean to Europe by boat in 2015,
with 153,000 reaching Italy).
102. Art. 10, cl. 3 Costituzione [Cost.} (It.).
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The right to asylum is expressly embedded in the constitution and is
expansive in scope. The Italian Constitution does not limit asylum to those
who are persecuted, but extends asylum to all those who have been pre-
vented from participating in democratic self-government. It encompasses
those who run afoul of governments that have more constricted views of
freedom and democracy than those set forth in the Italian Constitution.
Notwithstanding the explicit constitutional guarantee of asylum, the Ital-
ian parliament has never enacted the implementing legislation called for in
the constitution. To this day, there are no procedures setting forth the terms
by which individuals deprived of democratic freedoms can claim their con-
stitutional right to asylum.10
Despite the absence of an effective constitutional right to asylum, there is
a functioning Italian asylum system. In the post-war years, Italy sent a dele-
gation to the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status
of Refugees and Stateless Persons,104 and it was one of the first nations to
ratify the resulting 1951 Refugee Convention.'05 The asylum procedures
have developed as a result of Italy's ratification of the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention, which protects a substantially smaller category of refugees than the
Italian Constitution. According to the 1951 Convention, those with a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, politi-
cal opinion, or membership in a particular social group qualify as
refugees. 106
When Italy ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, it limited the refugee
definition to those who suffered a well-founded fear of persecution in Eu-
rope. 07 By adopting this geographic reservation, Italy ensured that individ-
103. Individuals have filed claims in Italian courts relying on the constitutional guarantee of asy-
lum, and the courts have recognized these claims. Those who are successful in the judicial system on
constitutional asylum claims are not admitted to the asylum system, however. See H61ne Lambert,
Francesco Messineo & Paul Tiedemann, Comparative Perspectives of Constitutional Asylum in France, Italy,
and Germany: Requiescat in Pace?, 27 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 16, 24-25 (2016). The Italian asylum system
developed in response to refugee protection obligations set forth by the international refugee conven-
tion, see Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 {hereinafter
1951 Refugee Convention), and the Common European Asylum System, see infra text accompanying
notes 114-243.
104. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Persons: Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting (Nov. 21, 1951), http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68cdc4
.html [thtps://perma.cc/KCV8-LS4T).
105. See 1951 Refugee Convention, Participants, UNTS DATABASE (Mar. 6, 2016), https://treaties
.un-org/pages/ViewDetailsll.aspx?src= TREATY&mtdsg.no=V-2&chapter= 5&Temp= mtdsg2&lang= en
[https://perma.cclJGD6-HEBH} (hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention, Participants). Italy signed the
1951 Refugee Convention on July 23, 1952 and ratified it on November 15, 1954. Id.
106. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 103, art. 1(A)(2).
107. See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 103. As a compromise, the drafters of the 1951
Refugee Convention had allowed contracting states two options: They could limit the scope of the
Convention to refugees caused by events occurring in Europe, see id. are. 1(B)(1)(a), or events occurring
in Europe or elsewhere, see id. art. (1XB)(Xb). In 1951, Italy selected the Europe-only option. See
Christopher Hein, Italy: Gateway to Europe, but not the Gatekeeper?, in Kosovo's REFUGEES IN THE EURO-
PEAN UNION 142 (Joanne van Seim ed., 2000). The 1951 Refugee Convention does not define persecu-
tion. See infra section II.B. The current Italian asylum looks to the criteria set forth in the EU
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uals persecuted in most regions of the world-such as Africa, Asia, and
Latin America-had no legal claim to asylum in Italy. Indeed, even refu-
gees from Europe had difficulty vindicating their rights in Italy. For the
next four decades, Italian law lacked procedures to determine who should
be recognized as refugees and granted asylum.
Nonetheless, for decades Italy was a major way station for refugees on
their way to resettlement in the United States, Canada, Australia, and
Israel.' 0 Though the legal underpinnings for refugees to gain resident sta-
tus in Italy were practically nonexistent during the Cold War, Italian policy
was generous to refugees in transit. Finally, in 1990, Italy adopted legisla-
tion setting forth a procedure for those claiming asylum.109 The 1990 legis-
lation also deleted the geographical reservation,"1 0 thus expanding the
refugee definition in Italy to encompass those fleeing persecution anywhere
in the world.
Despite Italy's slow pace in enacting national asylum legislation, Italy
was one of the most active in forging a unified post-war Europe. Italy was
one of the six founding members of the European Economic Community in
1960, the predecessor to the EU.''' Italy was an early participant in the
Schengen system to remove internal border controls in Europe.1 2 It was
also one of the initial states to ratify the Dublin Convention."' When the
EU concluded in the late 1990s that migration and asylum could no longer
be left to the individual member states, the Italian government registered
Qualification Directive, supra note 35, to decide whether an asylum seeker fears persecution and is
entitled to refugee status, whether they fear specified serious harm, such as violence from armed con-
flict, and are entitled to subsidiary protection, or whether there are overriding humanitarian circum-
stances that entitle them to remain in Italy.
108. E.g., Fred A. Lazin, Refugee Resettlement and "Freedom of Choice": The Case of Soviet jewry, CTR.
FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIEs (July 2005), http://cis.org/RefugeeResettlement-SovietJewry Chttps://perma
.cc/9C2L-G6AJ} (describing how many Soviet Jews were processed in Rome for resettlement in Israel or
the United States); see also Hein, supra note 107, at 141-42.
109. Legge 28 febbraio 1990, n.39, D.L. Dec. 30, 1989, n. 4 16 (It.).
110. The Martelli law incorporated into legislation the provisions of Decree Law No. 416 of De-
cember 30, 1989, Containing Urgent Provisions Regarding Political Asylum, Entry, and Sojourn of
Non-EC Nationals, as well as Regularization of Non-EC Nationals and Stateless Persons Already Pre-
sent in the National Territory. See Legge 28 febbraio 1990, n.39, D.L. Dec. 30, 1989, n.416 (It.).
Article 1(1) of Decree Law No. 416 withdrew the Europe-only geographical reservation. See Hein, supra
note 107, at 142. By 1990, only Congo, Hungary, Madagascar, Malta, Monaco, and Turkey maintained
the Europe-only limitation. Hungary withdrew the geographical reservation in 1998 and Malta with-
drew the geographical reservation in 2002. See 1951 Refugee Convention, Participants, supra note 105,
at n.12.
111. Treaty of Rome, supra note 27.
112. Five member states created the Schengen Agreement, 1985, which Italy signed and ratified in
1990. The Schengen Acquis - Agreement on the Accession of the Italian Republic to the Convention
Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual
Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, 1990 O.J. (L 239) 63. There are now
twenty-six members. Schengen Area Countries List, SCHENGEN VISA INFORMATION (2015), www
.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-countries-list/ [htrps://perma.cc/MP97-48DT).
113. Dublin I, supra note 45.
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no dissent to the Tampere Declaration's call for the development of a Euro-
pean asylum law.
B. Current Asylum System
Italy's adoption of the CEAS Regulations and Directives, enacted be-
tween 2000 and 2005, transformed its rudimentary structures into a more
elaborate and robust framework. The terms of each EU asylum law typically
allowed member states two years in which to incorporate the EU provisions
into national legislation. As each component of the EU asylum legislation
entered into force, it brought clearer standards and procedures to the asy-
lum regime in Italy. By 2008, Italian lawmakers had completed the trans-
position process,"' and the overall impact on the asylum system in Italy
was salutary.
Currently, there are two administrative stages, followed by three levels of
review within the civil court system. The first step of the asylum procedure
occurs when individuals make a request for asylum either to the Italian
border guards or, if they are inside Italian territorial boundaries, to the
Questura, a nationwide police force organized by province."' The initial en-
counter generally results in fingerprinting and identification, but it does
not include a discussion of the substance of the asylum claim." 6 Then ap-
pointments are scheduled for asylum seekers at the Questura, where a more
formal inquiry and registration will take place." 7 Due to the shortage of
personnel, asylum seekers may report to the Questura office multiple times
over several months until they are able to successfully record the details of
their claim."" Ultimately, the details are discussed in the verbalizzazione
interview, when the Questura staff member asks a formalized set of questions
and the asylum seeker provides oral answers." 9 The asylum seeker also
writes a short statement of the asylum claim in the applicant's native lan-
guage to supplement the Questura's summary of the applicant's responses.12 0
114. Under EU law, regulations become effective immediately in member states, whereas directives
must be adopted as law in member states by the national legislatures. P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO
EUROPEAN UNION LAW chs. 3-4 (2007); AUINA KACZOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW ch. 10
(2009). Accordingly, the EURODAC and Dublin Regulations became directly effective in Italy when
adopted in 2000 and 2003, respectively. The Temporary Protection, Reception Conditions, Qualifica-
tion, and Procedures Directives were transposed into Italian law via a series of legislative decrees.
Decreto Legislativo 30 maggio 2005, n.140, G.U. July 21, 2005, n.168 (It.) (regarding reception of
asylum seekers); Decreto Legislativo 19 novembre 2007, n.251, G.U. Jan. 4, 2008, n.3 (It.) (regarding
qualification for protection); Decreto Legislativo 28 gennaio 2008, n.25, G.U. Feb. 16, 2008, n.40 (It.)
(regarding asylum procedures).
115. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 20.
116. This initial registration, known as the fotosegnalamento, is administrative in nature. Id.
117. Id. at 21.
118. This is particularly true in large cities. See id.
119. The C/3 form (Modello C/3 per il riconoscimento dello status di rifugiato ai sensi della Convenzione di
Ginevra) sets forth details of the applicant's claim for international protection as well as details of travel
to Italy. Id. It is commonly called the verbale. Id.
120. Id.
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The Questura forwards the verbalizzazione to the Territorial Commission
for the Recognition of International Protection, a unit of the Ministry of the
Interior, which has the authority to grant or deny the application.121 In
theory, the Territorial Commission will interview the asylum seekers within
thirty days,1 2 2 but, in reality, asylum seekers wait several months.1 2 3 The
Territorial Commissions-the administrative decision-makers in the Italian
asylum process-receive evidence, interview the applicants, and issue writ-
ten decisions on the merits of each case. 124 They can grant three alternative
forms of protection: refugee status, 2 5 subsidiary protection status,'1 2 6 or a
humanitarian residence permit. 127
Until late 2014, there were ten Territorial Commissions and sub-com-
missions, each responsible for the claims filed by asylum seekers living
within a prescribed geographical area.1 28 The massive increase in asylum
seekers led the government to authorize the establishment of ten additional
Territorial Commissions, with a possibility of supplementary sub-commis-
sions, if needed.1 29 Each Commission has four members: an official from the
municipality where the Commission meets, an official from the national
police, a staff member from the UNHCR office, and a Questura officer, who
serves as the President of the Commission.3 0 The Territorial Commission
interviews each asylum applicant in person, with translators paid for by the
Ministry of Interior.'"' Applicants may bring a lawyer, but most do not.1 3 2
Typically, a single member of the Commission does the interview,' 3 and
then drafts a recommended decision, which all members of the Commission
121. See id. at 27-29.
122. Id. at 28.
123. In major cities, such as Rome, this portion of the process can take up ten months. Id. at 28.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 29. Refugee status is defined in the Qualification Directive, supra note 35. In Italy this
entails a five-year renewable residence permit. Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2014, n.18, G.U. Mar. 7,
2014, n.55 (It.) (regarding implementation of standards for the qualification of third-country nationals
or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for
persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted).
126. Subsidiary protection status is defined in the Qualification Directive, supra note 35. Italian
law, which used to provide a three-year renewable residence permit, has now changed the term to five
years, the same as accorded refugees. D.L. n. 18/2014 (It.).
127. See Decreto Legislativo 25 luglio 1998, n.286, L. Mar. 6, 1998, n.40, art. 6(10) (It.) (gov-
erning immigration and norms on the condition of foreign citizens); COUNTRY REPORT, shupra note 13,
at 29.
128. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 27.
129. Decreto Legge 22 agosto 2014, n.119, G.U. Oct. 21, 2014, n.245, art. 5 (It.) (concerning
international protection).
130. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 27-28.
131. Id. at 32.
132. Id. at 34-35.
133. Id. at 28. Multiple interviews, each by a single member of the Territorial Commission, may
take place simultaneously in the same room. Author's Interview with Territorial Commission, Gorizia
(May 7, 2013); Author's Interview with Territorial Commission, Milan (May 30, 2013).
Harvard Human Rights journal / Vol. 29
discuss and vote on.'3 4 The asylum claimant receives a written decision ex-
plaining the rationale and the result.135
Asylum seekers have the right to seek judicial review of negative deci-
sions. There is a thirty-day deadline to file appeals to the Civil Court.'3 6
The appeal suspends government expulsion orders.137 Applicants can appeal
negative judicial decisions to the Court of Appeals 38 and ultimately to the
Supreme Court.139 The administrative process before the Territorial Com-
missions generally takes far longer to resolve than the thirty-day goal.1 40
The subsequent judicial review, which occurs within the general civil court
system, can be lengthy.141
Pursuant to the EU Qualification Directive, Italy has embraced both sub-
sidiary protection status and refugee status. Until 2014, applicants granted
subsidiary protection received renewable three-year residence permits; now,
they receive the same renewable five-year permits as those granted refugee
status.14 2 In addition, Italian legislation (not EU law) recognizes humanita-
rian reasons, such as serious medical conditions or displacement due to nat-
ural disasters, as grounds for a one-year residence permit. 43  Frequently,
Italy grants more applications for subsidiary or humanitarian protection
than for refugee status. In 2014, for example, 3,600 received refugee status,
7,600 received subsidiary protection, and 9,300 obtained humanitarian res-
idence permits.1 4 4 In 2013, a similar pattern occurred: 3,000 received refu-
gee status, 5,500 received subsidiary protection status, and 7,500 received
humanitarian residence permits. 14  Statistics, of course, do not assure that
134. The decision is by majority vote; in the case of a tie, the President casts the deciding vote.
COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 28.
135. Id. at 33.
136. Decreto Legislativo 28 gennaio 2008, n.25, G.U. Feb. 16, 2008, n.40, art. 35 (It.); Decreto
Legislativo 1 settembre 2011, n.150, D.L. June 18, 2009, n.69 (It.) (modifying D.L. n. 25/2008 and
addressing Supplementary Provisions to the Code of Civil Procedure). Asylum applicants whose claims
were rejected as "manifestly unfounded" have fifteen days to appeal, as do certain others. COUNTRY
REPORT, supra note 13, at 33.
137. Asylum applications rejected as "manifestly unfounded" do not have suspensive effect, but the
appellant can seek a stay from the judge. This is true for certain other categories of rejected claimants,
such as those who had received an expulsion order before filing their asylum application, and those who
had abandoned the collective shelters for asylum seekers without justification. COUNTRY REPORT, supra
note 13, at 33.
138. D.Lgs. n. 25/2008, art. 35(11) (It.); COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 34.
139. D.Lgs. n. 25/2008, art. 35(13) (It.); COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 34.
140. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 28.
141. Id. at 34.
142. Decreto Legislativo 21 febbraio 2014, n.18, G.U. Mar. 7, 2014 n.55 (It.).
143. What is ... Humanitarian Protection?, ITALIAN CIVIL PROT. DEP'T, PRESIDENCY OF THE COUN-
CIL OF MINISTERs, http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/en/che-cose.wp?contentld= APP26737 (last
visited Mar. 8, 2016) [https://perma.cc/WVC6-SFG3).
144. Asylum Applicants and First Instance Decisions on Asylum Applications: 2014, EUROSTAT, tbl.9
(2015), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-data-in-focus/-/KS-QA-15-003 [https://perma.cc/
EPF6-2XZR).
145. Asylum Applicants and First Instance Decisions on Asylum Applications: 2013, EUROSTAT, tbl.9
(2014), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-data-in-focus/-/KS-QA-14-003 {https://perma.cc/
D35V-P4YC) thereinafter EUROSTAT, Asylum Applications 2013]. In 2012, 2,000 received refugee
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the law is applied appropriately. Whether some of the individuals granted
humanitarian residence or subsidiary protection status should instead have
qualified as refugees remains an unanswered question.
Nonetheless, the proportion of positive decisions by the Territorial Com-
missions is large. Italian authorities typically issue positive decisions in
more than fifty percent of the asylum claims.14 6 Counting the various forms
of protection together, asylum applicants were successful in roughly eighty
percent of the decisions issued by Italian authorities in 2012 and sixty per-
cent in 2013.147 This is a much higher percentage than those who received
protection in decisions reached in 2013 in France (seventeen percent), Ger-
many (twenty-six percent), or Belgium (twenty-nine percent).14 8
Several other aspects of the Italian asylum system bear mention. Deten-
tion is rarely employed.' 4 9 Only those who do not request asylum until after
they have received an expulsion order are detained.15 0 Furthermore, the Ital-
ian government has a liberal non-refoulement policy. It does not send individ-
uals with expulsion orders back to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, or
Sudan.''
1. Dublin Regulation Transfers
The EU Dublin Regulation has introduced a significant level of com-
plexity to the Italian asylum process, requiring Italian officials to consider
whether to transfer asylum seekers to other EU member states rather than
evaluating their claims for protection in Italy. When the Questura staff takes
fingerprints of asylum seekers, they forward the fingerprints to
EURODAC, the EU-wide asylum claimant database.15 2 If the EURODAC
system already contains the fingerprints, the state in which the asylum
seeker was fingerprinted may be responsible for assessing asylum eligibility.
This diverts the case to the Dublin Unit, an office within the Ministry of
the Interior.' 3 This group examines the case in light of the criteria set forth
status, 5,000 received subsidiary protection status, and 2,000 received humanitarian residence permits.
Asylum Applicants and First Instance Decisions on Asylum Applications: 2012, EUROSTAT, tbl.9 (2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-data-in-focus/-/KS-QA-13-005 [https://perma.cc/ED5J-
RZJE] [hereinafter EUROSTAT, Asylum Applications 2012].
146. Of the 23,565 decisions issued on asylum applications in 2013, 14,390 were positive. EUROS-
TAT, Asylum Applications 2013, supra note 145. Of the 27,280 decisions issued in 2012, 22,025 were
positive. EUROSTAT, Asylum Applications 2012, supra note 145.
147. This constituted an eighty percent success rate for the 27,290 decisions issued by Italian
authorities in 2012, EUROSTAT, Asylum Applications 2012, supra note 145, and a sixty-one percent
success rate for the 23,565 decisions issued in 2013, EUROsTAT, Asylum Applications 2013, supra note
145.
148. EUROSTAT, Asylum Applications 2013, supra note 145, fig.9.
149. Interview with Christopher Hein, Director, Italian Council on Refugees (CIR) (Nov. 28,
2012) [hereinafter Interview with Christopher Hein].
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 37.
153. Id.
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in the Dublin Regulation to see if the asylum application should be decided
elsewhere.'5 4 As noted earlier, the vast majority of cases considered by the
Dublin Unit concern the "default" provision: in the absence of family ties
or prior residence, the first EU state entered is responsible for the asylum
claim. 5
It is too soon to assess the impact of the 2013 modification to the Dublin
Regulation (Dublin III). The Dublin II Regulation did not require a per-
sonal interview of the asylum seeker or a hearing.' 56 The Dublin Unit
would only consider the fingerprint records, the travel route, and other de-
tails that the asylum seeker may have provided to the Questura staff during
earlier encounters.' 5 7 Based on this information, the Dublin Unit decided
whether Italy or another EU member state was responsible for evaluating
the asylum claim. If it was found to be the latter, the Dublin Unit issued an
order transferring the asylum seeker to the other EU state." If such an
order was issued, the Italian authorities closed the asylum procedure and no
longer considered the merits of the case.' 59
In 2014, Italy requested other EU states, primarily Greece and Malta, to
shoulder responsibility for 5,412 asylum applicants.1 60 Of these, Italy only
transferred ten individuals, less than one percent of the asylum seekers it
sought to send elsewhere.' 6' This minuscule result was due to the reluc-
tance of other EU states to accept responsibility under the Dublin Regula-
tion as well as various delays and other procedural errors by the Dublin
Unit, which resulted in judicial decisions quashing many of the transfer
orders. For example, the Regional Administrative Tribunal of Lazio can-
celled a transfer decision to Slovenia because the transfer had not taken
154. Id. at 38.
155. Dublin II, supra note 15, art. 10(1); Dublin III, supra note 16, art. 13.
156. The Dublin III Regulation requires a personal interview before an asylum seeker may be
transferred to another EU state. Dublin III, supra note 16; Commission Regulation 604/2013, 2013
O.J. (L 180) 31, art. 5 (EU); see ANNA GALOSI & CRISTINA LAURA CECCHINI, EUR. COUNCIL ON REFU-
GEES AND ExiLEs, DUBuN II REGULATION: NATIONAL REPORT: EUROPEAN NETWORK FOR TECHNICAL
COOPERATION ON THE APPLICATION OF THE DUBLIN II REGULATION - ITALY 16 (2012), hrtp://www
.refworld.org/docid/514054492.html [https://perma.ccIY79U-SZAQ) (hereinafter ECRE, DUBLIN 11
NATIONAL REPORT] (stating that Italian authorities schedule no interview specifically focused on a
Dublin transfer, instead relying on the information gathered during the verbalizzazione encounter during
the standard asylum application procedure); see also COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 40-41.
157. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 40-41.
158. Id. at 39.
159. Id. at 39-41 (stating that at this point, the asylum seeker could appeal the transfer order in
the Italian administrative courts).
160. Id. at 37. During the first six months of 2015, Italy made 4,871 outgoing Dublin transfer
requests. For statistics on Dublin requests in earlier years, see ECRE, DUBLIN II NATIONAL REPORT,
supra note 156, at 21. In 2011, Italy requested other EU states to accept 1,275 asylum applicants. Id.
The country wished to send 210 asylum seekers to Greece, 154 to Malta, 115 to Norway, and 101 to
the United Kingdom. Id.
161. See COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 37; ECRE, DUBLIN II NATIONAL REPORT, supra note
156, at 22 (describing that in 2011, other EU states agreed to assume responsibility for 196 of the
1,275 requests place by Italy, but Italy transferred only fourteen individuals).
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place within the six-month period mandated by the Dublin Regulation. 162
Another reason for the paltry number of Dublin transfers is the enduring
asylum system crisis in Greece, which many asylum seekers enter before
arriving in Italy.'63 The Dublin Unit has not officially suspended transfers
to Greece, despite the M.S.S. and N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home De-
partment judgments.' 6 4 It has, however, approved few such transfers, and
many of those approved have been overturned by the Italian administrative
courts. 165
The Dublin Unit is also responsible for replying to requests from other
countries that want to send asylum seekers back to Italy. In 2014, Italy
received 28,904 requests to take responsibility for determining the merits
of asylum claims filed in other European states.1 66 This is more than five
times as many requests as Italy presented to other states.' 6 7
Italy's exceedingly long coast line, combined with the southerly setting
of Sicily and Lampedusa's proximity to North Africa, has made it a favored
entry point into the EU. The overwhelming majority of Dublin transfer
requests received by Italy are based on the asylum seekers' entry into the
EU through Italy.' 6 8 In simple terms, other EU states are not arguing that
the asylum seekers have family links or prior ties to Italy that would make
Italy the appropriate venue for assessing the asylum claims. Rather, other
EU states almost always rely on the Dublin "default" criterion: Italy is
responsible for the asylum applications merely because the asylum seekers
arrived there prior to entering other EU countries.
Many, perhaps a majority, of the asylum seekers who arrive in Italy do
not want to stay there. They hope to travel further north, to countries with
more generous asylum systems, to countries with more developed immi-
grant communities, to countries with stronger economies, to countries
where the local language, such as French, Spanish, or English, is more
162. See ECRE, DUBLIN 11 NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 156, at 22-23.
163. Italian judges were suspending transfers even pre-M.S.S. based on the lack of implementation
of EU law in Greece. ECRE, DUBLIN 11 NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 156, at 25.
164. Id. at 24.
165. The Dublin Unit requested that Greece take responsibility for 210 cases in 2011, and it
appears that 2 of the 210 cases resulted in transfers. Id. at 24-25; see TAR, 15 febbraio 2012, n.1551,
Giur. it. 2012 (It.).
166. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 37. The majority of the Dublin requests came from
Switzerland, Germany, and Sweden. Id. The 28,904 requests received by Italy in 2012 resulted in 1,918
transfers. Id. Italy received 14,019 Dublin transfer requests from other countries in the first half of
2015. Id. at 64. Recently, Italy has opened several temporary centers to house those returned under the
Dublin Regulation. They can shelter 450 individuals on a temporary basis, and the majority of places
are reserved for vulnerable persons. Id.
167. Id. at 37 (reporting that Italy requested the transfer of 5,412 asylum seekers to other countries
pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, in contrast to the 28,904 Dublin transfer requests it received from
other countries).
168. See UNHCR, Mediterranean Emergency Response, supra note 8 (stating that Italy, along with
Greece, Spain, and Malta, form the southern border of the EU; France, Croatia, and Slovenia which also
are along the southern EU frontier, are more distant from Africa and the Middle East).
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widely used elsewhere in the world. 69 They fear harsh conditions in the
Italian asylum centers, and they are alarmed at the high unemployment rate
of Italian citizens. They also worry that there is not a chance that they will
have a decent life in Italy.'7 0
The numbers of asylum seekers entering through Italy continue to rise. A
decade ago, roughly 15,000 new asylum seekers reached Italy in an average
year, but more than 30,000 arrived in 2008 and nearly 40,000 when the
Arab Spring began in 2011. The number of arrivals by boat increased from
43,000 in 2013,'7 to 170,000 in 2014,172 and 150,000 in 2015.173 As
these asylum seekers, like the Lampedusa survivors, leave Italy and file ap-
plications elsewhere, they often face the Dublin Regulation. Many of them
contend that European human rights law protects them from being re-
turned to Italy." 4 They point to systemic deficiencies in the reception con-
ditions provided by Italy as the major flaw.
2. Reception Conditions
The Italian system, though decent in many regards, violates the EU Re-
ception Conditions Directive in profound ways that can result in demean-
ing and life-threatening conditions for asylum seekers. The disregard for the
reception conditions law occurs throughout the Italian procedure. The situ-
ation is so severe that in many instances other EU states should not rely on
the EU Dublin Regulation to return asylum seekers to Italy.
The failings in the Italian asylum policy highlight fractures that are
likely occurring elsewhere within the CEAS as well. Italy transposed the
terms of the EU Reception Conditions Directive into Italian law in 2005 by
adopting standards that correspond to the EU measures.'" Italy, however,
has not translated the law into reality, nor has its recent legislation incorpo-
rating the 2013 revision of the EU Reception Conditions Directive changed
that reality.' 76 In the ten years since the Italian reception conditions law
169. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TURNED AWAY: SUMMARY RETURNS OF UNACCOMPANIED
MIGRANT CHILDREN AND ADULT ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM ITALY TO GREECE 10 (2013), https://www
.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/italy0 13ForUploadO.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV95-UF43) [hereinaf-
ter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT); COUNTRY REPORT, sJpra note 13, at 38; Nelson, suopra note 2.
170. See infra text accompanying Part IV (describing claims made by asylum seekers).
171. Migrant Arrivals by Sea Top 170,000 in Italy in 2014, INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION (Jan. 16,
2015), https://www.iom.int/news/migrant-arrivals-sea-italy-top-170000-2014 [https://perma.cc/
SHM6-SA43).
172. Id.
173. UNHCR, Mediterranean Emergency Response, supra note 8 (reporting that 1,015,078 migrants
crossed the Mediterranean to Europe by boat in 2015, with 153,000 reaching Italy).
174. See infra Part IV.
175. Decreto Legislativo 30 maggio 2005, n.140, G.U. July 21, 2005, n.168 (It.).
176. In August 2015, the Italian government adopted legislation to implement the 2013 revisions
of the Reception Conditions Directive and the Procedures Directive. Decreto Legislativo 18 agosto
2015, n.142, G.U. Sept. 15, 2015 n.214 (It.) (addressing implementation of Directive 2013/33/EU on
minimum standards for the reception of asylum applicants and Directive 2013/32/EU on common
procedures for the recognition and revocation of the status of international protection); COUNTRY RE-
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went into effect, Italy has failed to provide an adequate and dignified stan-
dard of living to many asylum seekers. Indeed, a significant number of
asylum seekers have received no shelter at all. Many have been homeless,
reduced to begging for a place to sleep and foraging for food.17
There are several components to the problem. First, Italy has erected
bureaucratic barriers that prevent asylum seekers from filing their claims
for weeks or months. Second, Italian authorities have created overlapping
systems of shelters for asylum seekers, which creates confusion, and the
shelters accommodate far fewer than the number of asylum seekers who
arrive in Italy every year. Third, and most shocking, those granted protec-
tion in Italy often find themselves living on the street, abandoned by the
government authorities that have recognized their vulnerability and their
need. All three of these situations involve fundamental misreadings and
misapplications of EU law. The first stems from a restrictive and illogical
interpretation of the text of the Directive. The second results from the Ital-
ian government's failure to develop adequate shelters despite the clear com-
mand of both the Reception Conditions Directive and Legislative Decree
140/2005. The third arises from a fundamentally flawed vision of the un-
derlying purpose and requirements of the CEAS.
a. At the Beginning: Delayed Access to Shelters
Italy has adopted an exceedingly restrictive interpretation of the Recep-
tion Conditions Directive in order to avoid its responsibilities under the
CEAS. The Directive requires member states to make reception conditions
available to asylum applicants "when they make their application for asy-
lum."7a The Italian practice treats the verbalizzazione interview with the
Questura as the point at which the individual "makes an application for
asylum" within the meaning of the Reception Conditions Directive.17 9 The
scheduling of the verbalizzazione is completely controlled by the Questura;
the asylum seeker has no power to accelerate the date, which sometimes
occurs weeks or even months after entry into Italy. Between the time they
arrive in Italy and the date of their formal verbalizzazione interviews, asylum
seekers need food and shelter. Italy, however, refuses to view them as asy-
lum seekers and therefore denies them the protections mandated by the
CEAS. 80
PORT, supra note 13, at 12 (stating that a regulation implementing the legislation is expected to be
adopted within six months of the legislation's entry into force).
177. Swiss REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 60, at 6, 38-40.
178. Recast Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 80, art. 13(1).
179. COUNTRY REPORT, Supra note 13, at 21, 62; sw also Swiss REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 60,
at 11-12.
180. Interview with Christopher Hein, supra note 149 (indicating that asylum seekers who are
transferred from another EU member state to Italy pursuant to the Dublin Regulation generally arrive
at the Rome airport accompanied by police officers from the transferring state); see also COUNTRY RE-
PORT, supra note 13, at 59, 29-30 (stating that officials at the airport give the returned asylum seeker a
paper indicating the Questura to which they should report and that in recent years Italy has opened a few
83
Harvard Human Rights journal / Vol. 29
The Italian practice is an illogical and illegitimate interpretation of the
Reception Conditions Directive. Moreover, if member states can escape
their obligations under the Reception Conditions Directive by artificially
delaying the moment when persons "make" or "lodge" their asylum appli-
cation, this would provide perverse incentives. Article 3 states that the Di-
rective applies to those who "make an application for asylum at the border
or in the territory.""m Although the phrase "make an application" is not
defined, the Directive expressly contemplates that this act can take place at
the border. It is common that asylum seekers attempt to enter a country via
remote frontier areas, and remote border control posts often lack well-devel-
oped administrative facilities and staff. It follows that the Reception Condi-
tions Directive contemplates that an individual can "make an application
for asylum" via a straightforward communication to a border guard in a
small outpost. It is unnecessary to interpret the text to refer only to elabo-
rate, formal procedures in which the substance of asylum claims are fully
amplified.
A similar result should apply to asylum seekers who first encounter Ital-
ian authorities at a Questura office within Italy. The Article 3 text "make an
application for asylum" should encompass their request for permission to
stay and apply for asylum. Indeed, the Italian practice demonstrates that
Italian authorities in reality view the individuals as asylum seekers from
their first appearance at the Questura even though the authorities insist that
pre-asylum seekers do not mature into asylum seekers until they have their
verbalizzazione interviews. Though Italian authorities do not call individuals
asylum seekers until after the verbalizzazione, the only reason the authorities
schedule them for the verbalizzazione is that the authorities believe they
want to claim asylum.
Reflection on basic migration principles bolsters this conclusion. Italy,
like most states, generally requires non-citizens to obtain permission in or-
der to enter and remain within its territory. 18 2 EU law authorizes all EU
member states' citizens to move freely within the EU.183 Non-citizens with
entry visas also have permission to enter, as do individuals from states that
have special entry agreements with Italy. However, non-citizens who lack
visas or other special permission to enter and remain in Italy are barred-
temporary shelters for Dublin returnees, but frequently they are not eligible for accommodations in the
reception facilities).
181. Recast Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 80, art. 3(1).
182. NUALA MOLE & CATHERINE MEREDITH, ASYLUM AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 10 (2010) ("A key attribute of national sovereignty is the right of states to admit or
exclude aliens from their territory . . [oinly if exclusion from the territory or from protection would
involve a breach of some other provision of international law are states bound to admit aliens . . . (and
the} concept of asylum is the most important example of the latter principle.").
183. Treaty of Rome, supra note 27, art. I (establishing that free movement of EU citizens within
the EU is a cardinal principle of the EU); see also Council Directive 2004/38, 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77 (EU)
(establishing the current legislation governing free movement and the right of citizens of the Union and
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the member states).
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unless they qualify for asylum or other international protection. Those who
come to Italy to seek asylum generally do not possess Italian visas or resi-
dence permits. Accordingly, many of them promptly report to the Questura
to request permission to remain in Italy during their asylum process.184 The
Questura officials typically issue them temporary residence permission and
then schedule them to come back for the verbalizzazione interview.'18  The
non-citizens granted temporary residence by the Questura must be asylum
seekers, because otherwise there would be no basis for the verbalizzazione
interview. Accordingly, these non-citizens should also be considered asylum
seekers and entitled to the same protections as those who explicitly tell a
border guard they want asylum.
Indeed, the structure of the Reception Conditions Directive supports this
conclusion. The Directive orders EU states to provide individuals with doc-
uments stating they are asylum seekers and have permission to stay while
their asylum application is pending.' 86 States must do this within three
days after an application is "lodged."187 This requirement ensures that asy-
lum seekers can quickly obtain evidence that they are legally present. It
makes no sense for the Directive to mandate that member states act
quickly-within three days-to provide residence permission, but to allow
state officials to wait for weeks or months before they acknowledge that an
individual who has reported and asked for asylum officially "make[s] an
application for asylum."
Other provisions of the Reception Conditions Directive also support the
conclusion that asylum seekers "make" an asylum application as soon as
they first tell the authorities they want asylum or need international protec-
tion. The Directive requires member states to inform asylum seekers within
fifteen days of lodging their asylum claim of the benefits and obligations
related to their reception as asylum seekers.' States must furnish informa-
tion on organizations that may provide assistance to asylum seekers con-
cerning food, shelter, health, and other related services.' 8 ' In fact, the
Italian practice is to distribute leaflets with this type of information long
before the verbalizzazione interview. 90 It would defy common sense to think
that these EU obligations-which help asylum seekers provide for their
basic human needs and prepare for their asylum hearings-do not come
into play until fifteen days after several weeks of waiting for the verbalizza-
184. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 21 (stating that those who apply for asylum at the border
are given a letter, verbale di invito, that invites them to continue the asylum procedure by reporting to
the Questura office).
185. See, e.g., COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 13; Hussein v. Netherlands & Italy, App. No.
27725/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1¶ 33-34 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-118927#
{"itemid":["001-118927"I} fhttps://perma.cc/2428-47DQI.
186. Recast Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 80, art. 6(1).
187. Id.
188. Id. art. 5(1).
189. Id.
190. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 46-47.
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zione interview. It would be counterproductive for EU law to allow member
states to delay providing this information for several months while new-
comers wait in limbo.
Furthermore, the Directive authorizes member states to restrict asylum
seekers to an assigned area."' Under the Italian interpretation of "make an
application for asylum," the individuals who requested asylum at the bor-
der are not asylum seekers during the weeks or months before the verbaliz-
zazione interview. Therefore, the Directive would not allow Italy to limit
individuals' movements to an assigned area during their initial weeks or
months in the country. Illogically, the Italian understanding of the Direc-
tive would authorize officials to regulate the geographical locations of indi-
viduals only after they provide information at the verbalizzazione interview,
but would allow the newly arrived individuals free movement within Italy
before that time.
In addition to the text and structure of the Reception Conditions Direc-
tive, the policy behind the EU asylum law renders the Italian practice un-
supportable. The Directive is premised on the need for an "area of freedom,
security and justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legiti-
mately seek protection within the Union."192 Those forced to seek protec-
tion within Italy report to the Questura, return on the dates scheduled, and
frequently are rescheduled for appointments on subsequent dates. They
have no control over the date and time of the verbalizzazione interview. Yet
the Italian authorities insist that these individuals must somehow survive
on their own in Italy, a country where they are unlikely to speak the lan-
guage or have social networks. It is inhumane to exclude them from the
protections of the Reception Conditions Directive for the first few weeks
when they may be most vulnerable and isolated.
If member states can refrain from acknowledging that individuals have
lodged asylum claims until late in the process, member states can artifi-
cially shorten the period during which they must furnish food, shelter, and
other necessities of life. To escape the mandate that they provide a "stan-
dard of living adequate for the health of applicants and capable of ensuring
their subsistence,"" member states would simply need to declare that asy-
lum seekers only "make an application for asylum" when they provide evi-
dence at the hearing on the merits of their asylum claim. Under this
reading of the Directive, states are only responsible for providing the mate-
rial reception conditions specified by EU law only for the few hours or few
days between the merits hearing and the decision entered in the case. This
type of manipulation of procedural definitions by government authorities
surely is not what EU asylum law contemplates.
191. Recast Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 80, art. 7(1).
192. Recast Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 80, pmbl., cl. 2.
193. Id. art. 13(1).
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It is difficult to imagine a practice more destabilizing to the common
European asylum policy than Italy's delay for several weeks or months in
providing access to reception centers or other assistance to newly arrived
individuals. The prospect of homelessness at a time when they are disori-
ented, vulnerable, and isolated incentivizes asylum seekers to travel else-
where in Europe to file their asylum applications. This is true even if
homelessness only occurs to a portion of the asylum seeker population in
Italy; so long as asylum seekers think there is a significant possibility that
they may be homeless, they will want to leave.
b. In the Middle: Limited Number of Shelters and Limited Services
The Italian government provides accommodations to thousands of asy-
lum seekers each year, yet the specter of homelessness confronts many asy-
lum seekers and refugees in Italy. There are two major problems. There are
far fewer shelters than there are asylum seekers who need shelter; the shelter
system is disorganized, difficult to access, and uneven in quality. Annual
statistics highlight the lack of capacity problem. Italy reported that it re-
ceived approximately 15,000 asylum seekers per year in the first years of the
twenty-first century. This was followed by roughly 10,000 asylum seekers
per year for several years, and then the numbers increased dramatically.
There were 31,000 asylum seekers in 2008, 18,000 in 2009, 12,000 in
2010, 37,000 in 2011, 17,000 in 2012, 42,000 in 2013, 170,000 in 2014,
and 150,000 in 2015.194 In the face of these persistently large numbers of
arrivals, the Ministry of the Interior planned to double the accommodations
so that by 2016 the long-term reception centers may be able to shelter
30,000 asylum seekers.195 In addition, in 2014 and 2015, the Minister of
Interior requested local authorities to identify facilities that could be used
for emergency shelters for the large numbers of asylum seekers arriving by
sea.196
Aside from the dearth of accommodations, the reception system is
marked by confusion and dysfunction. Over the past two decades, Italy has
developed multiple overlapping systems to provide accommodations to asy-
lum seekers. National authorities have created Initial Reception and First
194. See Statistiche, CONSIGLIO ITALIANO PER I RIFUGIAT, http://www.cir-onfus.org/en/media2/sta-
tistics (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) [https://perma.cc/CU2W-KBYY} (reporting that starting in 2013 the
number of asylum claims has been far lower than the number of migrants reported to have arrived in
Italy); supra notes 169-174 (detailing arrivals in Italy since 2012, and indicating that observers say
many asylum seekers have chosen not to file asylum applications in Italy); see also, e.g., Niels Frenzen,
Very Few Migrants Reaching Italy Apply for Asylum, MIGRANTS AT SEA (Jan. 12, 2015), http://migrantsat-
sea.org/category/post-category/data-stats/ {https://perma.cc/LQ6Y-46TK}; COUNTRY REPORT, supra
note 13, at 38.
195. COUNTRY REPORT, sJpra note 13, at 68.
196. Id. See also William Spindler, Italy Reception Centres Under Strain as Thousands Rescued at Sea,
UNHCR NEWs STORIES (May 6, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/554a075a6.html [https://perma.cc/
5GKD-659G}.
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Aid Centers (CPSA), 19 7  Accommodation Centers for Asylum Seekers
(CARA),' 98 Accommodation Centers (CDA),1 '99 Centers for the Protection
of Refugees and Asylum Seekers (SPRAR) 2 0 0 and, most recently, Emer-
gency Reception Centers (CAS). 201 In theory, asylum seekers spend their
first few hours or days in the Initial Reception Centers for immediate medi-
cal care, health screening, and registration. Those without documents then
move to the CARA or CDA facilities for up to thirty-five days while their
identities are checked and their applications are formalized. 2 02 Afterwards,
they transfer to the SPRAR centers, where they spend six months. 203 In
theory, asylum seekers will be quickly registered and will have their asylum
claims reviewed during the first month; those who receive protection will
spend half a year with services that will help them become self-sufficient.
Premised on this optimistic timeline, the four CPSA Centers and the ten
CARA and CDA Centers were built as temporary processing centers
through which substantial numbers would pass in a short time. 20 4 Because
they were envisioned as temporary way stations, they are not equipped with
education, healthcare, and other services that help individuals respond to
their precarious situations. Further, they tend to be large institutions, some
197. EUR. MIGRATION NETWORK, FOCUSED STUDY 2013: THE ORGANIZATION OF RECEPTION FA-
CILITIES FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS IN DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES 2-3 (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european-migration-network/reports/docs/emn-studies/
14a.italy-national-report.reception-facilities en-version.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW8Z-JKF9)
[hereinafter EMN, FOCUSED STUDY} (indicating that Initial Reception and First Aid Centers, Centri di
Primo Soccorso ed Assistenza, (CPSA), established in 2006, are located near the major landing sites for boat
arrivals); see also COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 60.
198. Id. at 2-3 (describing Accommodation Centers for Asylum Seekers, Centri per Accoglienza di
Richiedenti Asilo (CARA), established by Legislative Decree 25/2008, are larger centers where it is con-
templated asylum seekers will remain for approximately thirty days while waiting for access to the
formal administrative asylum procedure); see also COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 60.
199. EMN, FOCUSED STUDY, supra note 197, at 2-3 (stating that Accommodation Centers, Centri
di Accoglienza (CDA), were established in 1995 for irregular migrants, not specifically for asylum seek-
ers, but asylum seekers sometimes receive accommodations); see also COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at
60.
200. EMN, FOCUSED STUDY, supra note 197, at 1 (describing the System of Protection for Asylum
Seekers and Refugees, Sistema di Protezione per Richiedenti Asilo e Refugiati (SPRAR), established in 2002
by Law 189/2002, which provides publicly funded shelters sponsored by local authorities and nonprofits
organizations, and consists of smaller shelters designed for longer stays, and Presidential Decree No.
303/2004 provides for a variety of assistance and integration services); COUNTRY REPORT, supra note
13, at 60-61.
201. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 60, 69 (stating that the October 2013 tragic deaths at
Lampedusa led the Italian government to establish Mare Nostrum, a naval operation in which Italian
ships patrolled the Mediterranean Sea to identify and assist endangered boats). Anticipating that these
operations would bring greater numbers of asylum seekers to Italy, the Ministry of Interior ordered local
governments to identify facilities that could be used as Emergency Reception Centers, Centri di Accog-
lienza di Soccorso (CAS). Id. By June 2015 these temporary shelters hosted 50,000 individuals. Id.
202. Id. at 74.
203. MARIA DE DONATO, ASYLUM INFO. DATABASE, COUNTRY REPORT: ITALY 52-53 (2015),
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/italy [https://perma.cc/8W8G-MYN7} (hereinafter
January 2015 COUNTRY REPORT}; EMN, FOCUSED STUDY, supra note 197, at 6 (discussing timing at
the different centers).
204. January 2015 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 203, at 52-53, 59-60.
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of which house over 1,000 individuals and are isolated from the local com-
munity. 2 05 In contrast, the 430 SPRAR Centers are much smaller, are
jointly run with municipalities and local groups, and provide multiple sup-
port services for the residents. 2 0 6
The reality collides with the theory. The accommodations are too few
and are fundamentally misallocated. There are approximately 750 places
available in the initial reception centers, approximately 10,000 in the
CARA and CDA centers, and-until recently-approximately 3,000 in the
SPRAR system. 2 0 7 How would asylum seekers move from the short-term
CARA centers to the longer-term SPRAR centers, if there are more than
twice the number of beds in the thirty-day CARA settings as there are in
the SPRAR centers where the stay is expected to be six times as long? This
fundamental mismatch in types of facilities led to a dysfunctional system.
After a few days in the Initial Reception and First Aid Centers, many asy-
lum seekers were assigned to CARA Centers, even though the individuals
in question had identity documents and did not need to be screened and
processed. They were not placed in SPRAR accommodations, because there
were no openings available. 208 The length of the stay compounded the inap-
propriateness of the setting. Many asylum seekers remained in the CARA
Centers far longer than the thirty-five day maximum 209 due to lack of ca-
pacity in the SPRAR facilities. Stays of six months or longer in the CARA
Centers were routine, 2 1 0 consigning asylum seekers to "temporary" centers
that lack needed social services such as psychological counseling, language
classes, vocational training, and so on. The recent plans to fund many more
SPRAR homes in order to accommodate up to 20,000 asylum seekers and
refugees should make a decided improvement in the Italian reception
system. 2 11
The lack of support services is intensified because the CARA Centers
tend to be located in isolated and rural settings, far from public transporta-
tion or normal community life. 2 12 Several are huge facilities. For example,
3,000 asylum seekers can be housed in the CARA Center in Mineo in Sicily
and more than 1,000 in the CARA Center Crotone in Calabria in southern
Italy.2 13 This is essentially a large warehouse of foreigners, far from home,
205. EMN, FOCUSED STUDY, supra note 197, at 1; COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 66.
206. EMN, FOCUSED STUDY, supra note 197, at 1; COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 66-68.
207. EMN, FOCUSED STUDY, supra note 197, at 6 (stating that SPRAR recently increased by 2,400
to bring capacity to 5,400). In September 2013 plans were announced to increase the number of
SPRAR placements to 16,000 by 2016. This number has been increased to 20,000. Id. COUNTRY
REPORT, supra note 13, at 68.
208. January 2015 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 203, at 52.
209. Decreto Legislativo 28 gennaio 2008, n.25, G.U. Feb. 16, 2008, n.40, art. 20 (It.) (establish-
ing that twenty days maximum if there are no documents, thirty-five days if there are false documents).
210. January 2015 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 203, at 53; D.Lgs. n. 25/2008, art. 6 (It.) (per-
mitting extended stays if no support for asylum seekers and no accommodations in SPRAR).
211. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 68.
212. Id. at 71.
213. Id. at 66.
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unschooled in Italian, and vulnerable to violence and crime. There have
been reports of poor sanitary conditions, with only three toilets for one
hundred individuals and no laundry facilities other than the showers; fur-
thermore, there have been reports of no heat and payment requested to
receive a pillow or a blanket. 2 14
Some asylum seekers are never assigned to a shelter and others leave shel-
ters due to the dehumanizing conditions. 2 15 Italian law provides that asy-
lum seekers who are not placed in CARA or SPRAR centers should receive
a financial allowance for living expenses. 2 16 Again, the reality diverges from
theory; officials never provide financial allowances. 217 Asylum seekers are
either assigned to over-capacity CARA or SPRAR centers or, sometimes,
turn to squatting in abandoned buildings, such as the notorious Salaam
Palace, home to 800 asylum seekers and refugees on the outskirts of
Rome. 2 1 8 In addition, some private organizations furnish housing and ser-
vices to asylum seekers and other vulnerable individuals, though there do
not appear to be many of these. 2 19
Italy has struggled to respond to the large numbers of asylum seekers
who have arrived during the past decade. 220 Ad hoc responses have resulted
in overlapping and uncoordinated systems to shelter asylum seekers. An
Italian parliamentary committee reported in November 2013 that Italian
accommodations for asylum seekers had progressively deteriorated through-
out each of the prior three years. 221 Two years later, in November 2015,
Doctors Without Borders issued a report to an Italian parliamentary com-
214. January 2015 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 203, at 63; see also Verwaltungsgeright (VG}
[Administrative Trial Court] Feb. 21 2013, 2A 126/11 (Ger.), http://www.rechtsprechung.niedersach
sen.de/jportal/portal/page/bsndprod.psml?doc.id=MWRE140000906&sc= null&showdoccase=I https:/
/perma.cc/9VG9-3PMM}.
215. E.g., Verwaltungsgeright [VG} [Administrative Trial Court] Feb. 21 2013, 2A 126/11 (Get.),
http://www.rechtsprechung.niedersachsen.de/jportal/portal/page/bsndprod.psml?doc.id=MWRE14000
0906&st=null&showdoccase=1 (https://perma.cc/9VG9-3PMM); Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No.
29217/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148070#{"itemid":["001-148
070"} [https://perma.cc/76ZV-FUBK}.
216. Decreto Legislativo 28 gennaio 2008, n.25, G.U. Feb. 16, 2008, n.40, art. 6(7) (It.) (indicat-
ing that the first payment of the allowance totals Eur 557.80 for the first 20 days; the second payment
amounts to Eur 418.35).
217. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 65.
218. Id.; see also Elisabetta Povoledo, Palace of Squatters is a Symbol of Refugee Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (June
14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/world/europe/palace-of-squatters-is-a-symbol-of-refu-
gee-crisis.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2P58-N9F4); Povoledo, Migrants in Rome, supra note 7.
219. Interview with Christopher Hein, supra note 149; Interviews with Individuals in St. Paul
Outside the Walls, Rome, Italy (Jan. 2013).
220. Khlaifia v. Italy, App. No. 16483/12 (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-157277
[https://perma.cc/E3TG-MTQS). On September 1, 2015, the ECtHR ruled that the reception condi-
tions in the Initial First Aid and Reception Center on Lampedusa constituted inhuman or degrading
treatment. Id. The court recognized that the Italian island Lampedusa had received 55,000 migrants in
a short time immediately after the 2011 Arab Spring political developments, and that the authorities
had worked to accommodate the large number of fleeing individuals. Id. Nonetheless, the court ruled
that the serious overcrowding, lack of sanitary facilities, and poor detention conditions violated Euro-
pean human rights law. Id.
221. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 70.
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mission criticizing reception centers in Sicily for "sanitation that is often
out of order, [lack of facilities] to give treatment against scabies and . . . no
guarantee of privacy."222 At the end of 2015, Doctors Without Borders
severed its ties with the reception center and explained its decision:
[Tihe overcrowding, the lack of legal information, the lack of
protection and the all-round precarious and undignified condi-
tions in which people are received in Sicily continue. Under cur-
rent circumstances, which we fear will continue, our capacity to
offer an effective response to the medical and psychological needs
of vulnerable people-including pregnant women, minors, and
victims of torture-in . . . reception centers across Ragusa Prov-
ince is extremely limited.2 2 3
Italy has announced plans to rationalize the reception system in 2016,
repositioning the existing CARA and CDA facilities as regional hubs that
will more efficiently process asylum applications. 2 2 4 The impact of these
plans is an open question. Thus far, the lack of long-term planning and the
lack of a coordinated and rational plan for accommodating asylum seekers
have exacerbated the pressures that large surges of refugees and other mi-
grants have imposed on the Italian asylum system.
c. At the End: After the Formal Grant of Protection
Italy's treatment of refugees and others granted protection might be even
more scandalous than the delay in providing accommodations at the start of
the asylum process or the deficits in reception conditions during the asylum
proceedings. For those who receive positive decisions on the applications for
protection, the Italian policy is to give them residence permits and leave
them to fend for themselves. Abandoned by the system after they succeeded
in their claims, some refugees have ended up homeless in Italy. 2 25
To put this in context, asylum seekers include some individuals who are
eligible for protection and others who are not. The Reception Conditions
Directive mandates that all receive accommodations, and that all should be
treated as potentially meritorious claimants at the start, because it is impos-
sible to know at the beginning-before applicants have a fair determination
procedure-which ones will ultimately be able to prove that they are enti-
tled to receive long-term residence in Italy. 2 2 6 Once the Italian asylum pro-
222. Migration: Unacceptable Conditions for Migrants and Asylum Seekers in Pozzallo Reception Center,
Italy, MEDECINS SANs FRONTIERS (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.msf.org/article/migration-unacceptable-
conditions-migrants-and-asylum-seekers-pozzallo-reception-center Chttps://perma.cc/WYF2-LRXJ.
223. Italy: MSF Ends Activites in Pozzallo Reception Center, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (Dec. 30,
2015), htrp://www.doctorswithoutborders.orglarticle/italy-msf-ends-activities-pozzallo-reception-center
[https://perma.cc/NWZ8-X578}.
224. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 67.
225. Swiss REFUGEE COUNCIL, supra note 60, at 39-41.
226. Recast Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 80, pmbl. (establishing need area of free-
dom and security for those who legitimately seek asylum in EU).
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cess has taken place and the authorities have evaluated all the applicants,
the authorities know which applicants' claims are meritorious and have the
legal right to stay in Italy. The existence of individuals who deserve protec-
tion lies behind the idea that member states must provide decent reception
conditions for asylum seekers.
However, the Italian practice discriminates against the very people the
system aims to protect. Once the Italian asylum process determines that an
individual deserves protection, that individual loses the right to the accom-
modations afforded to others still in the process-those who may or may
not have meritorious applications for protection.
A cramped reading of the Reception Conditions Directive underlies this
practice. The Directive refers to those who have "made an application for
asylum in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken."227 Rely-
ing on the reference to "final decision," the Italian government's view is
that those who have received a decision in their case no longer fall within
the scope of the Directive. To adopt such a limiting view of the Directive is
illogical 2 28 and contrary to the development of a common European asylum
policy. Those who have won their asylum cases are, by definition, vulnera-
ble and law-abiding individuals. They have followed the prescribed asylum
process and have proved they cannot be safe in their home country. They are
the very people the EU asylum policy intends to shelter. A literal reading of
the text can be said to support the Italian government's interpretation that
the Reception Conditions Directive extends only to applicants with pend-
ing claims and not to applicants whose claims have been decided. Indeed, it
is sensible to conclude that applicants whose claims have been rejected are
no longer entitled to the safeguards provided by the Reception Conditions
Directive. It makes no sense, however, to withdraw these safeguards from
those whose claims have been decided positively. The premise of the Recep-
tion Conditions Directive is that vulnerable newcomers to EU member
states need assistance to help them survive while they access their rights
under EU and international law. Their vulnerability and survival needs do
not vanish on the day they receive a decision vindicating their legal rights.
Once they have established their right to protection in the EU, they deserve
at least as much support as provided earlier.
Furthermore, it does not make sense to increase the vulnerability and
heighten the challenges to integration for the very people the Italian offi-
cials have just authorized to reside in Italy. When Italy grants residence
permission and simultaneously rescinds the entitlement to social support,
this sends a message that Italy does not want these individuals to stay. It
227. Id. art. 2(b); Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 34, art. 2(c).
228. See Reception Conditions Directive, supra note 34, pmbl. It is illogical to develop an area of
freedom, security, and justice for those within the EU in legitimate need of protection, but then to
withdraw social assistance as soon as individuals are evaluated and found deserving of protection.
92
2016 / Asylum Crisis Italian Style
casts doubt on the EU's stated commitment to "absolute respect of the
right to seek asylum."229
Moreover, it is self-defeating. If refugees and others granted protection
obtain basic necessities and participate in the social structures of Italian life,
they will become self-supporting and contribute to Italian society. Refugees
need avenues through which they can do so. Granting refugees residence
permits in need of regular renewal and telling them they are on their own is
not likely to yield positive gains for Italy or for the individuals in need of
international protection. A more justifiable approach would be to offer
some basic support to provide refugees a transition into Italian life. Hous-
ing subsidies, language classes, cultural awareness, vocational training-
these support services that are provided in some Italian centers open to
asylum seekers will, in the end, enable refugees to support themselves and
become part of the fabric of Italian life.
In addition to its contention that the Reception Conditions Directive
does not apply to asylum seekers who have been successful, Italy justifies its
abandonment of support for successful applicants on the terms of the 1951
Refugee Convention. The Convention requires contracting states to provide
refugees the same treatment accorded to nationals with regard to public
relief and assistance, 23 0 social security, 231 labor protection, 2 3 2 and public ed-
ucation. 23 3 With regard to employment, 234 self-employment 2 35 practicing a
profession,236 and access to housing, 237 contracting states must treat refu-
gees in as generous ways as they treat noncitizens. Italy argues that refugees
have the same rights as Italian citizens. 238 They can apply for jobs, rent
apartments, and go grocery shopping. This abstract "equal treatment" col-
lides with the reality that refugees and holders of subsidiary protection and
humanitarian permits are fundamentally disadvantaged in comparison with
Italian citizens. Currently, the applicants for protection tend to be new ar-
rivals, not members of communities that have long-established footholds in
Italy.239 The new arrivals generally do not speak Italian fluently and have
229. Tampere Declaration, supra note 32, f 13.
230. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 103, art. 23.
231. Id. art. 24.
232. Id.
233. Id. art. 22.
234. Id. art. 17.
235. Id. art. 18.
236. Id. art. 19.
237. Id. art. 21.
238. This is reminiscent of the damning commentary by Anatole France: "The law in its majestic
equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, beg in the street, and steal bread."
ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 119 (Calmann-L6vy trans., 14th ed. 2007) (1894).
239. For example, the largest group of asylum applicants reviewed in 2015 was from Nigeria
(12,500), followed by groups of applicants from a wide variety of African and Asian countries: Gambia
(6,500), Pakistan (6,000), Senegal (5,000), Bangladesh (4,500), Mali (4,000), and Afghanistan (3,000).
COUNTRY REPORT, Supra note 13, at 6. None of these countries had been a previous Italian colony or
had obvious ties to Italy.
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not been educated in Italy. They lack the familial and neighborhood net-
works that Italian citizens generally possess. Raised in different cultures
with different expectations, 240 refugees lack the training and cultural flu-
ency of those who are native-born. Justifying the treatment of refugees on
the grounds that refugees have the same rights as Italian citizens-that is,
neither citizens nor refugees receive help from the Italian government-is
dishonest.
Most fundamentally, Italy's view that successful applicants lose the pro-
tections mandated by the Reception Conditions Directive undermines the
CEAS. The Tampere Declaration proclaimed the EU aim to create "an area
of freedom, security and justice in the European Union" that is open to
"those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to our terri-
tory."24 1 When Italian authorities decide that the applicants who "justifia-
bly" sought access to Italy no longer fall within the scope of the CEAS, the
authorities' actions make the right to protection nothing more than an
ephemeral legal construct. If the asylum system does not address the basic
survival needs of those granted asylum, it is fundamentally misconceived.
A substantially related problem is that Italy's interpretation also incen-
tivizes successful applicants to leave Italy and seek protection elsewhere in
the EU. This will intensify secondary movements of refugees and others
who qualify for protection within the EU, a result that undercuts a major
goal of creating a common European asylum system. When one member state
installs a dramatically less desirable support framework for those granted
asylum than do the other member states, this will reduce the numbers of
individuals who want to remain in the first member state-like Italy. This,
in turn, will encourage asylum seekers to avoid or leave Italy for European
destinations where refugees have access to social support that allows them
to succeed. Secondary movements will impose substantial costs on other EU
member states. Not only will their reception systems be called on to re-
spond to greater numbers of applicants for protection, but their asylum
procedures and judicial systems will also experience greater workloads.
When those granted protection by Italy travel to other member states in
order to survive, the EURODAC system will report that they previously
resided in Italy. 2 4 2 Asylum authorities and national courts in the other
member states must now expend significant energy to assess whether the
individuals should be returned to Italy or whether the conditions prevailing
in Italy violate European human rights law.
If the Italian interpretation is correct in that the Reception Conditions
Directive applies only to asylum seekers and provides no assurances to those
granted protection, then the EU must amend the CEAS. A common system
cannot exist if the end results are so disparate: homelessness for those
240. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 6.
241. Tampere Declaration, supra note 32, ¶¶ 2, 3.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 62-69 (EURODAC discussion).
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granted refugee status in one EU state and state-provided accommodations
in another. This will fuel destabilizing secondary movements. The plight of
refugees and other successful applicants for protection will be an important
part of the European human rights calculus in assessing the threat of inhu-
man and degrading treatment if returned to Italy. As the German Adminis-
trative Court of Giessen concluded, the specter of homelessness for those
who have been granted protection in Italy is a powerful factor in refusing to
order returns under the Dublin Regulation. 243
III. EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND THE TRANSFER
OF ASYLUM SEEKERS
A. The Non-refoulement Norm
Almost fifty European states, including all twenty-eight EU member
states, have ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 2 4 4 One of the key features of
this broad human rights treaty is its prohibition of torture and inhuman
treatment: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment."2 45
The ECtHR has interpreted this provision to require state parties to re-
frain from torture and inhuman or degrading conduct within their territo-
ries and to refrain from returning individuals to countries where they face a
real risk of torture, inhuman, or degrading treatment. 246  1 The protection
against return to another country, known as non-refoulement protection, has
given the ECHR extraterritorial effect: rejected Chilean asylum seekers in
Sweden, for example, fell within ECtHR jurisdiction when they challenged
Sweden's decision to return them to their homeland. 247 Somali asylum seek-
ers also came within the protection afforded by the ECHR when they pro-
tested the Dutch government's order deporting them to "relatively safe"
areas of Somalia despite the generally unstable situation. 248
243. Verwaltungsgeright [VG} [Administrative Trial Court] Jan. 24 2013, 2013 OPENJUR 5398
(Ger.), https://openjur.de/u/601080.html [https://perma.cc/9UUE-RMET}; see infra text accompanying
notes 331-348.
244. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S.
222 [hereinafter ECHR). The ECHR was signed on November 4, 1950, came into force on September
3, 1953, and has been expanded and modified by seventeen Protocols. There are currently forty-seven
state parties to the convention. Chart of Signatures and Ratifications ofTreaty 005, COUNCILOF EUR. (Mar.
7, 2016), http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treacy/005/signatures?p-auth
=h3qllnPT (https://perma.cc/S32W-GCWV}.
245. ECHR, supra note 244, at 3.
246. Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Cr. H.R. 439 (1989).
247. Cruz Varas & Ors v. Sweden, 1991 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26.
248. Salah Sheekh v. Netherlands, App. No. 1948/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/app/conversion/pdf/?Iibrary= ECHR&id=001-78986&filename=001-78986.pdf [hrtps://perma.cc/
Y2Y5-UPZ3}.
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In addition to the broad reach of European human rights law, the ECHR
non-refoulement principle is more expansive than the non-refoulement obliga-
tion that arises in the traditional refugee context. International law forbids
the return of refugees to states "where [their) lives or freedom would be
threatened on account of [their] race, religion, nationality, political opinion
or membership in a particular social group."249 European human rights law
also forbids the return of anyone-not just refugees-to a state where there
are serious risks of inhuman or degrading treatment. 25 0 Consequently, asy-
lum seekers in Europe have sometimes been able to obtain relief under the
ECHR that they might not have been eligible for under refugee law princi-
ples. 25 1 This has led to a rich and varied jurisprudence to which rejected
asylum seekers in Europe frequently turn. 25 2 It is important to note, how-
ever, that European human rights law and European asylum law form paral-
lel systems with different remedies. In applying Article 3 of the ECHR, the
ECtHR can forbid deportation, which will yield permission to stay in Eu-
rope as long as the inhuman and degrading conditions remain in the home-
land. 253 Only the asylum system, however, can determine whether an
individual satisfies the refugee criteria and is entitled to a renewable resi-
dence permit as well as the other legal protections guaranteed by EU law to
those in need of international protection. 25 4
After the CEAS came into effect, asylum seekers in Europe began to rely
on European human rights law to challenge elements of the asylum system.
In particular, asylum seekers frequently challenged the operation of the
Dublin Regulation, asserting that, in practice, it resulted in individuals
being exposed to risks that they would experience inhuman or degrading
treatment or even death. In essence, they argued that the Dublin Regula-
tion's premise that all EU member states are safe countries for asylum seek-
ers was faulty.255 Some of these challenges to the Dublin Regulation
contended that the asylum procedures in some of the EU member states
were so inadequate that they would not yield accurate decisions on the mer-
its of the claims, and therefore would send asylum seekers to countries
where they faced persecution, torture, inhuman treatment, or worse. 25 6
Other challenges focused on the inadequacy of the reception conditions in
the EU state to which the asylum seeker would be transferred, arguing that
the asylum seekers would face inhuman or degrading treatment within the
249. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 103, art. 33(1).
250. ECHR, supra note 244, art. 3; Soering, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439; MOLE & MEREDITH, supra note
182, at 20-21.
251. MOLE & MEREDITH, Supra note 182, at 23-38.
252. See generally MOLE & MEREDITH, supra note 182.
253. Id. at 19-23.
254. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
255. E.g., K.R.S. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32733/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 17 (2008), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"docname":{"k.r.s."),"itemid":{"001-90500"}} [https://perma.cc/4VSC-YSMQ}
("The presumption must be that Greece will abide by its (CEAS) obligations.").
256. E.g., id. at 12-14.
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EU. 25 7 Both of these assertions were present in M.S.S., a challenge filed by
an Afghan asylum seeker who protested the Belgian authorities' reliance on
the CEAS in sending him back to Greece. 25 8 In its landmark judgment in
2011, the ECtHR ruled that Greece was not a safe country and that
Belgium could not apply the Dublin Regulation to send an asylum seeker
to Greece. 25 9 Within one year, the CJEU came to a similar conclusion in
N.S. 2 60 These two opinions seriously impaired the Dublin Regulation, one
of the structures that undergird the CEAS. Together, they foreshadowed
Tarakhel, the 2014 judgment that has thrown the functioning of the CEAS
into doubt.
B. Judicial Enforcement of European Human Rights Law
1. The European Court of Human Rights
During the last few decades of the twentieth century, the ECtHR's juris-
prudence has gradually expanded protection afforded to asylum seekers in
Europe. An actual grant of asylum, however, was beyond its purview. 261
The court's interpretations of human rights law developed on a parallel
track to EU law. However, as the EU increasingly gained competence over
migration and asylum matters, it became more likely that EU law and Eu-
ropean human rights law would intersect. As the EU developed the CEAS,
albeit in a piecemeal fashion, litigants mounted human rights challenges to
the CEAS framework. 2 62
A pivotal case came before the ECtHR shortly after the final pillar of the
CEAS, the Asylum Procedures Directive, became law. 263 Mr. K.R.S., a citi-
zen of Iran, arrived in the United Kingdom in 2006 and filed an asylum
claim. 2 6 4 The United Kingdom authorities determined that he had entered
the EU via Greece and that he should be returned to Greece pursuant to the
2003 Dublin Regulation for a ruling on the merits of his case. He filed
judicial challenges to this ruling in the United Kingdom courts, but ulti-
mately was unsuccessful.2 65 He was ordered to be deported to Greece in
July 2008.
257. E.g., Hussein v. Netherlands & Italy, App. No. 27725/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 59 (2013), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-118927#{"itemid":{"001-118927"}} [https://perma.cc/2428-47DQ}.
258. M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, 2011-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 255.
259. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 279-299.
260. Joined Cases C-411/10&C-493/10, N.S. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2011 E.C.R. I-
13905; see discussion infra in text accompanying notes 305-327.
261. MOLE & MEREDITH, supra note 182, at 19.
262. See generally MOLE & MEREDITH, supra note 182.
263. The Procedures Directive, supra note 36, was the final pillar to become law. It was enacted in
2005, and article 43 provides that member states must implement the Directive's terms into national
legislation by December 1, 2007 (with an extension until December 1, 2008 to implement art. 15
regarding the right to legal assistance and representation).
264. K.R.S. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32733/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng#{"docname":("k.r.s."),"itemid":1"001-90500"I} [https://perma.cc/4VSC-YSMQ}.
265. Id. at 2-3.
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One week before his expulsion, he sought an emergency stay from the
ECtHR. 266 He contended that Greece had not complied with the Asylum
Procedures Directive and that the asylum procedures in Greece were so defi-
cient that he faced a serious risk of being sent back to Iran where he feared
persecution or worse. The court granted the request, known as a Rule 39
measure 2 67 and informed the United Kingdom authorities that Mr. K.R.S.
should not be expelled to Greece pending the court's review of his case. 2 68
The court specifically referred to a UNHCR report casting doubt on the
adequacy of the asylum procedures in Greece:
The parties' attention is drawn to paragraph 26 of the [UNHCR}
report that states that "In view of EU Member States' obligation
to ensure access to fair and effective asylum procedures, including
in cases subject to the Dublin Regulation, UNHCR advises Gov-
ernments to refrain from returning asylum seekers to Greece
under the Dublin Regulation until further notice. UNHCR rec-
ommends that Governments make use of Article 3(2) of the Dub-
lin Regulation, allowing States to examine an asylum application
lodged even if such examination is not its responsibility under
the criteria as laid down in this Regulation."
[Tlhe Rule 39 measure will remain in force pending confirma-
tion from your authorities that the applicant, if removed to
Greece and if he so wishes, will have ample opportunity in
Greece to apply to the Court for a Rule 39 measure in the event
of his onward expulsion from Greece to Iran.2 6 9
This was hardly a unique situation. The ECtHR reported that it had
issued eighty provisional stays under Rule 39 suspending removals from the
United Kingdom to Greece during the four months in 2008 when Mr.
K.R.S. filed his stay request. 270 The large number of emergency stays issued
by the court signaled that the court had serious concerns about the safety of
asylum seekers transferred to Greece. Nonetheless, despite the concerns ex-
pressed by UNHCR, international human rights bodies, and nongovern-
mental organizations, the court ultimately concluded that "the
presumption must be that Greece will abide by its obligations under" the
266. Id. at 3.
267. Under Rule 39 of its Rules of Court, the ECtHR may indicate any "interim measure" that it
considers should be adopted "in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings."
R. OF CT. R. 39(1), EUR. CT. H.R. As a majority of Rule 39 applications relate to the suspension of an
expulsion or extradition order, the Court grants such requests "only on an exceptional basis, when the
applicant would otherwise face a real risk of serious and irreversible harm." ECHR Press Unit, Interim
Measures, EUR. CT. H. R. (2013), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS Interim-measures-ENG.pdf
{https://perma.cc/B5AJ-U8WM).
268. K.R.S. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32733/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 3 (2008), http://hudoc
.echr.coe.int/eng#{"docname":("k.r.s."),"itemid":["001-90500"I} [https://perma.cc/4VSC-YSMQ}.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 3-4.
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CEAS.2 7 ' New asylum legislation in Greece gave comfort to the ECtHR.
The court ruled that the United Kingdom could rely on the CEAS, and on
the Dublin Regulation in particular, to send Mr. K.R.S. to Greece. Only in
Greece could he then submit an asylum request. 2 72 Accordingly, as of late
2008, the court reaffirmed the view of the United Kingdom and other EU
member states that the Dublin Regulation permitted them to send asylum
seekers found in the interior of the EU to member states forming the EU's
external borders. 2 7 3
A mere two years after the unanimous decision in K.R.S. v. the United
Kingdom, the ECtHR changed direction. In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,2 74
the court concluded that Belgium had violated European human rights law
when it relied on the Dublin Regulation to send an asylum seeker to
Greece. 275 The fact that Greece had adopted the CEAS provisions into na-
tional legislation did not warrant a presumption that Greece would abide
by EU law. 2 76 Indeed, the court ruled that the reception conditions and
asylum procedures were so abysmal in Greece that sending an asylum seeker
to Greece subjected him to inhuman and degrading treatment. 2 7 7 Moreover,
the court ruled that in addition to Greece's violation of European human
rights law, Belgium's transfer pursuant to the Dublin Regulation had also
violated the asylum seeker's human rights. 2 7 8
Mr. M.S.S., an Afghan asylum seeker, entered Greece in 2008, was de-
tained for one week, and left Greece without applying for asylum.2"9 He
traveled to Belgium, where he filed an asylum claim based on his work as
an interpreter for international forces in Kabul. 28 0 When he provided docu-
ments supporting his work as an interpreter, the Belgian authorities refused
to review them because Greece was responsible for determining his asylum
application, according to the Dublin Regulation. 2 81 His attorney attempted
to appeal this decision in Belgium and to seek an emergency stay from the
ECtHR under Rule 39, but Belgian authorities promptly transferred Mr.
271. Id. at 17-18. In addition, the Court established another presumption with regard to the
possibility of a subsequent remedy for the asylum seeker: "The Court recalls in this connection
that Greece, as a Contracting State, has undertaken to abide by its tEuropean Human Rights) Conven-
tion obligations and to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined
therein, including those guaranteed by Article 3. In concrete terms, Greece is required to make
the right of any returnee to lodge an application with this Court under Article 34 of the Convention
(and request interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court) both practical and effective. In the
absence of any proof to the contrary, it must be presumed that Greece will comply with that obligation
in respect of returnees including the applicant." Id.
272. Id. at 17-18.
273. Id.
274. 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255.
275. Id. $1 360, 368.
276. Id. $T 345-60.
277. Id. $T 347-60.
278. Id. ¶ 360.
279. Id. T$ 9-10.
280. Id. 1$ 11, 267.
281. Id. T 17.
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M.S.S. to Greece.2 8 2 While his attorney in Belgium pursued the legal pro-
ceedings, Mr. M.S.S. was detained in Greece in a small room with twenty
other individuals, provided only a dirty mattress to sleep on and very little
food to eat, allowed to use the toilets only at the discretion of the guards,
and denied all access to the outdoors. 283 After three days, he was released
from detention and applied for asylum. 284 He had nowhere to live, so he
went to a park where other homeless asylum seekers had gathered.2 85 Un-
protected from the elements and from criminal acts, he managed to survive
six weeks of homelessness, at which point he tried to leave Greece. 2 8 6 He
was arrested again and placed in detention for a week, convicted of using
false papers in his attempt to leave Greece, and sentenced to time served. 287
In reviewing these facts, the ECtHR expressly acknowledged the particu-
lar burdens the EU asylum law places on Greece:
The Court notes first of all that the States which form the exter-
nal borders of the European Union are currently experiencing
considerable difficulties in coping with the increasing influx of
migrants and asylum seekers. The situation is exacerbated by the
transfers of asylum seekers by other member States in application
of the Dublin Regulation. The Court does not underestimate the
burden and pressure this situation places on the States concerned,
which are all the greater in the present context of economic crisis.
It is particularly aware of the difficulties involved in the recep-
tion of migrants and asylum seekers on their arrival at major in-
ternational airports and of the disproportionate number of
asylum seekers when compared to the capacities of some of these
States. However, having regard to the absolute character of Arti-
cle 3, that cannot absolve a State of its obligations under that
provision. 28 8
Turning to the homelessness that Mr. M.S.S. had suffered while an asy-
lum seeker in Greece, the court emphasized:
[T]he situation in which the applicant has found himself is par-
ticularly serious. He allegedly spent months living in a state of
the most extreme poverty, unable to cater for his most basic
needs: food, hygiene and a place to live. Added to that was the
ever-present fear of being attacked and robbed and the total lack
282. Id. $$ 386-92.
283. Id. ¶ 206.
284. Id. ¶ 35.
285. Id. ¶ 37.
286. Id. $$ 37, 43.
287. Id. IT 43-45 (explaining that he was arrested for possessing a false Bulgarian identity card,
convicted of attempting to leave the country with false papers, and sentenced to two months imprison-
ment, suspended for three years).
288. Id. $ 223.
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of any likelihood of his situation improving. It was to escape
from that situation of insecurity and of material and psychologi-
cal want that he tried several times to leave Greece. 2 8 9
Further, the court noted that the Greek authorities must have known that
asylum seekers were reduced to homelessness:
[T~he Court does not see how the authorities could have failed to
notice or to assume that the applicant was homeless in Greece.
The Government themselves acknowledge that there are fewer
than 1,000 places in reception centres to accommodate tens of
thousands of asylum seekers. [It is a well-known fact that at the
present time an adult male asylum seeker has virtually no chance
of getting a place in a reception centre and that . . . all the Dub-
lin asylum seekers questioned by the UNHCR were homeless.
Like the applicant, a large number of them live in parks or dis-
used buildings. 2 9 0
Therefore, the court concluded:
[11n view of the obligations incumbent on the Greek authorities
under the European Reception Directive, the Court considers
that the Greek authorities have not had due regard for the appli-
cant's vulnerability as an asylum seeker and must be held respon-
sible, because of their inaction, for the situation in which he has
found himself for several months, living on the street, with no
resources or access to sanitary facilities, and without any means of
providing for his essential needs. The Court considers that the
applicant has been the victim of humiliating treatment showing
a lack of respect for his dignity and that this situation has, with-
out doubt, aroused in him feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority
capable of inducing desperation. It considers that such living
conditions, combined with the prolonged uncertainty in which
he has remained and the total lack of any prospects of his situa-
tion improving, have attained the level of severity required to fall
within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. 2 9 1
The court also examined the conditions of detention in which Mr. M.S.S.
was held. It noted that prior ECtHR judgments had concluded that detain-
ing asylum seekers for two to three months in an "overcrowded place in
appalling conditions of hygiene and cleanliness" had violated the prohibi-
tion against inhuman and degrading treatment. 292 Mr. M.S.S. had been de-
289. Id. ¶ 254.
290. Id. 258.
291. Id. ¶ 263.
292. Id. ¶ 222 (referring to S.D. v. Greece, App. No. 53541/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":{"001-93034"1} [https://perma.cc/S9WL-QDR5}; Tabesb v. Greece,
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tained for significantly less than two months, though he had been detained
on two or three occasions. 2 93 In these circumstances, the court held that the
conditions of detention constituted inhuman and degrading treatment:
"[Al period of detention of six days, in a confined space, with no possibility
of taking a walk, no leisure area, sleeping on dirty mattresses and with no
free access to a toilet is unacceptable with respect to Article 3."294
Accordingly, the court ruled that Mr. M.S.S. had experienced massive
and substantial violations of his human rights while an asylum seeker in
Greece. 295 In particular, the court emphasized the prolonged homelessness
Mr. M.S.S. experienced, his lack of access to sanitary facilities, the lengthy
periods of uncertainty he suffered concerning his ability to access the asy-
lum process, and his lack of prospects for improvement. 296
Furthermore, the court emphasized that Belgium as well as Greece had
also violated European human rights law. 29 7 The Belgian authorities' reli-
ance on the Dublin Regulation did not preclude their responsibility under
the ECHR:
[Tihe [degrading] conditions of detention and living conditions
in Greece . . . were well known before the transfer of the appli-
cant and were freely ascertainable from a wide number of
sources. . . . [Tjhe Court considers that by transferring the appli-
cant to Greece the Belgian authorities knowingly exposed him to
conditions of detention and living conditions that amounted to
degrading treatment. 298
Significantly, though the court ruled that both Greece and Belgium had
violated Article 3, the court assessed greater damages against Belgium than
against Greece. 299
The M.S.S. judgment effectively fractured the CEAS. The court ruled
that European human rights law trumps EU law. Moreover, the court ruled
that the Dublin Regulation, one of the main pillars of the EU asylum sys-
tem, was unlawful, at least in regard to transfers of asylum seekers to
Greece. More broadly, the consequence of the M.S.S. judgment was that
European states could no longer rely on the presumption that all EU mem-
ber states are safe countries with minimally acceptable asylum systems. Nor
could EU member states rely on a ministerial application of the Dublin
App. No. 8256/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":{"001-95892"]}
[https://perma.cc/8MC7-PK2H); A.A. v. Greece, App. No. 12186/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"itemid":{"001-100014"} [https://perma.cc/8SSB-DJTJ]).
293. Id. ¶¶ 10, 33-35.
294. Id. 222.
295. Id. ¶¶ 263-64.
296. Id. ¶ 263.
297. Id. ¶ 362-68.
298. Id. ¶ 366-67.
299. The Court awarded 24,900 Euro in non-pecuniary damage against Belgium, id. ¶ 411, and
1,000 Euro against Greece, id. $ 406.
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Regulation criteria in transferring asylum seekers to other member states.
In the future, member states would have to assess the individual situation of
every asylum seeker who protested that the Dublin Regulation would result
in deportation to a state with inadequate asylum policies and practices. A
transfer authorized pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, such as a transfer to
the first EU member state the asylum seeker had entered, could not proceed
if the transferred asylum seeker would not be safe. In such situations, the
EU state with custody of the asylum seeker would have to relinquish its
plan to transfer the asylum seeker and would have to determine the merits
of the asylum claim.
2. The Court ofJustice of the European Union
A few months after the M.S.S. judgment, the CJEU considered a similar
case, N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, and reached a similar
result regarding the Dublin Regulation and the CEAS. Significantly, the
CJEU grounded its conclusion in a different source of law. The European
Parliament, European Commission, and Council of Ministers proclaimed
the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000,300 but its legal status remained
uncertain for a decade. The Charter did not become EU law until the Lis-
bon Treaty adopted it in 2009.301 Many provisions are relevant to the Euro-
pean asylum policy, but two are particularly salient. Article 4 of the
Charter, identical to Article 3 of the ECHR, states, "No one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."302
Article 18 states, "The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due re-
spect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Proto-
col of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance
with the Treaty establishing the European Community."o3
It was against this backdrop that N.S. developed. Rather than arguing
that European human rights law trumped aspects of the EU asylum system,
Mr. N.S. asserted that EU law itself prohibited the member states' auto-
matic reliance on the EU CEAS. Specifically, he claimed that the EU Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights prohibits a conclusive presumption that member
states are in compliance with the CEAS and that a member state can rely on
the Dublin Regulation to transfer asylum seekers to another member
state.304
300. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391 thereinafter
Charter); see also EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: How the Charter Became Part of the EU Treaties, EUR.
COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 8,
2016) {https://perma.cc/VT7A-GWDB] (hereinafter How the Charter Became Part of the EU Treaties)
(explaining the Charter's evolving legal status).
301. How the Charter Became Part of the EU Treaties, supra note 300.
302. Charter, supra note 300, art. 4.
303. Id. art. 18.
304. Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10, N.S. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2011 E.C.R. I-
13905, ¶ 48.
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Mr. N.S., an Afghan asylum seeker, entered the EU via Greece, where he
was arrested and detained."o" He did not claim asylum, was expelled to
Turkey-where he was imprisoned-and eventually traveled to the United
Kingdom, where he immediately filed for asylum. 0 6 United Kingdom au-
thorities relied on the Dublin Regulation to order him deported to
Greece, 07 while the asylum seeker protested that the inadequate reception
conditions and substandard asylum procedures in Greece would violate his
fundamental rights under EU law.30 He challenged this decision in the
United Kingdom courts, which, ultimately, referred the case to the
CJEU.3 09
Simultaneously, the High Court of Ireland referred a case to the CJEU in
which asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Iran, and Algeria had traveled to
Greece, where they had been arrested for illegal entry and fingerprinted.3 1o
They then made their way to Ireland, where they applied for asylum and
contended that the deficiencies in the Greek asylum system precluded their
return to Greece under the Dublin II Regulation.311
The national courts asked the CJEU for a preliminary ruling concerning
the interaction of the EU Charter and the CEAS.31 2 Two questions capture
the heart of the matter. The first: "[Dloes the obligation to observe EU
fundamental rights preclude the operation of a conclusive presumption that
the responsible State will observe . . . the minimum standards [set forth by
the Reception Conditions Directive, Qualification Directive, and Asylum
Procedures Directive]?" 13 The second: "Is the transferring Member State
under [the Dublin Regulation] obliged to assess the compliance of the re-
ceiving Member State with Article 18 of the Charter [the right to asylum]
and the [Common European Asylum System] Directives?",'4
305. Id. ¶ 34. The CJEU also joined a case in which asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Iran, and
Algeria filed similar challenges to Ireland's decision to rely on the Dublin Regulation to return them to
Greece. All of the individuals had entered the EU through Greece; none had filed asylum applications
in Greece. Id. ¶ 51. They argued that the asylum procedures and reception conditions in Greece invali-
dated the decision to deport them to Greece.
306. Id. ¶ 35.
307. Id. T 37.
308. Id. ¶ 38.
309. Id. TT 41-50.
310. The President of the CJEU joined Case C-493/10, M.E. v. Refugee Applications Commissioner,
and Case C-411/10, N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, as companion cases on May 16,
2011. Id ¶ 54.
311. None of the individuals had filed asylum applications in Greece. See id. f¶ 51-52.
312. Id. ¶ 50.
313. Id. ¶ 50(3). The first question posed by the United Kingdom court concerned the CJEU's
competence to decide the matter, which the CJEU answered in the affirmative. The six additional
questions raised concerns about the extent to which an EU member state could satisfy its human rights
obligations by transferring asylum seekers to another EU member state and relying on the transferee
state to comply with European asylum and human rights law. Id. ¶ 50(1)47).
314. Id. ¶ 53(1). The High Court in Ireland stayed the proceedings to ask the CJEU whether
Ireland could rely on the Dublin Regulation. The two referred questions focused on whether Ireland was
obliged to analyze Greece's compliance with European asylum law and, if Greece was not compliant,
whether Ireland would be responsible for deciding the merits of the asylum claim. Id. ¶¶ 5 1-53.
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The CJEU noted that the structure of the CEAS, and particularly the
Dublin Regulation, is premised on "mutual confidence" that all member
states are treating asylum seekers in compliance with the legislative provi-
sions.315 According to the court: "It is not however inconceivable that the
system may, in practice, experience major operational problems in a given
member state meaning that there is a substantial risk that asylum seekers
may, when transferred to that Member State, be treated in a manner incom-
patible with their fundamental rights."316
Once the court acknowledged the divergence between theory and prac-
tice in European asylum law, it struggled to delineate when the discrepancy
would become too great. It emphasized that minor violations of the CEAS
legislation were not sufficient to undercut a member state's ability to rely
on the Dublin Regulation to transfer an asylum seeker to another member
state for examination of the merits of the asylum claim.3 17 However, the
court stated:
[I1f there are substantial grounds for believing that there are sys-
temic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for
asylum applicants in the Member State responsible, resulting in
inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article
4 of the Charter, of asylum seekers transferred to the territory of
that Member State, the transfer would be incompatible with that
provision.""
Accordingly, the court ruled that EU states cannot presume conclusively
that member states will comply with the fundamental guarantees imposed
by EU law,319 because ratification of refugee and human rights conventions
does not necessarily entail compliance with the treaty provisions. 320 Conse-
quently, awareness of systemic deficiencies in the reception conditions and
asylum procedures will make it impossible to rely on the Dublin Regula-
tion to transfer asylum seekers.3 2 1 In response to concerns that member
states lacked tools to determine accurately the asylum conditions in sister
states, the CJEU observed that reports by UNHCR, international nongov-
315. Id. 79.
316. Id. 81.
317. Id T$ 82-85.
318. Id. ¶ 86. The precise formulation incorporates a double negative: "Article 4 of the [EU Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights] must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States . . . may not
transfer an asylum seeker to the 'Member State responsible' within the meaning of [the Dublin Regula-
tion] where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the
reception conditions of asylum seekers in that member State amount to substantial grounds for believ-
ing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment. . . ." Id. ¶ 106; see also id. ¶ 2 (CJEU's ruling on Question 2).
319. Id. ¶ 99.
320. Id. 1¶ 102-03.
321. Id. ¶ 106.
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ernmental organizations, and international and regional institutions would
provide trustworthy data.3 2 2
If a member state becomes aware of systemic deficits in a sister state that
precludes transfer to that state, the member state should examine whether,
pursuant to the Dublin Regulation criteria, any other EU state has respon-
sibility over the asylum application in question. 32 3 The CJEU warned, how-
ever, that this second phase of the Dublin process should not take too long:
"The Member State in which the asylum seeker is present must, however,
ensure that it does not worsen a situation where the fundamental rights of
that applicant have been infringed by using a procedure for determining
the Member State responsible which takes an unreasonable length of
time. "324
If the terms of the Dublin Regulation do not provide an expeditious
transfer of the asylum seeker to another EU member state, the sovereignty
clause comes into play.3 2 I The member state where the asylum seeker is
present must determine the merits of the asylum claim.3 2 6 Based on this
analysis, the CJEU expressly ruled that EU law itself precludes a conclusive
presumption that the CEAS is actually in effect in all EU member states. 327
IV. Asyi.um, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND NON-REFOULEMENT TO ITALY
The M.S.S. judgment by the ECtHR and the N.S. judgment by the
CJEU created major challenges for the CEAS. They ruled that the asylum
procedures and reception conditions for asylum seekers in Greece were so
deficient that other EU member states could not return them there. Both
courts undertook detailed analyses of the conditions facing the individual
protesting transfer back to Greece. Both courts were attentive to the exis-
tence of "substantial grounds for believing there are systemic flaws."328
Moreover, both courts evaluated the conditions in Greece to determine
whether they constituted inhuman or degrading treatment.
These judicial rulings have serious implications, particularly for Italy.
This is because many asylum seekers first enter the EU through Italy. 3 2 9
When other member states locate asylum seekers or recognized refugees
within their borders, the government authorities are likely to ask if the
asylum seekers' journey took them through Italy. If so, EU states have an
322. Id. $$ 90-91.
323. Id. ¶ 96.
324. Id. ¶ 98.
325. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing sovereignty clause).
326. Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10, N.S. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2011 E.C.R. I-
13905, ¶¶ 107-08.
327. Id. ¶ 99.
328. Id. ¶ 86.
329. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT, supra note 169, at 10-11.
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incentive to employ the Dublin Regulation to return the asylum seekers to
Italy.
Since 2011, asylum seekers have tried to rely on European human rights
law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to halt their transfer to
Italy. In response, government authorities have argued that the M.S.S. and
N.S. judgments are limited to circumstances like those in Greece, where
there was a total breakdown in the asylum procedures, reception conditions,
and grants of refugee status. In their view, human rights norms counter-
mand Dublin Regulation transfers to Italy only if asylum seekers can
demonstrate the Italian asylum system is totally and thoroughly
dysfunctional.3 3 0
A. jurisprudential Developments
A growing number of courts, both at the national and supranational
level, have wrestled with the standards set by the ECtHR and the CJEU
and the applicability of the standards to the situation in Italy. Their analy-
ses have been intensely fact-driven, and the dialogue between courts has
yielded inconsistent results. What has been consistent, however, is the great
unease tribunals have voiced when the Dublin Regulation intersects with
credible claims of substandard asylum systems.
1. National Courts
A series of German judicial opinions published in 2013 evaluated chal-
lenges to Germany's reliance on the Dublin Regulation to return asylum
seekers to Italy. Administrative courts in Giessen, Braunschweig, Diissel-
dorf, and Frankfurt am Main concluded that there were serious and system-
atic shortcomings that would present a substantial risk of inhuman or
degrading treatment if the asylum seekers were sent to Italy. It is hard to
know how representative these cases are, but they reveal concerns that
judges in another EU state have about reception conditions in Italy.
In January 2013, the Administrative Court in Giessen considered the
appeal of an Eritrean family against the government's decision to rely on
the Dublin Regulation to send them back to Italy.3 3 1 The applicants were a
married couple who had fled military conscription in Eritrea and escaped to
Sudan.33 2 They married in Sudan, had one child there, and traveled through
several countries before they entered Italy. 3 3 They filed asylum claims and
330. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10, N.S. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2011
E.C.R. 1-13905; Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, Eur. Ct. H.R., $ 71, 79 (2014), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148070#{"itemid":["001-148070"}} [hrtps://perma.cc/76ZV-FUBK).
331. Verwalcungsgeright (VG) (Administrative Trial Court] Jan. 24 2013, 2013 OPENJUR 5398
(Get.), https://openjur.de/u/601080.html [https://perma.cc/9UUE-RMET.
332. Id. ¶ 2.
333. The husband said he went to Turkey, Greece, and then Italy. The wife, who had deserted the
Eritrean army, said she went from Sudan to Libya to Italy. They filed for asylum in spring 2011. See id.
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received protection as well as one-year residence permits.33 4 They lived in
an Italian refugee center for six months, after which they were homeless.335
A nun took them in and provided temporary shelter for two months, while
they ate at soup kitchens.33 6 They learned of a house where they could live,
six adults per room. 37 Life with a small child was very difficult under these
circumstances, so they traveled to Germany, where their second child was
born, and sought protection there.338 German authorities ruled that they
should be sent back to Italy, pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, and Italian
officials agreed to take them back.339 The applicants appealed. 340
The Giessen court ruled that returning the applicants to Italy would
place them at serious risk of inhuman or humiliating treatment.3 4' In light
of the M.S.S. judgment by the ECtHR, the Giessen court examined reports
about the lack of guaranteed accommodations, the lengthy waiting lists for
residences in refugee homes, and the difficulties in accessing medical
care.3 4 2 The court noted that, in theory, health care is guaranteed to those
with residence permits, but in practice, bureaucratic restrictions and the
difficulties of establishing a permanent residence make it hard to obtain
health care. 43 Using a similar perspective, the court remarked that those
who receive residence permits have the same general rights as Italian citi-
zens, but that in reality the refugees receive no financial assistance from the
government and have to depend on seeking accommodations in government
facilities.344 The court weighed, along with these structural deficiencies, the
particular circumstances of the asylum seekers. They could not speak Ital-
ian.3 45 They were a family of four with two small children.34 6 They had
previously experienced homelessness and hunger in Italy. 47 The court con-
cluded that sending these particularly vulnerable individuals to Italy would
violate their human rights.348
334. The opinion refers to their recognition as refugees, id. ¶ 2, but under Italian law in effect at
the time refugees received five-year residence permits, those with subsidiary protection received three-
year residence permits, and those protected on humanitarian grounds received one-year residence per-
mits. See supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text (discussing Italian legislation).
335. Verwaltungsgeright (VG} [Administrative Trial Court] Jan. 24 2013, 2013 OPENJUR 5398, ¶
7 (Get.), https://openjur.de/u/601080.html (https://perma.cc/9UUE-RMET].
336. Id. ¶ 2.
337. Id. T 7.
338. They filed for protection in Germany in December 2011. Id. ¶ 1.
339. Id. $$ 4-5, 20
340. Id. ¶ 9.
341. Id. ¶ 22.
342. Id. ¶¶ 25-28.
343. Id. ¶ 28.
344. Id. ¶ 25.
345. Id. ¶ 27.
346. Id. ¶ 27.
347. Id. ¶ 2.
348. Id. ¶ 22.
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The next month the Administrative Court in Braunschweig took a simi-
lar approach.3 49 An asylum seeker had left Iran and traveled through Turkey
and Italy before reaching Germany, where he applied for asylum based on
the persecution he had experienced as a member of the Baha'i faith in
Iran. 5 0 Relying on the Dublin Regulation, German authorities ordered
him to be returned to Italy, where his fingerprints had been registered."'
He reported that he had encountered terrible conditions in Italy.35 2 He had
been kept in a reception center in Crotona, Italy, with several hundred
other refugees who were housed in containers and received only one liter of
water and one meal each day.35 3 There were three toilets and three showers
for one hundred people, and the hygienic conditions were deplorable.354
People could only wash their clothes in the showers.35 5 No heat was pro-
vided, and blankets and pillows were only available to those who paid for
them. 5 6 There were insufficient interpreters to explain the procedures. 3 "
When he received an identity card and permission to leave the center after
ten days, he traveled north to Germany, where the police stopped him.35 8
The Braunschweig court looked to the standard set by the CJEU in 2011
and inquired into whether there was a serious risk that returning the asy-
lum seeker to Italy would constitute inhuman and degrading treatment.5 9
To this end, the court reviewed information and reports concerning recep-
tion conditions in Italy submitted by the German Foreign Office, the
UNHCR, from nongovernmental organizations, and from experts. 6 0 The
court stressed that the reception conditions in Italy feature systematic
homelessness, due to the lack of capacity, the long waiting lists, and the
gap in reception between arrival and the formal registration of the asylum
claim.3 6' Noting that homelessness also occurred among those who had re-
ceived protection in Italy and that homelessness made it especially chal-
349. Verwaltungsgeright (VG] [Administrative Trial Court] Feb. 21 2013, 2A 126/11 (Ger.),
http://www.rechtsprechung.niedersachsen.de/jportal/portal/page/bsndprod.psml?doc.id=MWRE14000
0906&sc= null&showdoccase= 1 [https://perma.cc/9VG9-3PMM}.
350. Id. at 3-4.
351. Id. at 4.
352. Id. at 4-5.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 5
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 9. Rather than referring to judgement in M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, 2011-I Eur. Ct.
H.R. 255, the Braunschweig Administrative Court relied on NS. v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2011
E.C.R. 1-13905.
360. Verwaungsgeright (VG} [Administrative Trial Court] Feb. 21 2013, 2A 126/11, at 5-6
(Get.), http://www.rechrsprechung.niedersachsen.de/jportal/portal/page/bsndprod.psml?doc.id=MWRE
140000906&st= null&showdoccase= 1 (hrtps://perma.cc/9VG9-3PMM}.
361. Id. at 10-12.
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lenging to access the health system, 362 the Braunschweig court granted the
asylum seeker's petition not to return to Italy.3 63
In April 2013, the Administrative Court in Frankfurt am Main consid-
ered a complaint filed by a Somali asylum seeker challenging his transfer
from Germany to Italy, where he had previously filed an asylum claim. 6 4
The claimant had broken his leg, and the tribunal concluded that he would
not have access to adequate medical care in Italy.3 6 1 Accordingly, the court
ruled that Germany should not rely on the Dublin Regulation to send him
back to Italy. Instead, the court ruled that the claimant should be permit-
ted to pursue his asylum claim in Germany.3 66
In June 2013, the Administrative Court of Disseldorf came to a similar
decision. 67 A Kurdish asylum seeker from Iran entered Germany in No-
vember 2010 after spending one night in Italy where he was finger-
printed. 68 He filed a handwritten asylum claim in Germany, and he
challenged the decision by the German authorities to return him to Italy
pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. 69 After supplying details of his claim,
presenting documents concerning his political activity, and contesting the
appropriateness of having his application examined in Germany, he sought
judicial review. 70 The Diisseldorf court evaluated the complaint to deter-
mine whether there were systematic deficiencies in the asylum system in
Italy that would threaten the particular claimant with inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment.37t The court emphasized several factors: the asylum seeker
had not filed an asylum application in Italy; those who did file a claim faced
a several weeks or months gap before the formal registration occurred, dur-
ing which time they might be homeless; eighty percent of those returned to
Italy pursuant to the Dublin Regulation during 2011372 and 2012 were not
provided accommodations in government centers; there were long waiting
lists for accommodations and asylum seekers could not be sure they would
receive assistance from private charitable organizations; and the applicant
was particularly vulnerable to homelessness in that young men without
362. Id. at 13-14.
363. Id. at 14.
364. Verwaltungsgericht [VG) [Administrative Trial Court] Apr. 18, 2013, 9 K 28/1I.F.A. (Ger.),
https://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=9%20K%2028/11 [https://perma.cc/46JV-
8E75}.
365. Id. at 2-3.
366. Id. at 4-5.
367. Verwalunsgericht [VG} [Adminstrative Trial Court] Jun. 24, 2013, 22 K 2471/11.A (Get.),
https://dejure.org/dienstelvernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=22%20K%202471/11 { https://perma.cc/
B3S3-2XC2).
368. Id. at 2-3.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 3.
371. Id. at 7-9.
372. Of the 2,046 asylum seekers transferred under the Dublin Regulation to the Rome airport,
only 416 received accommodations. Id. at 7. In the first eight months of 2012, only twenty percent of
the 1,148 Dublin transferees received accommodations. Id.
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families were the lowest priority in terms of accommodations 373 In light of
this evidence, the court concluded that returning this individual to Italy
exposed him to a serious risk of inhuman and degrading treatment.374 Ac-
cordingly, the Disseldorf court did not sustain the order to transfer him to
Italy, and the court proceeded to examine the merits of his asylum claim. 3 75
One month later, in July 2013, the Administrative Court in Frankfurt
am Main reviewed another appeal against a Dublin transfer to Italy.3 7 6 The
Afghan asylum seeker had traveled through Iran, Turkey, Greece, Italy, and
France before arriving in Germany.377 He presented evidence that he suf-
fered from post-traumatic stress disorder and needed psychiatric treat-
ment.378 There was a dispute as to whether he had applied for asylum in
Italy. He said that he had arrived on a small boat that evaded the Italian
coastal officers, had gone to a hospital in Italy where his fingerprints had
been taken, had spoken to policemen in broken English with no interpreter
present, and had said he did not intend to remain in Italy.3 7 ' Italian author-
ities reported that in addition to providing fingerprints he had filed an
asylum application. 80 The German court pointed out that the EURODAC
database contains fingerprints of all noncitizens who illegally cross EU bor-
ders, a group substantially larger than all asylum seekers,3 8 1 and reasoned
that this evidence on its own was not evidence of an asylum claim.3 8 2 It also
noted that the Italian authorities did not submit any documents other than
the fingerprint records that demonstrated the applicant had submitted an
asylum request in Italy."" Thus, there was no evidence that Italy had pro-
vided accommodations to the applicant or granted him protection.
Turning to the applicability of the Dublin Regulation, the Frankfurt am
Main court evaluated whether there was evidence that the Italian asylum
system suffered from structural deficiencies and systemic failures.3 8 4 The
Frankfurt Administrative Court carefully examined reports by the Italian
government, by the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights,
and by nongovernmental organizations concerning reception conditions in
Italy. 8 1 The court concluded that the Italian authorities issued contradic-
373. Id. at 7-9.
374. Id. at 9.
375. Id. at 9-13.
376. Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Administrative Trial Court] July 9, 2013, 9 K 28/1 1.F.A. (Ger.),
https://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=9%20Ko2028/11 [https://perma.cc/46JV-
8E75).
377. Id. ¶ 4.
378. Id. ¶ 7.
379. Id.
380. Id. ¶ 13.
381. Id. ¶ 22.
382. Id.
383. Id. ¶ 22.
384. Id. $T 26, 44.
385. Id. T 33.
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tory reports concerning the capacity of the various shelters, 8 6 but that year
after year the Italian reception accommodations fell far below the number of
asylum seekers that Italy received.387 The insufficient capacity led to long
waiting lists,88 which, in turn, led to asylum seekers and refugees living as
squatters in desolate urban slums. 89 It also led to scenes of asylum seekers
turned out of reception centers after six months, who then slept on the
center's doorstep. 390 Those fortunate enough to receive accommodations
sometimes lived in squalid settings, where there was no hot water, water
was rationed, people slept in mattresses on the floor, prostitution was com-
mon, and criminal activity was rampant.3 91
In contrast to several 2013 rulings by the ECtHR, discussed below, the
Frankfurt court was reluctant to rely on government plans to upgrade the
Italian asylum system, stating that the promise of improvements did not
mean that the systematic deficiencies in the capacity and quality of the
accommodations would be assuaged.39 2 As to the undisputed fact that It-
aly-in contrast to Greece-has an established set of structures and recep-
tion centers, the Frankfurt court pointed out that the existence of structures
does not guarantee that inhuman and degrading treatment has been elimi-
nated.393 The court emphasized that the applicant did not need to show
that every single asylum seeker was at risk, and that it was sufficient to
provide evidence demonstrating that roughly fifty percent did not receive
the accommodations mandated by EU law.3 9 4 The court also referred to
decisions by other German courts that reported that asylum seekers re-
turned from Germany to Italy were left on their own in the transit zone at
Fiumicino airport in Rome and not provided access to the Italian asylum
system. 95 For these and related reasons, the court concluded that returning
the asylum seeker in this case would expose him to a concrete risk of inhu-
man or degrading treatment in Italy.
2. Supranational Courts
As national courts reconsidered the Dublin Regulation in light of M.S.S.
and N.S., similar challenges reached the supranational courts.396 In particu-
386. Id. ¶ 28.
387. Id. ¶¶ 28-29, 32.
388. Id. ¶¶ 33, 36.
389. Id. ¶ 37.
390. Id. ¶ 39.
391. Id. ¶¶ 41-42.
392. Id. ¶ 60.
393. Id. ¶ 61.
394. Id. ¶ 62.
395. Id. ¶¶ 68-71.
396. Early in 2013, in February, the ECtHR received a challenge to Germany's decision to send
asylum seekers to Italy pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. In Isse and Mousa v. Germany, the European
Court sent German authorities a formal request to stay the transfer of asylum seekers. Letter from K.
Reid, Deputy Section Registrar to Dominik Bender & Stephan Hocks (Feb. 13, 2013); Letter from K.
Reid, Deputy Section Registrar, to Dominik Bender & Dr. Stephan Hocks (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www
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lar, the ECtHR reviewed multiple claims challenging Dublin transfers to
Italy. Mohammed Hussein v. the Netherlands,197 Abubeker v. Austria and Italy, 398
and Halimi v. Austria and Italy399 all emphasized the inadequacy of the re-
ception conditions and asylum procedures in Italy, but the court was hesi-
tant to conclude that the Italian system fell below minimum human rights
standards and ruled against the asylum seekers in all three of these cases. 400
A year later, however, the court reached the opposite result. Three years
after the M.S.S. and N.S. judgments, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR
ruled in Tarakhel that European human rights law forbade the planned
transfer of asylum seekers to Italy under the Dublin Regulation. 40
The first step in the ECtHR's assessment of Dublin transfers to Italy
took place in April 2013 in Mohammed Hussein, in a Somali asylum seeker's
attempt to prevent the Netherlands from returning her to Italy. Samsam
Mohammed Hussein told conflicting stories about harsh treatment after an
Italian ship intercepted her boat in the Mediterranean and took the passen-
gers to Lampedusa, where they were fingerprinted. 4 02 At one point, she said
that she had been raped and that Italian authorities had left her homeless 403 ;
at another, she said she had received a short-term residence permit. 404 After
Italy supplied information that she had applied for protection in Italy, had
received shelter at a refugee center in Tuscany, had been granted a residence
permit for three years, and had received medical care during her preg-
nancy, 405 Ms. Mohammed Hussein conceded the accuracy of these details. 406
.asyl.net/fileadmin/user upload/redaktion/Dokumente/20456.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB9K-HW8N}.
The Court specifically inquired, "Which guarantees can the German Government obtain from the
Italian Government to assure that the applicants will receive a sufficient level of protection, in particu-
lar in terms of reception conditions and accommodation in Italy especially in view of the applicant's
particular family situation?" Id. This case is not discussed in the text because the record does not
indicate the response filed by Germany or the subsequent proceedings, but the Court's official query
conveyed serious trepidation about the asylum system in Italy.
397. App. No. 27725/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
118927#{"itemid":["001-118927"}} {https://perma.cc/2428-47DQJ.
398. App. No. 73874/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), http://hudoc.echt.coe.intleng?i=001-122459
[https://perma.cc/76FS-ULRJ.
399. App. No. 53852/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122454
[https://perma.cc/G65U-GM4M].
400. See infra notes 401-441 and accompanying text.
401. App. No. 29217/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
148070#{"itemid":{"001-148070"J} [https://perma.cc/76ZV-FUBK].
402. App. No. 27725/10, Eur. Ct. H.R., TT 8-11 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
118927#{"itemid":["001-118927"}} [https://perma.cc/2428-47DQ].
403. Ms. Mohammed Hussein said Italian authorities transferred her to Florence, but left her at the
railroad station and did not provide food or shelter. Id ¶ 10. She asserted that she survived by relying
on food distributed by the church, that she had no access to health care, even though she had been raped
and was pregnant, and that she had never been able to apply for asylum in Italy. Id
404. In a subsequent interview she said that Italian authorities had given her a three-month resi-
dence permit, but that she had intended to travel to the Netherlands and had not wanted to apply for
asylum in Italy. Id. ¶ 11.
405. Id. $ 23. Italian authorities reported that the father of her child was another Somali living at
the refugee center, and that she had never mentioned a rape. Id.
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Unsurprisingly, the court did not look favorably on Ms. Mohammed
Hussein's claim. Ms. Mohammed Hussein had been housed in a refugee
center, allowed to file a prompt asylum application, and within five months
of her arrival in Italy granted subsidiary protection and a residence per-
mit. 4 0 7 In these circumstances, said the court, Ms. Mohammed Hussein's
treatment in Italy did not constitute a violation of Article 3.408
Several months later, the ECtHR rejected as inadmissible two other ap-
plications contending that the return of asylum seekers to Italy would vio-
late their human rights. The first case, Abubeker, concerned a man born in
Eritrea but considered stateless when he entered Italy in 2007. Mohammed
Abubeker applied for asylum, received shelter in a refugee reception center
in southern Italy, 409 was rejected as a refugee, but was then granted a hu-
manitarian residence permit for one year.4 1 0 He left the center and traveled
to Germany, which relied on the Dublin Regulation to send him back to
Italy in April 2008.4" He then lived in a SPRAR refugee center in Italy for
one year, after which Italian authorities granted him subsidiary protection
and provided a three-year residence permit. 4 12
Mr. Abubeker next traveled to Austria where he applied for asylum in
early 2011.413 He challenged Austria's decision to return him to Italy pur-
suant to the Dublin Regulation, contending that his severe psychological
and medical problems would be exacerbated due to Italy's failure to provide
accommodations and health care for beneficiaries of protection.4' 4 The Aus-
trian authorities rejected Mr. Abubeker's challenge, and the ECtHR was
not sympathetic to his contentions. The court noted that Mr. Abubeker had
been housed on two separate occasions in Italian refugee shelters and had
been granted residence permits that could lead to employment authoriza-
tion and access to social assistance and health care.4 15 In response to Mr.
Abubeker's assertion that his mental illness undercut the Italian authorities'
view that he had voluntarily left refugee accommodations to become home-
less, the court concluded that Mr. Abubeker had not furnished evidence of
his mental state at the pertinent time. 4t6
The Halimi case, decided the same day as Abubeker, posed significantly
different facts. Nasib Halimi, an Afghan who said he had fled Taliban per-
406. Ms. Mohammed Hussein agreed that she had received accommodations, medical care, and a
three-year residence permit in Italy, but disputed other details about her case. Id. ¶ 24.
407. Id. ¶¶ 4-7, 24.
408. Id. 1 75.
409. Abubeker v. Austria and Italy, App. No. 73874/11, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 4 (2013), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122459 [https://perma.ccl76FS-ULRJ].
410. Id. ¶ 5.
411. Id. $$ 5-6.
412. Id. ¶ 8.
413. Id. ¶ 9.
414. Id.
415. Id. $$ 59-60.
416. Id. ¶ 61.
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secution in Afghanistan in 2008, had been smuggled into the EU, where he
was discovered by Italian police in 2010, interrogated, and released.4 1 7 He
did not apply for asylum, but after five days in Italy, left for Austria, where
he immediately sought asylum.4 1 8 Six months later, Austrian officials sent
him back to Italy pursuant to the Dublin Regulation.4 19 After twelve days
in Italy, Mr. Halimi returned to Austria and filed a second asylum applica-
tion there. 42 0 He alleged that the Italian police had mistreated him, that he
had been turned away from a refugee center, had been homeless, and had
subsisted on food donations from churches, but that he had not applied for
asylum in Italy. 4 21 In support of his second asylum request, he submitted
evidence concerning his medical condition, his post-traumatic stress disor-
der diagnosis, and the ongoing psychological therapy he was receiving in
Austria.4 2 2
The court noted that Mr. Halimi had never applied for asylum in Italy
and, consequently, had not been eligible to access the Italian asylum system
in his prior times there. 4 23 Instead, he had been treated as an unlawful im-
migrant and had apparently received valid expulsion orders. 4 2 4 Accordingly,
the court concluded that there was no evidence that Italy had done any-
thing in violation of the ECHR. 4 25 As to the future, Italian authorities
guaranteed that if Mr. Halimi were returned by Austria, Mr. Halimi would
be able to file an asylum claim and would have access to shelter and to
medical care. 4 26 The court acknowledged reports of "de facto obstacles to
the lodging of asylum applications in Italy"427 and of "shortcomings [in]
living conditions for asylum seekers in Italy,"428 but did not think that
these failures amounted to "such a systemic failure as was the case in M.S.S.
v. Belgium and Greece." 4 29 Accordingly, the court denied Mr. Halimi's
application. 43 0
In all three cases in which the court ruled against asylum seekers in
2013, Mohammed Hussein, Abubeker, and Halimi, the court focused on the
particular details of the individual applicant's prior experience in Italy,
none of which presented sympathetic claims for protection against return to
Italy. In two of the cases, Italy had provided the applicants with accommo-
417. Halimi v. Austria and Italy, App. No. 53852/11,Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 4(2013), http://hudoc.echr
.coe.int/eng?i=001-122454 {https://perma.cc/G65U-GM4M).
418. Id. T 4.
419. Id. T$ 7-10.
420. Id. $ 11.
421. Id.
422. Id. ¶¶ 16-19.
423. Id. ¶T 62, 64.
424. Id. ¶ 63.
425. Id. ¶ 65.
426. Id. ¶ 69.
427. Id. ¶ 68.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. IT 74-76.
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dations and with residence permits, and in the third case the applicant had
not applied for asylum in Italy. In each of the cases, the court placed great
weight on assurances by Italian authorities that they would provide special
individualized attention to the applicants if they were returned to Italy.4 3 '
For example, the court emphasized that the Italian government would re-
ceive advance notice in order to prepare for Ms. Mohammed Hussein's arri-
val, and the Italian Ministry of the Interior agreed to pay her travel
expenses from Rome to Sicily. 4 3 2 MS. Mohammed Hussein and her two
small children would also receive special priority for accommodations in the
reception system as they qualified under Italian legislation as vulnerable
persons.4 33
While these arrangements were beneficial for Mr. Mohammed Hussein
and her family, this is not the typical scenario that faces individuals re-
turned to Italy pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. To the contrary, Dublin
transferees often confront substantial obstacles when they arrive back in
Italy. If they had earlier applied for and received some form of protection in
Italy, their residence permits are likely to have expired.434 In that event,
they must file an application to renew their permission to stay in Italy, and
this requires them to travel to the appropriate provincial police headquar-
ters. There they must present their original paper permits, which many no
longer have. 3 Seeking a replacement permit can then become an even
more cumbersome process. Furthermore, if individuals returned pursuant to
the Dublin Regulation had lived in refugee shelters during their prior resi-
dence in Italy, they generally are not provided accommodations.4 3 6
Although the ECtHR's jurisprudence places on the applicant the burden
of showing systemic failings in a country's asylum system, the court ac-
corded little weight in Mohammed Hussein, Abubeker, and Halimi to reports
submitted by the UNHCR, the Council of Europe's Commissioner for
Human Rights, and nongovernmental organizations detailing longstanding
inadequacies in the reception conditions in Italy.43 7 The reports unani-
mously concluded that the reception facilities lacked the capacity to accom-
modate thousands of the asylum seekers that arrive annually, 4 3 8 a fact the
431. Abubeker v. Austria and Italy, App. No. 73874/11, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 70-71 (2013), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122459 (https://perma.cc/76FS-ULRJI; Halimi v. Austria and Italy,
App. No. 53852/11, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 69-72 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122454
(https://perma.cc/G65U-GM4MI; Hussein v. Netherlands & Italy, App. No. 27725/10, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
¶¶ 76-78 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-118927#{"itemid":{"001-118927"}1 (https://per
ma.cc/2428-47DQ}.
432. Hussein, App. No. 27725/10, ¶ 77.
433. Halimi, App. No. 53852/11, ¶ 77.
434. Hussein, App. No. 27725/10, 1$ 48, 76-77.
435. Halimi, App. No. 53852/11, $ 48.
436. Id. ¶ 49.
437. Abubeker v. Austria and Italy, App. No. 73874/11, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 41 (2013), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.in/eng?i=001-122459 [https://perma.cc/76FS-ULRJ}; Halimi, App. No. 53852/11, ¶
32-34; Hussein, App. No. 27725/10, ¶¶ 43-44, 47-50.
438. Hussein, App. No. 27725/10, ¶¶ 43-44, 46.
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Italian authorities acknowledged openly. The reports also described inade-
quate reception services for vulnerable individuals, concerns about unrea-
sonable limitations on the length of residence in some centers, minimum
subsistence standards in some of the facilities, and other troubling issues. 39
Nonetheless, the court concluded that the Italian reception conditions had
"some shortcomings," but did not show the type of "systemic failure to
provide support or facilities catering for asylum seekers . . . as was the case
in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece." 440 Italy had created a detailed asylum
structure, whereas Greece had not. The Italian reception conditions, as in-
adequate as they were, were better than the appalling reception situation
that M.S.S. faced in Greece.4 4 ,
Taken together, the ECtHR decisions in 2013 were discouraging to asy-
lum advocates. The court set a low bar in assessing whether poor reception
conditions constituted a "real risk of ill treatment." 442 The court disre-
garded reports on systemic problems in the Italian asylum system, despite
the M.S.S. legal requirement that the asylum seekers demonstrate system-
wide failures. In addition, the court was receptive to individualized guaran-
tees provided by government authorities to the rare asylum seeker who had
the resources to propel her case all the way to the court's attention. As a
policy matter, this last factor seemed especially pernicious: it incentivized
government authorities to respond favorably to a few asylum seekers who
challenged transfer pursuant to the Dublin Regulation rather than to im-
prove the basic reception conditions for all asylum seekers.
One year later, however, the ECtHR issued two judgments against Italy
in rapid succession. The first, Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece,443 focused
on the practices of Italian border authorities in ports on the Adriatic Sea.
When ferryboats arrived from Greece, Italian officials frequently placed un-
documented individuals into the custody of the ferry captains and immedi-
ately returned them to Greece.4 4 4 The individuals received no hearing of
any kind in Italy.4 45 The court ruled that Italy had violated the ECHR by
returning asylum seekers to Greece, thereby exposing them to risk of
refoulement to Afghanistan.4 4 6 The court reiterated its holding in M.S.S., 7
and insisted that the Italian authorities must perform an individualized
439. id. ¶¶ 43-44, 46.
440. Id. ¶ 78.
441. The Court also referred to recent government plans to make improvements to the reception
system. Id. ¶ 78.
442. In Halimi, the Court described its task, stating, "In order to determine whether there is a real
risk of ill-treatment in the present case, the Court must examine the foreseeable consequences of send-
ing the applicant to Italy, bearing in mind the general situation there and his personal circumstances."
Halimi, App. No. 53852/11, ¶ 57.
443. Sharifi v. Italy & Greece, App. No. 16643/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-147287 (https://perma.cc/RMD2-2QAU} (final judgment issued January 21, 2015).
444. Id. ¶ 101-04, 215.
445. Id.
446. Id. ¶ 235.
447. Id. ¶ 232.
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evaluation of each applicant before relying on the Dublin system to return
asylum seekers to another EU state.4 48 Sharifi's conclusion was important,
but hardly surprising. Italy had completely precluded asylum seekers from
access to the asylum system.4 4 9 Nonetheless, the court's re-emphasis on
M.S.S. was prescient.
Three weeks after Sharifi, the ECtHR's Grand Chamber, composed of
seventeen judges, announced a significant expansion of the court's Dublin
Regulation jurisprudence. In Tarakhel v. Switzerland, the court examined
claims by asylum seekers who had entered the Italian asylum system and
then departed for other European countries. Its evaluation of the situation
differed in both approach and result from that of the court's 2013 cases.
The Grand Chamber placed great weight on evidence concerning the over-
all asylum structures in Italy as it evaluated the asylum seekers' protests
that returning them to Italy would violate their human rights. The court
scrutinized reports submitted by UNHCR, the Council of Europe's Com-
missioner for Human Rights, nongovernmental organizations, and observa-
tions submitted by other European governments. 4 0 The court sought a
comprehensive understanding of the Italian asylum system and of the po-
tential impact of its ruling.
The Tarakhel family, two parents and six minor children,45 ' were origi-
nally from Afghanistan but had lived in Iran for fifteen years. 45 2 They ar-
rived on the coast of Italy in 2011, were fingerprinted, and placed in a
reception center for ten days.45 3 The family was then transferred to a CARA
center for asylum seekers, where they said they endured appalling sanitary
conditions, a lack of privacy, and a climate of violence.4 54 Two days later,
the family left and went to Austria, where they immediately applied for
asylum.455 Austria rejected their application and decided to return them to
Italy pursuant to the Dublin Regulation.45 6 Three months later, the
Tarakhel family applied for asylum in Switzerland.45 7
448. Id. $T 233-34.
449. Id. $$ 242-43.
450. Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1¶ 106-15 (2014), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-148070#{"itemid":{"001-148070"}} (https://perma.cc/76ZV-FUBK}.
451. Id. T 1. The youngest child was born in 2012 after the family arrived in Europe. Id. ¶ 10.
452. Id. ¶ 9. The father first left Afghanistan for Pakistan, where he married his wife, and then the
family went to Iran. Id.
453. Id. ¶ 10.
454. Id. T 11.
455. They departed the CARA center in Bari, Italy without permission on July 28, 2011, and they
were registered in Austria via the EURODAC system on July 30 and applied for asylum. Id. $ 12.
456. Id. 12.
457. Id. 13.
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Switzerland, though not a member state of the EU, '4  has a separate
agreement with the EU to apply the Dublin Regulation.45 9 Relying on the
Dublin Regulation, Switzerland rejected the Tarakhel family's asylum claim
and ordered them returned to Italy.4 60 Multiple rounds of appeals ensued,
first to the Federal Administrative Court, and then to the Federal Migration
Office, which forwarded the case again to the Federal Administrative
Court.46 1 At each stage, the court and the migration officials rejected the
Tarakhel family's contention that it would be inhuman and degrading treat-
ment to return them to Italy. 4 6 2 In particular, the Swiss court commented
that the Tarakhel family had left Italy so quickly that the Italian authorities
had not had a chance to shoulder their responsibilities to the asylum seek-
ers. 4 63 The Tarakhel family then asked the ECtHR to bar their return to
Italy.4 64
The Tarakhel family stressed four major points concerning reception con-
ditions in Italy: the delay of several weeks or months before individuals are
allowed to submit their formal asylum applications, with the consequent
risk of homelessness during that time; the woeful mismatch between the
annual number of asylum seekers and the accommodations for them; the
dismal living conditions in some of the accommodations that are available;
and the grave consequences for children consigned to centers where they
were separated from their families and exposed to a threatening atmosphere
with virtually no privacy.4 65
The Swiss government, supported by the Italian, Dutch, Norwegian,
Swedish, and United Kingdom governments, did not respond to the com-
plaint about the insufficient assistance provided during the time that
458. Switzerland has been a party to the ECHR since 1974 and is bound by its prohibition against
returning individuals to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. See Switzerland, EUR. CT. H.R.
(Jan. 2016), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CPSwitzerland-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP4Y-
X7FA).
459. Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confedera-
tion on the Swiss Confederation's Association with the Implementation, Application and Development
of the Schengen Acquis, 2008 O.J. (L 53) 52.
460. Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, Eur. Ct. H.R., $$ 15-16 (2014), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.intdeng?i=001-148070#{"itemid":"001-148070"}} [https://perma.cc/76ZV-FUBK).
The Swiss Federal Migration office interviewed the Tarakhel parents on November 15, 2011, requested
the Italian authorities to accept the Tarakhels on November 22, and formally rejected the Tarakhel
asylum application on January 24, 2012, ordering them removed to Italy. Id. $$ 14-16.
461. The Tarakhel family appealed to the Federal Administrative Court on February 2, 2012,
which rejected their appeal on February 9, 2012. They requested the Federal Migration office to reopen
their proceedings on March 13, 2012, a request rejected by the Federal Administrative Court on March
21, 2012. Id. 1¶ 17-19.
462. Id. ¶ 17.
463. Id ¶ 18.
464. Id. 20. The Chamber to which the case was originally assigned issued a preliminary stay. Id.
¶ 21. The Chamber later relinquished jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber, which proceeded to consider
the merits of the claim. Id. ¶ 5.
465. Id. $$ 57-67.
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elapses between arrival in Italy and formal application for asylum. 4 66 With
regard to the lack of capacity, the governments argued that Italy had plans
to dramatically increase the accommodations for asylum seekers 4 6 that the
UNHCR had not called for a halt in Dublin transfers to Italy, 68 and that
prior rulings by the ECtHR had not concluded that the substantial shortage
of shelters for asylum seekers constituted a human rights violation.4 69 They
argued that the conditions in the Italian reception centers must not be
deplorable enough because no EU states had suspended Dublin transfers to
Italy, 470 that the European Asylum Support Office was working to improve
reception conditions in Italy,47 and that the violent outbursts in the recep-
tion center had ended before the Tarakhel family arrived. 4 7 2 Italy contended
that asylum seeker families were not always split up in Italian facilities, "
and that special accommodations could be made for families with
children. 4 7 4
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR did not address the applicants' asser-
tions concerning initial delays in accommodations for asylum seekers newly
arrived in Italy, as the Tarakhel family had not experienced this person-
ally.4 75 Rather, the core of the court's analysis concentrated on the inade-
quate number of accommodations and the conditions of those
accommodations.4 7 6 In particular, the court emphasized the human rights
norms that require states to place special prominence on the extreme vul-
nerability of children.4 77 In assessing the accommodations, the court relied
heavily on the 2013 UNHCR report on the Italian asylum structures,478 the
2012 report by the Council of Europe's Commissioner for Human
Rights,47 9 analyses submitted by the International Organization of Migra-
tion, and various other groups' analyses. 4 0 The court acknowledged that
the parties debated the accuracy of the statistics, but noted that everyone
agreed that there were many more asylum seekers and refugees than accom-
modations,48 ' and that waiting lists were so long that most of those on the
466. Id. $$ 69, 76-77. The Italian government did comment that the average asylum procedure
took ninety-two days in 2013 compared to seventy-two days in 2012, and that efforts were being made
to expedite the process. Id. ¶ 76. This was not germane, in that the Tarakhels had complained about the
risk of homelessness at the outset, not about the length of the procedure itself.
467. Id. T$ 70, 78.
468. Id. TT 71, 79.
469. Id. ¶ 70.
470. Id. T 71.
471. Id. T 80.
472. Id. 86.
473. Id.
474. Id. ¶ 86.
475. Id. ¶ 107.
476. Id T$ 108-15.
477. Id. ¶ 99.
478. Id. TT 47, 111-12.
479. Id. ¶¶ 49, 111-12.
480. Id. ¶ 50.
481. Id. T$ 108-10.
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list had no realistic chance of obtaining the desired accommodations. 482 The
court noted that the reports and recommendations also indicated that those
who found accommodations were likely to face unduly overcrowded, un-
healthy, and sometimes violent conditions .4 83 Accordingly, the evidence in-
dicated that asylum seekers returned to Italy face serious risks of inhuman
or degrading treatment.48 4
Turning to the applicants themselves, the court emphasized the unique
vulnerabilities of child asylum seekers and the special protection obligations
governments have for children.4 85 The court reiterated the major deficien-
cies in the current reception system in Italy and emphasized the grave risks
posed to child asylum seekers.4 86 Although the Italian authorities repre-
sented that they view families with children as a particularly vulnerable
group and normally work to keep the family together in age-appropriate
conditions, 4 87 the court noted conflicting evidence concerning routine sepa-
ration of family units in some Italian cities.4 8 8 Due to the real risk that the
Tarakhel family, with their six minor children, would face inhuman or de-
grading treatment in Italy's seriously overwhelmed reception system, the
court prohibited Switzerland from returning them without first obtaining
individual guarantees that Italian authorities would provide accommoda-
tions appropriate to the age of the children and would keep the family
together.4 8 9
The Tarakhel judgment differs from the earlier ECtHR rulings concern-
ing Dublin transfers to Italy both in its prohibition of refoulement and in its
attentiveness to evidence of systemic failings in the Italian reception condi-
tions. The court was careful to note that "the current situation in Italy can
in no way be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S.
judgment," 490 but it gave credence to reports of system-wide failures in
Italy. As in the Mohammed Hussein, Abubeker, and Halimi decisions, the
Tarakhel judgment underscored the risks that specific family members were
likely to face if returned to Italy. The common thread in all of the cases is
the court's attention on the risks the specific individuals will face if re-
turned to Italy.4 91
482. Id. ¶ 108.
483. Id. $$ 111-15.
484. Id ¶ 115.
485. Id. ¶¶ 118-19.
486. Id. ¶¶ 120-21.
487. Id. ¶ 120.
488. Id. ¶ 66. There was evidence that this occurred systematically in Milan. Id. ¶ 64.
489. Id. ¶ 122.
490. Id. 114.
491. The court in Tarakhel, id. ¶ 18, however, showed less concern about the applicants' actual
prior experiences in Italy than did the courts in Hussein v. Netherlands & Italy, App. No. 27725/10, Eur.
Ct. H.R., $$ 76-78 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-118927#{"itemid":["001-118927"]}
(https://perma.cc/2428-47DQ}; Ababeker v. Xustria and Italy, App. No. 73874/11, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶
70-71 (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.intleng?i=001-122459 Chttps://perma.cc/76FS-ULRJI; and Halimi
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Furthermore, although the Tarakhel judgment reached the opposite re-
sult, it followed the earlier cases in embracing the Italian government's
willingness to construct guarantees regarding specific applicants. In effect,
this approach rewards exceptional treatment promised to a few fortunate
litigants. Asylum seekers with knowledge, resources, and good luck can
pursue multiple appeals within the national asylum system against a gov-
ernment decision to transfer them to Italy pursuant to the Dublin Regula-
tion, and, if unsuccessful, can then challenge the transfer in the ECtHR.
The Italian authorities are likely to learn of the litigation seeking to cancel
a transfer to Italy, and they have an incentive to avoid a judicial ruling that
castigates the Italian asylum system. Consequently, Italian officials will
promise special housing and other support to the litigants if they are re-
turned to Italy. While gratifying for the individuals involved, personal so-
lutions in a handful of cases should not be the benchmark for evaluating
whether Dublin returns conflict with the prohibition against inhuman or
degrading treatment. Nor should Italy be able to divert the court's atten-
tion from the systemic problems by proffering atypical government support
to a few individual asylum seekers.
In sum, the ECtHR jurisprudence in 2013 and 2014 indicate a court
initially reluctant to condemn Italy's woeful asylum shelter system. The
court was also reluctant to interrupt the functioning of one of the key EU
asylum laws. However, as the evidence of Italy's asylum crisis grew more
incontrovertible and as Italy's failure to take major steps to improve its
asylum system became more apparent, the court was compelled to apply the
analysis it developed in M.S.S. to Italy. The Tarakhel judgment acknowl-
edged that the Italian asylum system was less dismal than Greece's, but the
court nonetheless extended its non-refoulement prohibition to Italy. The
court's conclusion has serious ramifications for other European countries
with systemic failings in their asylum policies, and accordingly, places
many Dublin Regulation transfers in jeopardy.
V. THE FRACTURED EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM
As the tenth anniversary of the CEAS arrived, the M.S.S. judgment by
the ECtHR and the N.S. judgment by the CJEU exposed fractures in the
CEAS foundational principles. These judgments made it clear that some
EU member states do not provide adequate reception conditions to asylum
seekers, and they required that each individual asylum seeker receive the
opportunity to rebut the presumption that CEAS states respect fundamen-
tal human rights. Consequently, states must carefully assess each asylum
seeker's case to determine if they would face a real risk of experiencing
v. Austria and Italy, App. No. 53852/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
122454 [https://perma.cc/G65U-GM4M].
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inhuman or degrading treatment in the receiving country. Asylum seekers
must be able to appeal, or seek reconsideration, of such important decisions.
Accordingly, each transfer pursuant to the Dublin Regulation must include
the possibility of multiple assessments of the facts specific to each asylum
seeker. This defeats the Dublin Regulation's purpose of assuring rapid de-
termination of the state responsible for examining an asylum application.
The 2014 Tarakhel judgment casts further doubt on the compatibility of
the EU asylum system with human rights standards. Member states can no
longer relegate the M.S.S. and N.S. judgments to circumstances where there
is a total collapse of the asylum system, as in Greece in 2011. Indeed, the
ECtHR expressly acknowledged that the reception system in Italy was not
comparable to that in Greece, but nonetheless ruled out the Dublin trans-
fers ordered by the Swiss authorities due to "the possibility that a signifi-
cant number of asylum seekers removed to [Italy] may be left without
accommodation or accommodated in overcrowded facilities without any
privacy, or even in insalubrious or violent conditions." 4 92 Tarakhel made it
clear that serious overcrowding, lack of privacy, and unhealthy conditions
in asylum facilities can constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. This
conclusion will be applicable to multiple EU member states that have seri-
ous deficiencies in their asylum facilities and processes. Member states on
the periphery of the EU are frequently the destination of transfers under the
Dublin Regulation, and these states are among the most vulnerable to
human rights challenges.4 9 3
Furthermore, the paramount significance of the Tarakhel judgment is its
requirement of thorough individualized assessments of the suitability of the
reception conditions and the asylum structures in the receiving country
before a Dublin transfer can take place. While Tarakhel severely criticized
the Italian reception system, the Tarakhel judgment did not halt all future
Dublin transfers to Italy. Indeed, during the year after Tarakhel, the ECtHR
refused to stop the transfer of two young male asylum seekers to Italy from
other EU states.4 94 Before the asylum seekers could be transferred, however,
they had to receive careful evaluations of their unique circumstances and of
the circumstances they would likely face upon return to Italy.4 9 1 The Dub-
492. Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 120 (2014), http://hudoc.echr
.coe.int/eng?i=001-148070#("iemid":["001-148070"}} (https://perma.cc/76ZV-FUBK].
493. Even before Tarakhel, multiple national courts in EU states prohibited Dublin transfers to
Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Malta. COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 42.
494. A.M.E. v. Netherlands, App. No. 51428/10, Eut. Ct. H.R. (2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-152295 {https://perma.cc/D7S9-QL5L) (finding young able Somali asylum seeker could be
removed to Italy); A.S. v. Switzerland, App. No. 39350/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-155717 [https://perma.cc/ZPY2-LXA4) (finding healthy young man
could be transferred to Italy).
495. Tarakhel, App. No. 29217/12, ¶¶ 115-22 (requiring individual assessment).
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lin evaluation had to include the right to appeal within the national court
system and the right to petition the ECtHR.4 96
This ensures that the Dublin process will become even more time con-
suming. Evidence needs to be developed regarding the individual asylum
seeker's medical and psychological conditions, family situation, and other
vulnerabilities. Reports must be gathered regarding the capacity and sani-
tary conditions of the asylum shelters and the access the transferred individ-
ual will have to the asylum procedures. Careful evaluations and fact-specific
determinations take time and effort. They are in conflict with the Dublin
Regulation's premise that accurate assessments of which state is responsible
for determining the asylum claim can be accomplished quickly.
A. Dublin III: Amendments to Assuage Human Rights Concerns
These jurisprudential developments brought great urgency to ongoing
EU efforts to improve the CEAS, including the cornerstone Dublin II Reg-
ulation. Long before the European courts issued the judgments discussed
above, however, modifications to the CEAS were under discussion. Indeed,
as soon as the first phase of the CEAS concluded in 2005,497 the second
phase, a period devoted to assessment and improvement, began. Originally
slated to take place between 2005 and 2010, the second phase concluded in
2013, by which time five of the six CEAS laws had been revised.4 98 Its goal
was to bring into being a more fair and humane CEAS: "Asylum must not
be a lottery. EU Member States have a shared responsibility to welcome
asylum seekers in a dignified manner, ensuring they are treated fairly and
that their case is examined to uniform standards so that, no matter where an
applicant applies, the outcome will be similar." 99
The amendment process of the Dublin II Regulation began in earnest in
2008. The UNHCR and several nongovernmental organizations recom-
mended assigning responsibility for the asylum claim to the EU state where
the application was filed, but the broad consensus of EU member states
supported maintaining the general Dublin framework. 00 Calling the Dub-
496. See id. $$ 126-31 (finding that process must include close scrutiny by national authority and
ability to lodge an appeal with a body that undertakes a thorough examination and can grant an effec-
tive remedy).
497. The enactment of the Procedures Directive, supra note 36, the sixth and final element of the
CEAS, occurred in December 2005. Member states had two years, until December 2007, to transpose
the Directive into their national legislation. Id. art. 43.
498. The Temporary Protection Directive of 2001, supra note 38, has never been utilized and has
not been modified. The Recast Qualification Directive was adopted in 2011, with the effective date of
December 2013. Council Directive 2011/95, 2011 O.J. (L 337) 9. The Recast Reception Conditions
Directive, supra note 80, the Recast Asylum Procedures, Council Directive 2013/32, 2013 O.J. (L 180)
60, and the Recast EURODAC Regulation, Council Regulation 603/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 1, all
became effective in July 2015. The Recast Dublin Regulation, Dublin III, supra note 16, enacted in
2013, entered into force in January 2014. Council Regulation 604/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31.
499. Common European Asylum System, EURO. COMM'N (June 3, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/index-en.htm {https://perma.cc/58AD-42HW1.
500. COM, Int'l Protection, supra note 69, at 5.
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lin II Regulation the "first cornerstone of the [Common European Asylum
System),"1o1 the European Commission proposed a series of amendments
that tinkered around the edges. Its explicit goal was to improve the effi-
ciency of the Dublin transfer system,5 0 2 and it urged higher standards of
protection for asylum seekers subject to the Dublin procedure.5 03 To in-
crease efficiency, the Commission proposed deadlines for making and re-
sponding to Dublin requests, sharing more information between EU states
prior to carrying out transfers, emphasizing the discretion states have to
deviate from the Dublin criteria for humanitarian or compassionate reasons,
and requiring a compulsory interview of the asylum seeker to obtain infor-
mation relevant to state responsibility.o 4 To augment the protection of asy-
lum seekers, the Commission recommended providing more information
about the Dublin system to asylum seekers, guaranteeing a right to appeal
against Dublin transfer decisions, and furnishing a right to legal assistance
and translation services.50
The Commission's proposal included a mechanism for a temporary sus-
pension of transfers under the Dublin Regulation. Member states "faced
with a particularly urgent situation which places an exceptionally heavy
burden on its reception capacities, asylum system or infrastructure" could
request that states temporarily halt Dublin returns to the overwhelmed
state. 0 6 This proposal preceded the M.S.S. and N.S. judgments, but con-
cerns about Dublin transfers to member states with weak asylum systems
were already well known. 0 7 Indeed, in 2008 alone, the ECtHR issued
eighty provisional stays of transfers to Greece. 08
After five years of discussion and negotiation, during which national and
supranational courts were grappling with numerous challenges to Dublin
transfers to Greece, Italy, and other member states, Dublin II was
amended. 09 The 2013 Recast Dublin Regulation, or Dublin III, acknowl-
edged the dire circumstances that threatened the European-wide system. In
particular, the new legislation referred to the risk to human rights caused
by deficiencies in the asylum systems of EU member states. 10
Nonetheless, the temporary suspension mechanism did not survive polit-
ical negotiations. Instead, Dublin III's response to the impending crises was
501. Id. at 3.
502. Id. at 5.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 7.
505. Id. at 8.
506. Id. art. 31.
507. E.g., U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Position on the Return ofAsylum Seekers to Greece under the
Dublin Regulation (Apr. 2008), http://www.unhcr.org/482199802.html (https://perma.cc/36G8-NPJU
(advising against all returns to Greece).
508. K.R.S. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32733/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 3-4 (2008), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"docname":1"k.r.s."),"icemid":("001-90500")} [https://perma.cc/4VSC-YSMQI.
509. Dublin Ill Regulation, supra note 16.
510. Id pmbl., cl. 21.
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a cumbersome early warning crisis management system."' The European
Commission would invite member states facing crises in transferring asy-
lum seekers to "draw up a preventive action plan"512 and submit reports on
the risks "of particular pressure being placed on a Member State's asylum
system and/or problems in the functioning of the asylum system of a Mem-
ber State.""' In light of the disastrous situations identified by national
courts and the ECtHR over the past few years, this voluntary crisis plan-
ning approach is destined to be ineffectual.
Aside from the crisis management warning system, the core of Dublin III
is similar to the original Dublin system. There is a clause allowing member
states to decide on humanitarian grounds, including family and cultural
considerations, to take responsibility to determine the merits of the
claim. 14 A sovereignty clause permits a member state to examine the mer-
its of an asylum claim even if the state is not responsible under the Dublin
criteria.5 '5
In addition to preserving the core criteria, Dublin III contains several
new procedural safeguards to improve the accuracy and fairness of transfer
decisions. For example, EU states must now provide a personal interview to
every asylum seeker evaluated under the Dublin criteria,1 6 must furnish
free legal assistance if requested,517 must guarantee the right to appeal a
Dublin transfer order, 18 must allow a request to stay the execution of the
transfer order pending the decision on the appeal,519 and must provide spe-
cial protections for asylum seekers who are minors.5 20 Dublin III also in-
cludes an express acknowledgement that European human rights law
sometimes forbids transfer pursuant to the Dublin criteria, but, in those
instances when transfer is not allowed, Dublin III encourages member states
to find another member state that might have responsibility.5 21 Only if the
duty to determine the asylum claim cannot be thrust onto another member
state must the state with custody of the asylum seeker review the asylum
application. 22
Perhaps it can be considered an advance that Dublin III expressly admits
that European human rights law trumps the CEAS. This is hardly a surpris-
ing addition, however, in light of European jurisprudence. On the other
hand, the absence from Dublin III of effective tools to respond to the deep-
511. See id. art. 33.
512. Id. art. 33(1), ¶ 1.
513. Id.
514. Id. art. 17(2).
515. Id. art. 17(1). Formerly Dublin II art. 3(2). See Dublin II, supra note 15, art. 3(2).
516. Id. art. 5(1).
517. Id. art. 27(6).
518. Id. art. 27(1).
519. Id. art. 27(3)(a).
520. Id. art. 6.
521. Id. art. 3(2), ¶ 2.
522. Id. art. 3(2), ¶ 3.
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ening asylum crisis in Europe is profoundly worrisome. Dublin III's call for
drafting action plans and filing reports is not a proportionate response to
the human rights challenges that national and supranational courts have
identified. It is unclear how the Dublin III approach will cajole, encourage,
persuade, or support those member states with severe deficiencies in their
asylum systems to make substantial improvements. Furthermore, Dublin
III ignores the political realities. It is built on the incorrect premise that
member states will accurately decide when they should halt transfers to
sister states and instead take on the responsibility themselves of determin-
ing the asylum claim. The political pressure runs in the opposite direction.
Member state governments want to shrink the numbers of asylum claims
they examine. Unless they are expressly required to act, few, if any, member
states will voluntarily expand their asylum systems.5 23 Instead, they will
likely avert their eyes from the plight of asylum seekers returned to sister
states that are ill equipped to provide a satisfactory asylum process.
B. Suspending the Dublin III Regulation
Those member states whose asylum systems fall far below the standards
set forth in the CEAS are generally poor, are frequently swamped with asy-
lum seekers making their entry into the EU, and lack the political will to
treat asylum seekers as the law requires. Italy is a prime example, as is
Greece. Furthermore, there have been repeated calls to halt Dublin transfers
to Bulgaria.5 2 4 National courts have refused to apply the Dublin criteria to
send asylum seekers to Hungary,5 2 5 Poland, 5 2 6 and Malta. 5 27
523. See Ian Traynor, EU Ministers Push Through Divisive Deal To Share 120,000 Refugees, THE
GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/22/eu-governments-divi-
sive-quotas-deal-share-120000-refugees (https://perma.cclZX6V-6PX31 (describing the refusal of sev-
eral EU states to accept even small numbers of Syrian refugees in the fall of 2015 when neighboring EU
states had received hundreds of thousands of refugees provides a recent example; ultimately, the EU
voted modest quotas of refugees for each EU state).
524. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Observations on the Current Situation of Asylum in Bulgaria
(Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/534cfae69.html (https://perma.cc/3RZV-Y459; ECRE joins
UNHCR in Calling on EU Member States to Stop Sending Asylum Seekers to Bulgaria under the Dublin Regula-
tion, Euro. Council on Refugees and Exiles (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.ecre.org/component/content/
article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/555-ecre-joins-unhcr-in-calling-on-eu-member-scates-to-stop-send-
ing-asylum-seekers-to-bulgaria-under-the-dublin-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/V9YE-ETPK).
525. See, e.g., COUNTRY REPORT, Jupra note 13, at 42; Dublin: France, Suspension of Transfers, Asy-
LUM INFO. DATABASE, http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/france/asylum-procedure/proce-
dures/dublin (last visited Mar. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/YU43-3MCA) (discussing a French
administrative court suspending transfer to Hungary).
526. Netherlands: Court of Appeal Suspends Dublin Transfer to Poland, EURo. DATABASE OF ASYLUM
LAw, http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/netherlands-court-appeal-suspends-dublin-transfer-
poland-awb-1311314-art-47-charter (last visited Mar. 9, 2016) (https://perma.cc/BK6J-XACV] (dis-
cussing a Court of Appeal Decision suspending transfer to Poland).
527. See, e.g., COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 13, at 42; German Administrative Court Suspends Transfer
to Malta, ECRE WEEKLY LEGAL UPDATE (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.ecre.org/component/content/arti-
cle/64-elena-publications/95 7#German [https://perma.cc/P4M4-SG4A) (discussing an administrative
court in Minden suspending transfer to Malta due to serious defects in reception conditions and
procedures).
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Together, these developments-both the 2013 legislative modification of
the Dublin system and the human rights rulings prohibiting the return of
individual asylum seekers to states where they may face inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment-presage greater pressure on the transfer of asylum seekers
between EU states. The ECtHR requires greater scrutiny of the operational
realities in the asylum systems in Italy and other EU states along the south-
ern and eastern borders, where large numbers of asylum seekers first enter
the EU.5 28 States with custody of asylum seekers must gather thorough and
accurate reports of reception conditions in EU border states.5 29 Simultane-
ously, they must establish thorough and reliable procedures to evaluate
Dublin transfers and assess challenges to transfer orders, and they must en-
gage in individualized negotiations with the authorities in other European
states. 3 0 This multi-layered human rights approach may yield greater pro-
tection to individual asylum seekers. It will accomplish this, however, at
the expense of the CEAS. It will divert resources from examining the merits
of the asylum applications to the preliminary proceedings. Rather than
devote enormous energy to the decision as to which CEAS state is responsi-
ble for determining the asylum claim, states should deploy their efforts to
assessing accurately and quickly whether the individual applicants are in
need of asylum or other international protection.
At first glance, the current Dublin system appears massive. Roughly sev-
enteen percent of the asylum applications filed in Europe from 2008 to
2013 triggered a request that another state exercise responsibility for assess-
ing the claim."' This amounted to 300,000 requests out of 1.7 million
asylum applications.53 2 This large number of requests, however, actually
resulted in very few transfers. For example, in 2012 Germany issued 11,574
requests under the Dublin Regulation to transfer asylum seekers to other
states. 33 Of these, 3,062 transfers took place. 3 4 In Switzerland, there were
similar results, including 11,029 requests to transfer asylum seekers 535 and
4,637 actual transfers.136 Other top Dublin "sending States," such as Swe-
den, Austria, and Belgium, registered similar stark discrepancies between
the numbers of asylum seekers involved in Dublin procedures and the num-
528. See supra notes 274-299 and accompanying text (discussion of M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece);
supra notes 450-489 and accompanying text (discussion of Tarakhel v. Switzerland & Italy).
529. See supra notes 274-299 and accompanying text (discussion of ALS.S. v. Belgium & Greece);
supra notes 450-489 and accompanying text (discussion of Tarakhel v. Switzerland & Italy).
530. See supra notes 455-497 and accompanying text (discussion of Tarakhel v. Switzerland & Italy).
531. FRATZKE, supra note 19, at 6 (including data reflecting transfer requests in both EU states and
non-EU states, such as Switzerland, that have become part of the Dublin system).
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 26, tbl.A-1.
535. Id. at 26, tbl.A-3. Of the 11,574 German requests, 7,916 were accepted, but only 3,062 took
place. Id.
536. Id. at 26, tbl.A-1.
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bers actually transferred.17 Overall, only one-fifth of the transfer orders
submitted by states led to transfers.38 Thus, states invested a phenomenal
amount of energy in the transfer process, yet roughly eighty percent of the
time, energy, and financial costs of the Dublin system amounted to naught.
Furthermore, many of the member states that are most active in trying to
send asylum seekers to other states are also actively receiving and processing
requests to accept asylum seekers from other states. For example, in 2012,
among the top five states sending Dublin requests included Germany, Swe-
den, and Belgium. 3 9 Together these three states sent 23,498 transfer re-
quests, which comprised almost fifty percent of the European total. 40
During the same year, Germany, Sweden, and Belgium also were among
the top five states receiving Dublin requests. 4' Together, these three states
received almost 10,000 Dublin transfer requests. 4 2 It would be more pro-
ductive if states devoted their resources to deciding the asylum applications
on the merits, instead of processing thousands of requests to change venue
each year. This is particularly true if, as the Dublin data shows, only a small
percentage of the processed requests result in transfers.
Equally compelling, the evidence reveals that member states frequently
exchange similar numbers of Dublin requests with each other. The 2013
statistics show that Germany sent 1,380 asylum requests to Sweden, as it
received close to 1,000 requests from Sweden.1 3 Similarly, Belgium sent
355 requests to France, and in the same year received 562 requests from
France. 4 4 Sweden sent 627 transfer requests to Norway, while receiving
403 requests from Norway. 45 The transaction costs of the Dublin system
are enormous.
It does not make sense to use a system with triplicate layers of individu-
alized fact-finding. This is an inefficient use of state resources, imposes
great delays on the asylum process, and keeps asylum seekers in prolonged
suspense concerning their legal situations. That many states both send and
537. Id. at 27, tbl.A-3 (stating that of the 11,029 Swiss requests, 9,328 were accepted, but only
4,637 occurred).
538. Id. 26, tbl.A-1 & 27, tbl.A-3.
539. Id. at 11. In 2013, 76,358 transfer requests resulted in 56,466 positive responses, which led to
15,938 transfers. Id. This is a 20.8 percent success rate.
540. Id. at 26, tbl.A-1. Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland, and France together sent 39,916
Dublin transfer requests of the European total of 53,439. Id. These five states sent seventy-five percent
of the total. Id.
541. Id. Germany sent 11,574 Dublin transfer requests, Sweden sent 7,805, and Belgium sent
4,119. Id.
542. Id. at 26, tbl.A-2. Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Italy, and Poland together received 30,230
Dublin transfer requests of the European total of 53, 439. Id. These five states received fifty-five percent
of the total. Id.
543. Id. Germany, Sweden, and Belgium received roughly seventeen percent of the total. Id Italy,
with 15, 618 (thirty percent), received the highest number of transfer requests, and Poland, with 5,533
(ten percent), received the second highest number. Id. Together these five states received 30,185 or
fifty-five percent of the total.
544. Id. at 13.
545. Id.
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receive large numbers of Dublin transfer requests only compounds the
problem.
Germany's temporary suspension of the Dublin Regulation in August
2015 tacitly recognized the deep flaws of the Dublin system. 4 6 Faced with
hundreds of thousands of Syrian asylum seekers who had walked through
Greece and other countries to seek refuge in Germany, German officials
announced that they would not activate the Dublin Regulation to transfer
Syrian asylum seekers to other EU states. Germany decided to evaluate the
Syrian applicants' asylum claims, despite overwhelming evidence that the
asylum seekers lacked travel documents and had entered other EU countries
before they arrived in Germany. 4 7 The German Ministry of Interior pro-
nounced the Dublin system inefficient and burdensome.548 In actuality,
Germany had no other realistic option. Had Germany relied on the Dublin
Regulation criteria for determining which EU state might be responsible
for evaluating the merits of the asylum claims, Germany would have had to
initiate several hundred thousand individual hearings inquiring into the
applicants' identities, travel routes, mental and physical conditions, and
other particular vulnerabilities. It would have been unworkable, time-con-
suming, and demoralizing.
Furthermore, transferring large numbers of asylum seekers to Greece and
other countries on the perimeter of the EU would have run afoul of Euro-
pean human rights law. The M.S.S., N.S., and Tarakhel judgments all forbid
EU states from relying on the Dublin Regulation to send asylum seekers to
countries with systemic defects in their asylum processes. Indeed, the im-
pact of this jurisprudence came into the spotlight several months later. In
October 2015, Germany announced it would reinstate the standard Dublin
transfer procedures, but would not apply them to asylum seekers who had
entered EU territory via Greece. 4 9 Both M.S.S. and N.S. had expressly con-
cluded that the conditions for asylum seekers in Greece were so abysmal
that Dublin transfers to Greece constituted inhuman and degrading treat-
ment. Even if the Greek asylum system had improved significantly in the
four years since the M.S.S. and N.S. judgments, graphic news reports made
it clear that Greek institutions had not been able to cope with the magni-
tude of people arriving in the summer and fall of 2015.11o As a result,
European human rights law prohibited Germany from transferring asylum
seekers to Greece. Since most of the asylum seekers had traveled through
546. Id.
547. Adam Taylor, Germany's Small Yet Important Change to the Way It Deals with Syrian Refugees,
WASH. PosT (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.washingronpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/26/
germanys-small-yet-important-change-to-the-way-it-deals-with-syrian-refugees/ {https://perma.cc/
U67U-JDSL).
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Germany Reinstates Dublin Rules for Syrian Refugees, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Nov. 10, 2015), http://
www.dw.com/en/germany-reinstates-dublin-rules-for-syrian-refugees/a-18842101 [https://perma.cc/
3GDN-SUDS) [hereinafter Germany Reinstates Dublin Rules).
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Greece, Germany's formal reinstatement of the Dublin Regulation had no
impact on them.' Moreover, although Germany's reinstatement of the
Dublin Regulation did not explicitly exempt other EU states-such as Bul-
garia, Hungary, or Croatia-that asylum seekers may have transited on
their way to Germany, European human rights jurisprudence will not coun-
tenance transfers to countries with serious system-wide problems with their
asylum systems. It remains to be seen whether German officials will initiate
the individualized hearings European human rights law requires for every
asylum seeker under the Dublin Regulation.
Germany's public experiment with a modified CEAS (EU standards and
procedures, but few intra-EU transfers) heralds the future. In light of the
European human rights prohibition against transferring asylum seekers to
EU states whose asylum structures have serious systemic failings, the time
has come to adjust the Dublin system. The default position should be that
the state with custody of the asylum seeker should assess whether the indi-
vidual warrants international protection. The Dublin Regulation should
continue to apply when states ascertain transfer is warranted due to the
presence of the asylum seeker's family members in other member states5 5 2
or on humanitarian grounds.5 The Dublin transfer requests based on the
first EU country an asylum seeker irregularly entered should cease. 5 4 In-
stead, the presumption should be the same as with unaccompanied minors:
the member state where the individual has lodged an application for inter-
national protection should be responsible." Since more than ninety-five
percent of the total Dublin transfer requests are grounded on the irregular
entry provision, this effectively would constitute a suspension of the Dublin
Regulation. 5 6
Suspending the routine use of the Dublin III Regulation would result in
one fact-intensive proceeding (the merits of the claim), rather than two (the
conditions in the receiving country, followed by the merits of the claim) or
three (the conditions in the receiving country, followed by individualized
transfer guarantees, followed by the merits) evidentiary hearings. It would
achieve a measure of efficiency that the CEAS needs. It would also devote
resources to the asylum claim itself, rather than to the more peripheral
issues.
EU member states will no doubt disagree with this proposal to suspend
the routine use of Dublin III." They may argue that asylum seekers do not
551. See, e.g., Nicole Trian, Thousands of Arriving Refugees Overwhelm Greece's Island Villages, FRANCE
24 (Sept. 24, 2015), France24.com/en/20150924-greece-lesbos-molyvos-migrants-refugees-ournumber-
locals [https://perma.ccl47QP-AC65].
552. Germany Reinstates Dublin Rules, supra note 549.
553. Dublin III, supra note 16, art. 9.
554. Id.
555. Id. art. 17(2).
556. Id. art. 13.
557. Id. art. 8(4) ("In the absence of a family member, a sibling or a relative as referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2, the member state responsible shall be that where the unaccompanied minor has
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have the right to choose their country of asylum and that the current Dub-
lin system reduces "asylum shopping" and secondary movements of asylum
seekers. The appropriate response is a pragmatic one. It is abundantly clear
that under the Dublin III regime secondary movements occur in substantial
numbers. Most commonly, asylum seekers who have filed claims in Italy or
other EU border states with substandard reception conditions relocate to
states with stronger asylum systems, such as Germany, Austria, and Swit-
zerland.55 8 Indeed, the judicial opinions discussed earlier bear witness to the
secondary movements and to the human rights norms that justify the secon-
dary movements.55 '
EU states may argue that the Dublin system reduces some secondary
movements, even though it does not halt them. It is hard to gauge the
effectiveness of the deterrence that may occur, but it is clear that there are
extensive secondary movements. Asylum seekers choose destinations for
many reasons, chief among them the presence of friends and family who can
ease their entry into a new living situation. The availability of such net-
works is useful from the member states' perspective, because of the obvious
benefits of a more cohesive and supportive migrant community. Member
states' worries that asylum seekers choose destinations based on benefits
that are more generous or more expansive notions of asylum have not been
empirically confirmed.5 60 Moreover, the magnitude of the flows of asylum
seekers in 2014 and 2015 have made it clear that these concerns can only be
addressed in a serious fashion if there is a truly common European asylum
policy. Asylum law should be applied uniformly across the EU. It will take
substantial political will and transfer of resources to the weaker EU states to
make that happen. It will also require common action by EU states in face
of the current humanitarian crisis. The September 2015 EU Council deci-
sions to relocate asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other EU states
were an important first step. Further collective responses are necessary.
In the meantime, the costs of the current Dublin Regulation's approach
to transferring individuals back to countries through which they first en-
tered the EU are extremely high. The stark fact remains: more than eighty
percent of the asylum seekers involved in Dublin procedures in 2012 never
were transferred.5 6' Surely, member states would have had a net savings in
financial and institutional resources if they had simply decided those asy-
lum applications on the merits. Furthermore, EU states that exchange
lodged his or her application for international protection, provided that it is in the best interests of the
minor.").
558. See FRATZKE, supra note 19, at 8-9 (citing 2013 statistics on the different bases for Dublin
requests).
559. See, e.g., Mother Angela: Merkel's Refugee Policy Divides Europe, DER SPIEGEL (Sept. 21, 2015),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugee-policy-of-chancellor-merkel-divides-europe-a-105
3603.html [https://perma.cc/WDT4-4JKR).
560. See FRATZKE, supra note 19, at 13-15.
561. See id.
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roughly the same number of transfer requests with each other should decide
the substance of the asylum claims before them, rather than engage in the
Dublin procedure. That would be both sensible and cost-efficient.
Furthermore, the Dublin Regulation currently imposes significant other
costs-both financial and moral-on the asylum authorities in member
states. European human rights law effectively requires multiple claims and
court challenges if Dublin III continues to apply as written. 56 2 The Tarakhel
judgment will lead to amplified efforts to negotiate individualized guaran-
tees to protect specific asylum seekers subject to transfer requests. This ap-
proach is likely to undermine efforts to repair and improve unsatisfactory
reception conditions. Rather than using resources in the most efficient and
effective manner to make system-wide improvements to the accommoda-
tions and services provided to asylum seekers, the receiving states will di-
vert their energy and funds to respond to individual cases awaiting transfer
from sister states. Expending so much energy in responding to a series of
somewhat random individual crises will undermine efforts to carry out sys-
temic upgrades.
Most importantly, we must not forget the human suffering of individuals
caught in lengthy, drawn-out preliminary stages. These more serious costs
are the hardest to quantify. The losses and dislocations experienced by vul-
nerable people and fragile families are often overlooked. This is doubly
ironic since the experience of suffering, persecution, and other serious harm
impelled many to seek refuge in the EU in the first place. Reducing the
time, anxiety, and redundancy that the Dublin system imposes would bring
the European asylum system more in line with its fundamental purpose:
protecting those in need of international protection. As the European Com-
mission proclaimed:
The ultimate objective [of the CEAS is] to establish a level play-
ing field, a system which guarantees to persons genuinely in need
of protection access to a high level of protection under equivalent
conditions in all Member States while at the same time dealing
fairly and efficiently with those found not to be in need of
protection.5 63
CONCLUSION
The CEAS has not yet achieved its goal of establishing equivalent condi-
tions in all member states. Until the wealthier EU states transfer substan-
tial funds and other support to help poorer and less developed states build
562. See, e.g., Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, Denmark Wants to Become "A Little Bit Less Attractive" to
Refugees, NPR (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/01/25/464300740/denmark-
wants-to-become-a-little-bit-less-attractive-co-refugees [https://perma.ccl568X-YPJE}.
563. See FRATZKE, se/pa note 19, at 11.
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satisfactory asylum systems, asylum conditions will remain grossly uneven,
and asylum seekers will flee the inadequate and inhumane conditions they
encounter.16 4 Collective action to respond to the humanitarian crisis is nec-
essary, but the political will to transform the existing CEAS into a truly
common European asylum system does not currently exist. Accordingly, the
EU must respond to the contemporary situation. The EU should acknowl-
edge that the minimum standards approach adopted by the CEAS has re-
sulted in uneven and, in some cases, inadequate asylum systems. European
human rights law demands that the Dublin III Regulation take cognizance
of this reality. Dublin transfers for family reasons or humanitarian grounds
should continue, but otherwise Dublin transfers should be suspended. A
system in which the state where the asylum seeker files an application ex-
amines and decides the merits of the claim would be more efficient and
more humane.565
564. M.S.S., supra notes 274-299 and accompanying text, and Tarakhel, supra notes 450-489 and
accompanying text, require individualized hearings concerning the particularized claims of the asylum
seekers concerning their treatment if returned via the Dublin Regulation, and the Dublin III Regula-
tion requires asylum seekers to receive free legal assistance, personal interviews, right to appeal a Dublin
transfer, and the right to request a stay of a transfer order. See Part V.A., supra notes 492-496 and
accompanying text.
565. Commission Green Paper on the Future Common European Asylum System, at 2, COM (2007) 301
Final (June 6, 2007).
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